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ABSTRACT

After long decades of estrangement since the establishment of the republic, the Arab
policy of the AK party manifested visible changes that broke up with the state
establishment mindset by underlining a sort of rapprochement on the regional level. This
study aims to identify and understand the political and economic aspects of the Turkish
policy towards Arab countries by according specific attention to Syria that constitutes for
the current Turkish leadership a prototype for the Turkish policy towards its neighbors
notably Arab countries. By taking account of the context within which these changes in
the policy formulation occurred, the power structure model presents the analytical tool
that enabled this study to explain how the new elitist configuration that was bourgeoning
since the 80’s in the Turkish society reconsidered the formulation of the Turkish foreign
policy tenets in light of the domestic and international conditions. In addition to the
various literature dealing with the ruling elite socioeconomic structure and their evolution
on the political scene in Turkey, the contributions provided by various respondents,
addressed by a questionnaire, from the ruling party, the opposition, academic scholars
and journalists about the current elite’s cognitive map in terms of perceiving Arabs and
addressing them highlighted different reasons for the changes in the Turkish Arab policy.
By relying on the literature and the respondents’ reactions, the Arab policy of Turkey
since 2002 seemed to be controversial since it not only concretizes Turkey’s national
interests but also contributes to the empowerment of the its role as a regional actor that
seeks a permanent presence and influence on the international level.
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I. Introduction
The Arab policy under the rule of the AK party constitutes the central interest in our
study. After long decades of normalization between both Turkey and Arab countries,
psychological barriers and ideological disparities distanced them from each other and
disabled the development of a strong course of relations. Therefore, our research departs
from a surprising observation which is the visible rapprochement initiated by Turkey with
the different Arab countries starting from 2002. The breakdown with the mutual
estrangement that dominated their relations for decades and the development of visible
and intense interaction in various fields of cooperation increased our attention.
Since the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923 till the 1990’s, the Turkish elite
were dominated by an ideological determinism that marked their domestic and foreign
policy throughout these seven decades1. The pursuit of a wide-ranged process of
modernization on the national level aimed to reshape the nation’s identity on a Western
model that breaks up with the historical legacy. This modernization wave extended to the
Turkish diplomacy that was mainly formulated through the exigencies of world politics.
The domestic instability and the vulnerability of the Turkish territorial integrity oriented
its foreign policy towards a consistent alignment with the West2, especially the United
States. There was a dominating concern to consolidate the Turkish sovereignty on it
territories notably after the First World War I that compelled Turkey to follow a
modernizing path. Accordingly, the rapprochement towards the west through secularism
and the rupture with the ottoman past formulated the traditional/secular elite identity and
self perception.
Turkey supported an American intervention in different Arab countries like Lebanon
in 1957 and in Iraq during its revolution which crystallized an explicit antagonism. The
Arab policy was marginalized in the Turkish foreign policy and was formulated in light
of the western-Turkish alliances exigencies in the region.3 A clear indicator of such
antagonism was the Turkish-Syrian confrontation as a result of an armament treaty that
was signed by the Syrian regime at the time with Czechoslovakia in 1955 in reaction to
the Bagdad pact (Jung and Piccolo, 2001). In spite of the Turkish derogation from that
6

alignment in the 1960’s and the 1970’s, Turkey developed a line of conduct that was
mainly focused on the consolidation of its partnership with the United States and Europe
without manifesting a similar pattern with other regional and neighboring countries. After
the Cypriot crisis in 1963 where Arab countries voted in the United Nations for the Greek
side, Turkey started to revisit its conduct towards Arab countries. Such reconsideration
was considered as a necessity in light of the American position that didn’t support the
Turkish stance towards Cyprus while opposing its military intervention and protection in
the island. In the 60’s and the 70’s, Turkey deviated from its pro-western conduct in the
region by refusing to open its military bases for the American and Israeli forces at the
time of the 1967 and the 1973 wars (Hale, 2000). Besides, protection and different types
of aid were provided from the Turkish side to Syria in addition to the diplomatic support
for the resolution 242 concerning the retreat of the Israeli forces to the 1967 borders. In
these two decades, the relations with Israel were minimized at a low level of diplomatic
representation that only started to be strengthened at the 90’s in light of the Kurdish
threat emanating from the national and the regional levels (Karaoglu, 2007).
However, these positions were taken in reaction to a Turkish resentment towards its
western allies since it wasn’t accompanied by a structural change in the Turkish foreign
policy or in the elite’s cognitive map. The traditional elite were mainly constituted of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military that had a dominant position on the secular
ruling parties in terms of formulating a cautious and neutral policy towards Arab
countries. The traditional elite constituted a minority that occupied the center of the
decision making process while alienating the public and the conservative actors that were
kept in the periphery in terms of influence and power share (Onis, 1997). This elite’s
perception towards Arab countries didn’t evolve in parallel with the mentioned changes
that occurred in the 60’s and 70’s. Turkey adopted a nationalist stance regarding the
water issue towards Syria and Iraq, two downstream countries that were badly influenced
by the construction of the Keban dam on the Euphrates in 1964. By refusing to recognize
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as international waters, the equal partition principle,
advocated by Syria and Iraq, was refuted by the Turkish side that emphasized water
sharing and then efficient management as the main solutions for this trilateral problem
7

(Karaosmanoglu, 1983). The water issue was considered as a matter of sovereignty in
which Turkey shouldn’t comply with its neighbors’ demands in terms of constructing
dams that were necessary for different development projects in Turkey. Besides, the
Turkish elite created a sort of link between the water crisis issue and the Syrian support to
the Kurdish separatist groups by considering the Kurdish card as a pressure tool deployed
by Syria against Turkey.
In light of the binary division of the world order into two antagonist ideological blocks
and the rise of some nationalist exacerbation on the national scene where the Kurds and
the Islamists were portrayed as the first enemies of secular Turkey, the Arab-Turkish
relations would be normally perceived as problematic. Being part of the historical legacy
that reflects lateness and superstition for modern Turkey, the Arab countries weren’t
among the priorities of the Turkish foreign policy. The cultural and the religious
identification that were formulated and regulated by the state in conformity with the
modernization process were still dominating in different Arab countries which incited
Turkey to distant itself till the consolidation of its nation building. The construction of a
strong national identity in a Western style was not only a domestic priority but also an
exigency that influenced the Turkish foreign policy till the 1990’s. Therefore, the Turkish
policy in the Middle East was formulated in terms of its national interests in alignment
with the West which was clearly manifested in the 1930’s and 1950’s with the Saadabad
and Baghdad Pacts4 that were denounced by many Arab countries.
On the other hand, the communist threat was another factor that marked the Turkish
attitude on the international level since the Soviet Union made claims on the Turkish
north eastern territories and the leftist parties had a strong presence on the national scene
that was marked by frequent confrontations between leftist and rightist groups which
disturbed the government stability and led to a military intervention in 1980. The
decolonization process that affected the Arab countries created a nationalist repulsion of
the liberal ideology and eased their integration into the socialist camp that was mainly
distrusted by the Turkish elite at the time.
This estrangement between Arab countries and Turkey persisted throughout long
decades although there were some moments of interaction especially on the economic
8

level in light of the Western embargo imposed on Turkey in the 1970’s5 and the
European rejection of the Turkish candidacy to join the EU in the late 1980’s. The
economic level was approximately the domain that visibly flourished in the 1960’s,
1970’s and 1980’s where Turkey started to import natural resources like oil and gas from
Arab neighbors as well as Iran. However, on the political level, both sides didn’t manage
to develop a consensus on several issues due to the aforementioned reasons related to the
disparities in their respective ideological identification within the bipolar systemic
configuration that kept both sides apart. In light of these observations, the rapprochement
between Turkey and the Arab countries raises many questions in terms of motivations
and future expectations from both sides especially the Turkish one.
In 1983, Turgut Ozal, the head of the leading party of the center right, The Mother
Land Party-Anavatan Partisi (ANAP), started a rapprochement with Arab countries on
the economic and political levels but it was an incomplete attempt due to the political
divisions on the national scene and the deterioration of Ozal’s health which ended with
his death in 1993. Therefore, the Turkish-Arab relations were still frozen since the main
psychological barriers and factual problems weren’t discussed seriously and explicitly
between both sides. Ozal’s religious affiliations and his deployment of a conservative
discourse coated in a pragmatic view didn’t manage to break the ice between Arabs and
Turks. The antagonism reached its peak in 1998 where Turkey mobilized its military
troops on its common borders with Syria in an attempt to deter the Syrian support to
separatist groups’ militants like the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in terms of providing
shelter, logistic assistance and training. The political transition between 1998 and 2002
didn’t achieve a lot in terms of pacification; however, a strong willingness of
rapprochement was manifested by the head of the governmental coalition at the time,
Bulent Ecevit to start a new policy towards Arab countries while nothing was
materialized in terms of improving the mutual relations.
In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AK party) gained a parliamentary
majority and acceded to power with a pragmatic agenda while manifesting a tendency
towards the preservation and the promotion of the cultural and religious values in the
Turkish society that were marginalized by the state establishment. The Party’s members
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were busy at the first three years in consolidating their roots and liberal character on the
national and the international scene. Hence, there was an attention accorded to the
completion of the European Union membership candidacy and the fulfillment of the
required conditions in order to adopt the “acquis communautaire” in the legal and
institutional dispositions in Turkey. The military was at first a challenge that has to be
monitored so that that party won’t be compelled like the previous conservative and
Islamic parties to resign or to be prohibited from political participation by the
constitutional court. Different liberalizing reforms were adopted which emphasized the
modern and pragmatic appeal of the party and allowed its sustainability till nowadays.
By strengthening its domestic and international basis, the party started to materialize
its ideological premises in the Turkish foreign policy by according an importance to the
regional surroundings including Arab countries. The willingness to reconsider the
Turkish approach towards Arab countries was manifested by the party’s leaders whose
speeches underlined a tendency towards enhancing the Turkish Arab policy. An active
Turkish role was manifested within various tribunes like the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and the Arab League where some sessions and forums like the Turkish-Arab
Cooperation Forum6 were mutually held by both sides and where Turkey expressed its
concerns for Arab countries and how their destinies were tied to each other in the region.
The mutual problems between both sides like the psychological impasse, the territorial
disputes and water management issues were relegated and more emphasis was accorded
to the intensification of economic and commercial exchanges as well as the political
consultation on the bilateral and multilateral levels about the most important issues in the
region like the peace process and the Middle East stability. In light of this evolution in
the Arab policy formulation that was not sufficiently treated by scholarly studies, the
motives and the expectations for such an intense rapprochement in comparison with the
past decades deserve to be deeply investigated and explained. Besides, the current
Turkish elite’s discourses underline an explicit sympathy for the Arab world by referring
to it with an emotional lexicon that goes beyond a simple rapprochement to solidarity. As
a result, we decided to formulate our research question as follows:
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Why is the Arab policy of Turkey that visible and what are the relevant changes that
were introduced into this policy in comparison with the one adopted by previous ruling
parties? In other terms, what enabled Turkey to launch such a rapprochement by a series
of concrete measures and what expectations does it draw on such a rapprochement?
By observing the Turkish modern history, we remarked that the Arab policy of Turkey
was subordinated to the Turkish Western paradigm7 in terms of its relations with the
West. Therefore, most of the interactions that occurred between Turkey and Arab
countries were motivated either by the importations of some necessities like raw
materials and alimentary products or by the disturbance of its alignment with the West.
The Turkish resentment towards the US opposition to Turkey’s nationalist claims on
Cyprus in the 1960’s and the Western condemnation of the human rights violation
committed by the military establishment towards Kurds which contributed to the
European rejection of the Turkish candidacy in 1989, incited Turkey to adopt an open
policy towards Arab countries. As a result, two remarks would be inferred: in these
periods of tension between Turkey and the West, the former improved its relations not
only with Arabs but also with the Soviet Union which might indicate the absence of any
specificity for a particular rapprochement with Arab countries at these moments.
On the other hand, the Turkish conduct towards Arab countries in these periods was a
sign of normalization and not a rapprochement8 since all other countries develop such a
pattern of relations with Arab countries in terms of importing raw materials and asking
for their political support in the different international institutions in relation to certain
issues of concern. The increase and the diversification of the Turkish economic relations
that took place in the 1980’s was under the exigencies of the liberalization and
stabilization program imposed on Turkey by the IMF which compelled the state elite to
diversify foreign relations and benefit from the existing potentials in various partners
notably Arab countries. Here again the specificity is denied.
Under the rule of the AK party, the Arab policy of Turkey seems to be approached
in a different way. First, the AK party’s leaders took the initiative to materialize their
speeches on various levels of cooperation by the creation of a series of institutions and
partnerships to regulate the bilateral and multilateral relations in different economic and
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political domains. The creation of the High Council of Strategic Cooperation and a free
trade zone with six Arab countries as well as a Turkish-Arab cooperation forum on the
ministerial level within the Arab League in 2008 underlines a remarkable shift in the
Turkish policy in the region especially towards its Arab neighbors. Second, the
ideological framework “the Strategic Depth Doctrine” laid by Davutoglu, the Turkish
foreign minister, expresses specificity for Arab countries in the region. This doctrine by
being based on the investment of the ottoman legacy and its rediscovery through the
different innovative and creative principles of the new foreign policy vision which are
balancing between freedom and security, multidimensionality, proactivism, relations’
diversification and the consolidation of areas of priorities and common interest, rhythmic
diplomacy as well as zero problems with neighbors manifests an additional turning point
in the Turkish-Arab relations.
This turning point seemed to have alleviated to a considerable extent the
psychological barriers that impeded their rapprochement and froze their relations in a set
of stereotyped ideas that marked for long decades their mutual perception. For balancing
between freedom and security, Davutoglu listed this principle as the first tenet of the
Turkish foreign policy by emphasizing how Turkey’s active regional policy wouldn’t
have been concretized unless its national authorities protect their citizens’ security
without undermining their civil liberties and rights. This principle is important since it
provides the basic platform for the Turkish activism in the region in terms of legitimacy
towards the neighboring countries which enables Turkey to have a considerable zone of
influence on the regional level. Concerning multidimensionality, it refers to the
establishment of simultaneous and proportionally equal relations with all countries in the
region and on the international scene which breaks with the Turkish foreign policy’s
traditional centrality accorded to its alliance with the West. Besides, this term emphasizes
the notion of complementarity in the Turkish foreign policy where Turkey adopts a
consistent attitude that harmonizes its various and diversified relations.
In addition, proactivism is a term that underlines the Turkish willingness and readiness
to take the initiative towards the different events that occur in the region as well as in the
world in order to either contribute to the resolution of a potential crisis or to collaborate
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in ensuring peace and stability with its neighbors and the international community around
the world. On the other hand, relations’ diversification and the consolidation of areas of
priorities and common interest in the Turkish foreign policy refer theoretically to the fact
that Turkey tends to multiply its relations with its neighbors and other countries around
the world while according an equal priority to all of them. This principle is justified by
the existence of areas of interests between Turkey and the different countries which
deemphasizes bilateral conflicts and underlines the importance of each partner Turkey
deals with due to the existence of common interests for both sides.
Besides, according to the strategic depth doctrine elaborated by the current Turkish
foreign minister, a rhythmic diplomacy refers to Turkey’s ability to develop an active and
outreaching diplomacy through its presence in various regional and international
organizations. Turkey has an observer status in the African Union and created the
Turkish-Arab Forum in addition to hosting numerous meetings that involved a wide array
of countries in order to discuss important issues like the Iranian nuclear program, the
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the Afghani-Pakistani dialogue. As for the zero
problems with neighbors, this principle depends mainly on the adoption of a
rapprochement policy towards neighboring countries based on trust and cooperation
through the intensification of economic and diplomatic relations within a framework of
mutual respect of states’ sovereignty.
Third, while Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe particularly Greece were
accorded some importance in the Turkish foreign policy in the late 1980’s and 1990’s,
Arab countries didn’t have any priority on the Turkish agenda except for some
antagonistic issues related to the Kurdish threat and water partition. Consequently, the
attention given to Arab countries nowadays seems to illustrate a sort of specificity since
such an attention didn’t exist before. Accordingly, the change in the Turkish perception
towards Arab countries underlines this specificity in light of the new foreign policy
dynamics that manifest a paradigm shift adopted towards the different countries on the
external level.9Turkey’s diplomatic conduct is based on the adoption of soft power tools
regarding the different issues of contention while abandoning the security approach that
favors the recourse to violence and force in intimidating antagonist states. Thus, although
13

the Arab countries are addressed by this paradigm change, their relations with Turkey
don’t seem to be subordinated to the Turkish Western line of conduct. A sort of
autonomy is on its way of development and manifests itself on the political level
especially in light of the AK party’s differences with Israel.
Fourth, the regional condition and the disorder perpetrated by the Iraqi invasion in
2003 is a serious situation that complicated the Middle East politics and shed light on
further areas of coordination between Arabs and Turks where the former appeared as
partners with whom Turkey can collaborate to stabilize the region. Within the Iraqi
Neighbors Initiative meeting that was held in Istanbul in 2007, Turkey signed an
agreement with Arab countries for institutionalizing relations and creating the Turkish
Arab Forum (Davutoglu, 2008). Besides, the Iraqi war raised the Turkish interest in the
Middle East especially in light of the existence of the economic constituency of the AKP
that is engaged in the Iraqi reconstruction efforts like TUSIAD and MUSIAD as well as
the Turkish local businessmen working in Gaziantep and Diyarbakir (M. Altunisik,
personal communication, 2011).
Again, this dimension underscores the perceptual factor and how Turkey perceives
Arab countries and vice versa which is a major element of specificity in the Turkish-Arab
relations. Therefore, it would be illustrative to determine how Turkey managed to
develop such autonomy in world politics in terms of keeping equal distances in its
relations with the different countries including the US which led to a visible activism
towards Arab countries in spite of the American reserves on its relations with Hamas,
Hezbollah and Syria. Hence, even if this autonomy is favored by the prosperous
economic situation and the achievement of a sort of domestic stability regarding the
Kurdish issue as well as the fall of the Soviet Union, it underlines a notion of partnership
with Arab countries. Accordingly, the emergence of the common historical and religious
legacy broke up with the Turkish exclusive identification to the Western bloc that
resulted in a sort of superiority in the previous elite conduct towards Arabs.10 On the
other hand, we have to take into consideration that regionalism gained a central focus in
the Turkish elite’s agenda.11 In spite of the interest accorded to neighboring countries in
the 1980’s and especially in the 1990’s, the regional dimension has more implications in
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the Turkish foreign policy under the rule of the AK party. The incomplete experience that
started with Ozal didn’t manifest the same magnitude of influence and concretization as it
is nowadays.
Regionalism was a partial reform undertaken in the foreign policy dynamics in the
1980’s and 1990’s since it was manifested on the economic level only. However, under
the rule of the AK party, regionalism started to entail further levels of cooperation in
terms of economic, political and societal interactions that are intermingled together on the
elite’s agenda in the Turkish external conduct. The elite change and the ideological shift
are underlined in this new foreign policy paradigm where the AK party by manifesting a
different posture than its predecessors developed a new perception of foreign policy and
started to materialize it with different partners like Arab countries. Therefore, our main
research question will tackle the Arab policy of Turkey from 2002 till now by focusing
on the arrival of the AKP to power as a turning point and the regional juncture, notably
the Iraqi invasion, as an important contextual change that favored the implementation of
this elite’s foreign policy paradigm that presented a better understanding towards Arabs.
Limiting our study to this contextual framework will help in defining the major changes
that occurred in the Arab policy of Turkey and the reasons for introducing new
behavioral patterns especially on the political and the economic levels.
The implications of the Iraqi war and the regional disorder it resulted in has primarily
affected the regional intra-relations including Turkey’s formulation of its Arab policy.
The Iraqi invasion was detrimental to the Turkish national interest from two interrelated
perspectives. First, the institutionalization of an independent Kurdish region in Northern
Iraq crystallizes a national security dimension related to the exacerbation of the Kurdish
separatist tendencies in the Turkish South Eastern region that is heavily populated by
Kurds. On the other hand, the vacuum of power left in Iraq after the institutional
dissolution undertaken by the American interim governor has considerable repercussions
on the regional balance especially between Turkey, Iran and Israel. In order to cope with
these regional challenges, Turkey preserved its security-based national interest
conception that was no longer achieved through an antagonistic approach towards
neighbors, notably Arab countries, but within a comprehensive and inclusive policy
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based on the institutionalization of collective action mechanisms on the regional level
like the Turkish Arab Cooperation Forum and the High Level Strategic Cooperation
Council (Davutoglu, 2008).12 Hence, Turkey’s security is no more confined to its national
borders but it is more widened in terms of being tightly related to the regional stability
and well-being. Therefore, Turkey has to solve not only its problems but also the
different sources of disturbance on the external level by integrating the entire region into
formal networks of dependency through the visa abolition, the free movement of people,
goods and services and the multilateral consultation mechanisms. Due to the wide scope
of the manifestation of the changes in the Turkish policy towards Arab countries, it
would be better to emphasize these transformations by providing an analysis of the
Turkish policy towards Syria since 2002 as an empirical support to the study of the Arab
policy of Turkey under the AK party’s rule.
Our choice of Syria as an illustrative case study for the changes in the Arab policy of
Turkey is justified as follows. First, the Turkish-Arab relations entail significant
evolutions on various levels of interaction. Accordingly, Syria as a neighboring country
will underline the paradigm shift in the Turkish foreign policy since the geographical
contiguity made Syria an important partner for modern Turkey since its establishment in
1923 till nowadays. Therefore, by relying on Syria, we will have a wide historical
background that portrays in details the interactions that occurred on the economic and the
political levels as well as the evolution of Turkey’s approach towards various areas of
contention like the Kurdish issue, water management and territorial disputes. Second,
Syria is one of the most important countries for Turkey in the region due to the various
problems that culminated by the military mobilization on the common borders in 1998
which impeded Turkey to develop normal relations with Arab countries. Third, by
adopting an autarchic policy on the political level and by having a stagnant economy that
was unable to develop through an effective liberalization policy, Syria was isolated by the
West particularly the United States that is still the main strategic partner of Turkey.
Therefore, the Syrian case will identify how Turkey managed to adopt a sort of an
autonomous policy towards Arab countries without undermining its unchanging priorities
and alliances with the West. Fourth, through the Turkish policy towards Syria, it would
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be easier to identify the Turkish expectations from changing its Arab policy in terms of
gains and benefits on a wider scope of action that might exceed the regional level. The
Turkish engagement into a wide array of entrepreneurial projects with Syria helps to
some extent to lessen the Syrian alienation and favors its integration into the world order.
Moreover, the AK party’s figures illustrate the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation as a
prototype and a starting point that would be emulated to other Arab countries.
Consequently, in spite of the strategic importance of other Arab countries like Egypt and
Iraq, the focus on Syria will be more effective and direct in terms of indicating the
changes in Turkey’s foreign policy in general as well as in its Arab policy since 2002.
In light of this research background, our hypothesis in response to the main research
question would be as follows:
Changes in the Turkish policy towards Arab countries through the improvement of
mutual relations on the economic and the political levels and the contribution to regional
conflicts’ settlement result in a better position for Turkey on the regional and the
international level notably towards its Western allies like the US and the European
Union.
In other words, Turkey, by developing economic and political relations with Arab
countries is trying to widen the areas of mutual interests that would constitute an
infrastructure for better relations. This betterment is beneficial for Turkey since the idea
of the mutual exploitation of economic and political potentials in the region would
relegate differences by avoiding their discussion and deemphasizing their centrality.
According to the AK party’s intellect, the increase of mutual interests will give no chance
for the emergence of new areas of contention and will reduce the importance and the
magnitude of the existing antagonism that will be overwhelmed by cooperation.
However, Turkey’s agenda is not confined to the Middle East, it has a geographic
position that is surrounded by important regions other than the Middle East and it is also
a strategic partner for some global actors like the United States.
Therefore, by managing conflicts with Arab countries and increasing mutual reliance
by initiating economic projects, Turkey would decrease regional inequalities and reduce
the sources of disenchantment and violence. Besides, the liberal paradigm adopted by
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Turkey on the political and economic levels would be emulated to Arab countries which
would increase Turkey’s importance for the West as a key actor in the region. Moreover,
the energy sector which is accorded an important place in the Turkish foreign policy
would render Turkey as an energy hub between Europe, the Middle East and Central
Asia. Different projects in the energy sector were initiated by Syria and Iraq and most of
them are planned to be designed in a way to enable the oil and natural gas distribution to
Europe and Central Asia. Accordingly, Turkey would enhance its economic and financial
situation in the region and would emphasize its importance for the West especially the
European Union. By having good relations with Arab countries and increasing the areas
of cooperation in strategic issues like energy, Turkey would use Arab countries as a
pressure card on Europe in the negotiations for accession to the European Union. Since
the Arab policy of Turkey entails various dimensions like the European security, the
decrease of migration and the promotion of liberal values like democratization and free
markets in Arab and central Asian countries, it would enable Turkey to become a
strategic and reliable partner for Europe even if it couldn’t institutionally join its union.
On the other hand, the reconsideration of the Arab policy would enable Turkey to
counter some regional rivals like Russia and Iran which pursue a competitive policy with
Turkey to ensure their share of energy in the Middle East and Central Asia. Such
assertive agenda adopted on the regional level would be not only a maneuver to protect
the Turkish interests in the region but also a leverage for pressuring the European Union
either to accept Turkey as a member country or to be faced to the reality of a regional
leader that empowers its neighbors against the West by developing an agenda that looks
for marginalizing the US and EU’s interests in the region. The EU’s inability to take a
firm decision about Turkey’s membership request sheds the light on many speculative
scenarios about Turkey’s orientation towards another pole of interest that would be a
regional leadership protecting its own area of influence. The various resources in the
Caucasus, the Middle East and the Newly Independent States in Central Asia could be a
puzzling research issue especially in light of the political role that Turkey develops
towards solving these regions’ problems which can confirm the aforementioned concerns.
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In order to answer the research question, it will be important to highlight how the Arab
policy is formulated in comparison with the other different external partners in the region
in two parts. In light of the aforementioned manifestations of the Turkish policy towards
Arab countries since 2002, the first part will focus on examining the mains factors that
led to these changes in the Arab policy as well as the context and the tools of its
implementation on the regional level. In light of the paradigm shift that illustrates new
approaches towards soft power, the arrival of the AKP and the emergence of conservative
economic actors constitute the main reason of changes in the foreign policy formulation
due to the ideational background that they shared with Muslim and Arab countries.
Therefore, this part will consist of examining the Arab policy of Turkey as a branch of
the Turkish foreign policy since 2002 in order to identify the changes it manifests in
comparison to the mainstream policy adopted by the previous ruling parties in terms of
ideological shift and tools of implementation on the international and the regional level.
Accordingly, it would be illustrative to indicate how the domestic changes in terms of the
emergence of a new configuration of constituency, the elite change and the institutional
balance on the national level would design the Turkish foreign policy’s orientations and
priorities especially towards Arab countries. The second part will examine the changes in
the Turkish policy towards Syria and how these changes are manifested in the bilateral
relations through intensive economic cooperation and political consultation. On the other
hand, this part will try to show the importance of the rapprochement towards Syria for
Turkey in terms of its position on the regional and the international scene as well as its
effect on the Middle East pacification.

A. Literature Review
Most literature developed by Arab scholars that tackled the Turkish policy towards
Arab countries since 1930’s focused on the analysis of the Western dimension of the
Turkish attitude on the domestic and the international scenes as the main cause of the
ideological and psychological barriers between Arab countries and Turkey. On the other
hand, many of the Turkish scholars’ literature mainly before 2000’s emphasized the
security approach in the analysis of the Turkish attitude towards its areas of contention
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with Arab countries. Besides, a third type of literature was developed about the paradigm
shift that occurred in Turkey’s foreign policy in general and was reflected in its Arab
policy by relying on empirical studies and elite statements that were analyzed by various
scholars specialized in the Middle Eastern region including Turkey and the Arab world.
Accordingly, we decided to rely on a historical review that combines all these studies in
understanding the evolution of the Turkish foreign policy in terms of its orientations and
tools of implementation as well as the different approaches that were adopted towards
external issues especially towards Arab countries.
This review is going to be narrowed by giving more attention to the Turkish foreign
policy in the 1990’s. The choice of this point of time is relevant since it marked the
emergence of political Islam as an influential actor on the domestic scene especially in
light of its arrival to power in 1996. Besides, in the 1990’s, the world order started to
change due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the communist
ideology. Therefore, by considering the Turkish foreign policy starting from the end of
the bipolar system, the world structure and the ideological strives won’t constitute an
impediment but a favorable context for the amelioration of the Arab policy of Turkey.
Moreover, in the 1990’s, Turkey has already started to manifest some changes towards its
regional surroundings by according an importance to them especially on the economic
level. Thus, by reviewing on the literature elaborated on the Turkish foreign and Arab
policies in 1990’s, we will be able to focus our analysis to the reasons of the changes that
occurred in the Turkish external conduct.
Most of the Arab scholars tackled the evolution of the Arab policy of Turkey by
adopting a defensive approach13 in their analysis of the Turkish national and foreign
policies. Scholarly studies dating from 1930’s to 1990’s accused Turkey of rejecting its
Islamic identity while launching an aggressive nationalist policy on the national level
(The Center of the Arab Unity Studies, 1995). The Kemalist elite adopted a repressive
modernizing policy that curbed the religious groups’ influence in national politics while
manipulating the evolution of religion on the social level by creating a directorate of
religious affairs “Diyanet” that formulated an adaptive version of Islam the promotes
modernization (Lee, 2009). Accordingly, the military is the secular shield that maintained
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the secular character of the state while impeding the emergence of any religious
identification on the national scene. Not only the religious schools were closed but also a
comprehensive legal and educational system was promoted in a way that empowers a
social cultivation in line with the secularization process (Nur Al Din, 1997).
In addition to the development of a conspiracy theory as an explanatory framework
for secularization in Turkey, the Western orientation advocated by the Kemalist elites
was considered as the turning point that drove Turkey away from Arabs. By considering
Ataturk and many of his surrounding groups in the military apparatus as Jews who hid
their real identity and converted to Islam in order to prove their loyalty to the Sultan14,
many Arab scholars expressed a sense of disdain towards secular elites in Turkey while
emphasizing an Arab superiority (Salt, 1989). Many scholarly writings elaborated by
Turks where Arabs were referred to as inferior creatures and Turkey as a superior nation
that constitutes an integrative part of the West were translated by many Arab and Western
scholars which contributed to the increase of the psychological gap between Arab
countries and Turkey (The Center of the Arab Unity Studies, 1995). Besides, the Western
orientation adopted by Turkey on the external level and its alignment with the US and
many European countries contributed to the misperception of the Turkish state that was
considered as a Western ally that implements a Western agenda in the region. Therefore,
the Saadabad and the Bagdad pacts were boycotted by some Arab countries since they
were perceived as imperialistic tools deployed in the region.
On the other hand, the Turkish-Israeli relations constituted a considerable problem in
the evolution of the Arab policy of Turkey. In light of the Turkish recognition of the
Jewish state, it was the first Muslim nation to take such step which constituted an
additional rupture between Turkey and Arab countries. In spite of the Turkish opposition
to the Israeli aggressions that were undertaken against Arab countries in the 1950’s and
1960’s as well as its support to the PLO and the inauguration of its delegation
headquarter in Istanbul in 1976, Turkey was still misperceived and suspected by Arab
countries (The Center of the Arab Unity Studies, 1995). However, the Turkish-Israeli
relations were pragmatic and went through various fluctuations (Bengio, 2004 and
Karaoglu, 2007). Therefore, they weren’t clearly manifested except in the 1990’s,
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especially with the strategic alliance in 1996, in order to deter Syria and Greece from
their support to the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. Besides, Turkey had
recourse to such an alliance as a result to the European and American embargo imposed
on Turkey since they contested the usage of their imported weapons against Kurdish
citizens. The Israeli and the American factors in the Turkish foreign policy weren’t
permissible by many Arab countries that persisted till the 1990’s to perceive Turkey as an
opportunistic country that acts on the behalf of a Zionist and American agenda (Nur Al
Din, 1997). This conspiracy theory nourished the Arab misperception towards Turkey
and it was endorsed in the Arab scholarly writings in the 1990’s after the second Gulf
War that was launched by an international coalition against Iraq after its annexation of
Kuwait. In 1991, Turkey participated in the Operation Provide Comfort especially in
Northern Iraq where the Kurdish elements of the PKK found safe haven since 1983. The
military participation with the international coalition in bombarding northern Iraq till the
1997 increased the Turkish-Arab antagonism (Ataman, 2002).
Although Turkey had considerable economic relations with Iraq as well as with
different Arab countries, the security approach based on power politics and the recourse
to violence in the realization of national interest was detrimental for Turkey in its
relations on the regional level (The Center of the Arab Unity Studies, 1995). This
approach reached its peak in 1998 when Turkey mobilized forces on the common borders
with Syria and threatened to go into war with it unless it stops its support to the PKK and
other terrorist elements. This suspicious perception from the Turkish side started to
change in 2003 when the Turkish parliament opposed the participation in the Iraqi
invasion (Hale, 2007). Moreover, the arrival of the AK party to power was another
element of enchantment in many Arab countries which perceived it as a positive
transformation in the Turkish national politics that would have favorable repercussions
on Arabs. Although the Islamic legacy of the AK party was the main reason for such
welcoming, it didn’t have the same effect for the ANAP and the Welfare party that had
Islamic roots and deployed a religious rhetoric. The ANAP created a coalition with
various Islamic elements in Turkey in order to enlarge their constituency and support to
power.
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Therefore, the religious rhetoric was coated in a conservative and ideological lexicon
in order to appeal to Islamic groups and increase the probability of their success (Yilmaz,
2007). Most of this rhetoric was implicitly displayed in its public discourse since the
party manifested a pro-Islamic stance that advocated for more religious freedom for the
pious citizens. Accordingly, the Islamic rhetoric deployed by the ANAP was limited to a
national scale for a specific objective which is gaining in elections. Moreover, this party
has the same security and conservative approach in dealing with external issues by
having recourse to power. On the contrary, the Welfare party led by Erbakan deployed an
explicit and visible Islamic rhetoric based on the Just Order slogan that is not only
confined to the national level but also encompasses the Islamic world (Onis, 1997).
However, this rhetoric was authoritarian in its character in terms of underlining a Turkish
leadership that would reinvest its ottoman legacy negatively perceived by many Arab
countries.
The AK party as the heir of Erbakan’s party deployed a pragmatic discourse that
didn’t explicitly rely on a religious rhetoric that is not always positively received by Arab
countries. In addition to its refusal to participate in the Iraqi invasion, the success of its
experience on the national level in terms of economic development and political openness
increased the Arab countries’ admiration especially on the public level (Hale, 2000).
Starting from 2002 and after the Iraqi invasion, Turkey deployed pragmatic tools of
action in the region while making discourses that emphasize the importance of Arab and
the Muslim countries. The diplomatic activism that Turkey implemented under the rule of
the AK party gained to include the different regional partners and create areas of mutual
interests especially in terms of according importance to some Arab concerns like the
Palestinian issue, the Israeli-Syrian talks and the Iranian nuclear program (F. Houaidi,
Personal communication, 2011).
Concerning the Turkish studies led about the security approach towards the
different issues of contention in the region especially with Arab countries, most of them
were justified by the world order and instabilities on the domestic level. Therefore, some
scholars emphasized the vulnerability of the Turkish national scene especially on the
economic and political levels as the main reason for adopting the conservative and power
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politics approach on the national and the external levels. The resistance that the Kemalist
elite faced on the domestic level from the Kurds as well as the Islamic movements
“tariqat” forced the military to adopt repressive mechanisms against these elements by
having recourse to force (Zubaida, 1996 and Yavuz, 1996 and Onis, 1997). Besides, any
attempts to infiltrate into domestic politics by Islamist groups were interrupted by a
military intervention that is supposed to preserve the national cohesion of the newly built
state. Most of these scholars indicated that Turkey was vulnerable and weak since the
beginning of its creation. The series of treaties signed with several European countries in
the 1920’s and 1930’s underline such vulnerability. Most of these treaties were the means
by which Ataturk managed to preserve the territorial integrity of Turkey and counter
many regional rivals and ethnic groups from attacking Turkish lands since they had
claims on many of its territory (The Center of the Arab Unity Studies, 1995).
In addition, Western secularism was illustrated as the dominant state ideology that
preserved the country and enabled it to lessen the Western worries and suspicion about
Turkey’s intentions as the descendant of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, this ideology
had to be preserved by two dynamics; the first consists of repressing any internal attempt
to defy that order and the second is the alignment to the Western block on the
international level (Aydin, 2000; Ates, 2003 and Karaosmanoglu, 1983). Consequently,
the national scene was dominated by a secular elite and the military whose power was
ensured after the 1960 coup d’état where Menderes was executed due to his adoption of
some pro-Islamic policies that violated the Turkish constitution.15 This coup d’état led to
the creation of the national security council that is an instance dominated by military
figures who are supposed to deliberate and have the final say on the main politics
undertaken by the government on the national and the international levels in order to
preserve the national unity (Yavuz, 1996). Accordingly, the army intervened through the
1971 and 1980 coups d’état as a result of the political and economic instabilities that
reigned at the time in addition to the last military coup in 1997 called the post modern
coup where the Welfare party was compelled to resign due to its Islamist rhetoric and
anti-secular activities for which the constitutional court decided to close the party and
prevent Erbakan from politics for five years (Koker, 1995 and Onis, 1997). Therefore, the
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recourse to power and the repression of the outlawed groups was the persistent
mechanism deployed by the military to preserve the country’s stability and secular
character.
However, these power politics dynamics were alleviated by the adoption of the
harmonizing legal package by the Turkish parliament since 1999 under Ecevit’s rule.
This reform aimed to conform the Turkish legal structure and mechanisms to the acquis
communautaire in order to start the accession negotiations (Aydin and Acikmese, 2007).
These reforms ensured more freedom for the minority groups especially the Kurds and
enabled them to express their rights and culture publicly. In addition, the military power
was also undermined by these reforms since the military interventions exhibited clear
violation to the democratic rule which would harm Turkey’s accession to the European
Union. Furthermore, the pursuit of these reforms under the rule of the AK party
contributed to the redesign of the National Security Council whose prerogatives and
competencies where reduced and its members according to the reforms ought to be in
their majority civilians. As a result, the domestic scene manifested a paradigm shift and
an institutional balance which impeded the pursuit of the security approach and replaced
it by a liberal one that deploys political and economic means to resolve any problem that
would erupt on the national level.
On the international level, the same logic of the domestic power politics would apply
especially towards Arab countries. The Kurdish problem wasn’t unique to Turkey since a
large Kurdish population lives in Syria as well as in Iraq. Turkey wanted to curtail any
Kurdish influence since any changes in one of these two countries with regard to Kurds
would stimulate the PKK movement and threaten Turkey’s security (James, 2009). As a
result of the no flight zone regime established in Northern Iraq that is heavily populated
by Kurds, Iraq wasn’t able to maintain its authority on it which made this area a safe
haven for many separatist Kurds (Hale, 2007 and Tokel, 2006). Therefore, Turkey
launched several continuous air and land raids against the PKK elements in Northern Iraq
till 1996 where a treaty was signed under the auspices of the United States where the
Iraqi Kurds representatives agreed to manage this issue by abandoning any coalition with
PKK elements and refusing to receive them (Ertem, 2006; Gurkan, 1999 and Brown,
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2007). On another occasion, in 1998, Turkey was ready to launch a war against Syria as a
result of its support to Kurds (Soysal, 2001 and 1991; Saruhan, 2003). In 2003, some
military troops went through the Turkish-Iraqi borders and launched attacks against the
PKK elements especially in light of the US promise to grant them an autonomous rule in
Northern Iraq (Park, 2007 and Altinsik, 2005).
Starting from 2005, Turkey developed a series of free visa regimes and free trade
agreements with Syria and Iraq as well as Lebanon and Jordan. This approach of
liberalizing the commercial exchanges between the neighboring countries contributed to
the elimination of a lot of risks to Turkey’s integrity by being an effective alternative to
hard power in dealing with the regional threats that emanate from neighbors through the
intensification of common interests especially in trade and economic benefits.
Accordingly, in spite of the autonomous regime granted to Kurds and the persistence of
the PKK movements in Turkey, the intensification of the economic and commercial
relations with Iraq presented an opportunity for overcoming these problems in light of the
benefits that such exchanges provide for both sides. On the other hand, the development
of energy projects by the creation of natural gas and oil pipeline that links Syria to
Europe and Central Asia through Turkey relegated any prospect of conflict and
misperception between Syria and Turkey (Iskit, 1996 and Demir, 2010).
Regarding the literature treating the paradigm shift in the Turkish foreign policy,
the interconnectedness between the national and the external scenes was underlined by
scholarly studies too (Robins, 1989). Accordingly, the end of the ideological polarization
on the international level enabled Turkey to pursue an autonomous foreign policy
especially towards Arab countries. The absence of the ideological division in world
politics allowed Turkey to develop a further autonomous policy that is not only confined
to the consolidation of the Turkish ties with the West but also aims to develop its
relations with its regional neighbors while preserving its main interests and strategic
alliance with the European Union and the United States (Keyman, 2009 and Kramer,
2000). Therefore, the regional dimension emerged in the Turkish foreign policy and
gained a lot of significance in terms of realizing the Turkish interests (Robins, 2006).
Hence, many cooperation treaties were signed with East European countries, Central
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Asian republics as well as Arab countries. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and
Shanghai Cooperation Organization are visible example of the importance of the regional
dimension in the Turkish foreign policy (Ulusoy, 2002). By being member in both
organizations, Turkey started to develop economic relations with its neighborhood in an
attempt to achieve a better management and realize a strong economic position in the
region (Nazchamani, 2003; Jung and Piccolo, 2001).
This regional dimension that started by the economic cooperation was highlighted in
Davutoglu’s book about Turkey’s strategic depth where he emphasized how Turkey
would invest its central position by rediscovering its historical and cultural legacy with its
neighborhood in order to exploit all the existing potential for the benefit of the region
(Davutoglu, 1998). Therefore, the idea of regionalism underlines the interdependence and
the connectedness that exist between Turkey and its surrounding regions due to historical
and cultural ties. By constituting a wide geographical contiguity, the ex-Ottoman space is
a vital area where all regions have the same destiny which implies the necessity of
deploying cooperative and regulative mechanisms between Turkey and these different
countries (Murrison, 2006 and Oguzlu, 2007). As a result, the ideological vacuum in the
foreign policy’s intellect after the end of the binary structure of the world incited for the
invention of a new idealism that Turkey would pursue in order to preserve its national
interests (Kirisci and Rubin, 2002).
However, this idealism requires new tools and a new approach that is different than
the conservative one that was deployed by Turkey on the national and the international
scenes. Such exigency implied the use of soft power in order to achieve peace and
stability in the region through the different pillars of the Turkish diplomacy advocated by
Davutoglu. (Davutoglu, 1998). This intellectual paradigm developed by the current
Turkish foreign minister was considered by many scholars as the turning point in the
Turkish foreign policy where new dynamics, orientations and tools are manifested. As a
result, the tactic that was used by Turkey regarding its surrounding threats especially
those emanating from Arab countries especially Syria and Iraq in terms of supporting the
Kurdish militants and providing them a safe heaven on their own territories was
substituted by a diplomatic activism deployed by Turkey with different Arab countries
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like Syria and Iraq. The free trade agreements and the bilateral and multilateral
consultations with Arab countries dominated the Turkish policy since 2005 till nowadays
(Demir, 2010). Therefore, these areas of cooperation on the economic and political levels
enabled Turkey to widen its common interests with these countries which would reduce
any prospect of war and impede the reemergence of the Kurdish issue as a threat in their
relations.
In order to identify the changes in the Turkish approach towards Arab countries under
the current ruling party in comparison with its predecessors, we will rely on literature that
focus on the Arab policy of Turkey starting from the 1990’s. In spite of the liberal
atmosphere that started to emerge in Turkey in the 1990’s and the end of the bipolar era
that enabled some parties to start a regional policy, many problems impeded its visibility
(Marcou, 2009 and Jenkis, 2008). In addition to the Kurdish factor, the Turkish
neighborhood was marked with various areas of contentions. Accordingly, the water
difference with Syria persisted in the 1990’s and the mutual agreements that sometimes
included Iraq in order to agree on the water management process didn’t succeed in ending
the problem. Hence, the negative consequences from the development projects
undertaken by Turkey in its South Eastern parts undermined the Syrian and the Iraqi
interests for long decades especially in the 1980’s and the 1990’s.
The Syrian dependence on its water resources in its economic activities and urban
development compelled it to support the PKK elements as well as Armenian extremist
groups that were used as a pressure card on Turkey in order to incite it to change its
position towards the Syrian claims in water rights by sheltering them in Syria and
Lebanon and giving them training and financial support (James, 2009 and Soysal, 2001).
Besides, in spite of the Islamic identification of the ruling party at the time, the Welfare
party that refused the Turkish alliance with Israel, the army was still powerful to impose
such alternative in order to counter the aforementioned threats and substitute the
European rejection of the Turkish membership negotiations. In 1998, Turkey caught
Ocalan, the head of the PKK, with the support of Israel and threatened Syria to wage a
war against it if it doesn’t stop harboring the PKK elements. Our focus on the 1990’s is
important since it indicates the occurrence of a turning point in the Turkish system in
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terms of political liberalization while the AK party was still in a process of creation under
the leadership of Gul after it broke up with the Virtue party (Kramer, 1999). In addition,
it is the period of time where the repercussions of the EU reforms started to be manifested
into a visible change on the domestic scene on the socioeconomic and political levels.
The visible activism in the Turkish foreign policy especially with the arrival of the
AKP to the power can be interpreted in light of the socio-economic booming that the
country testified from the mid 1980’s till nowadays (Yilmaz, 2007 and Onis, 1997). The
transformation of the domestic context in terms of security and liberalization paved the
way for the introduction of new non-state actors who developed their own business and
integrated the national economy thanks to liberalizing efforts (Onis, 1997). These new
actors have ambitious economic plans about establishing larger companies and
corporations that would extend their activities beyond the national borders. Accordingly,
the eruption of the domestic scene with multiple private actors with particular
expansionist agendas paved the way for their inclusion in the foreign policy formulation
especially in issues related to economic and business relations as well as to cooperation in
the energy sector with external countries and neighboring ones (Wolf, 2000). Most of
these middle ranged companies called “the Anatolian Tigers” were essentially from
Central Anatolia and their leaders had a conservative and religious background. The
economic shift undertaken by the state in the 1980’s favored the emergence of these
companies that constituted the economic backbone of the Islamic and conservative
parties. In 1990’s, an industrialist and businessmen association was created under the
name “MUSIAD” and regrouped most of these small and middle ranged organizations
(Yilmaz, 2007).
Most of the owners of these companies were politically and economically
marginalized by the secular elite and they were negatively affected by the urbanization
process that left numerous inequalities in the society. Therefore, once the state decided to
step back from the economic activity and give the opportunity for the individual
initiatives to manage Turkey’s economy, these marginalized groups started to create
mutual solidarity and develop their economic corporations by having their own marketbased industry parallel to the traditional business class. Besides, many elements from
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these groups participated in politics and constituted a considerable electoral support for
conservative and pro-Islamic parties like the center right, the Welfare and the AK parties.
Empowered by the links that they have with the AK party, many of these private business
actors started to multiply their business in the neighborhood where they created private
companies in Central Asian countries, Russia as well as different Arab countries which
started to host many of these private businesses16 (Wolf, 2000; Demir, 2010 and Fuller,
Lesser, Henze and Brown, 1993). This socio-economic turnover let some political
analysts to assume that the multiplication of commercial and financial relations between
Turkey and Arab as well as Muslim countries is tightly related to the party’s identity and
the emerging conservative business class that encourages promoting a broad scale of
economic activities with Islamic countries (Mason, 2000 and Bozagioglu, 2008).
In addition, this liberalizing tendency is supported by a large and wide research
centers and think tanks that started to promote ideological basis for this accelerating
liberalization in the foreign policy by providing the theoretical framework and analyses
that justify the establishment of more commercial and financial relations with
neighboring countries including the Arab ones (Alacakaptan, 1998). The AK party was a
unique political actor with an Islamic background since it started to adopt a pragmatic
discourse that is no longer based on the religious and the ideological rhetoric (Somer,
2007). Accordingly, it aimed to reformulate the Islamic stance into a moderate and
pragmatic one that tries to satisfy the public demands which incited the party to rely on
think tanks’ reports and researches in order to identify the public needs and tendency in
elections (Ghanim, 2009). As a result, the AK party’s rationale manifested by the
pragmatic discourse laid the foundations for the adoption of a better foreign policy
especially towards Arab countries (Evin, 2003).
In light of these changes, some journalistic speculations shed light on the
development of some policies which tend to favor Islamic countries. Accordingly,
Turkey’s initiatives started to be motivated to manifest a sort of a regional regulatory
dynamic based on the multiplication of its initiatives towards neighboring countries like
the Arab ones (Jenkis, 2008 and Murrison, 2006). On the other hand, the staunch position
taken by AKP’s leaders especially Erdogan against Israel shown in its official public
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declarations underlines, for some analysts, a revisionist dynamic in the Turkish foreign
policy that looks for not only a simple regional management but also a distinguished
position with an Islamic character on various levels (Cilek, 1999; Demir, 2010; Iskit,
1996). In the 2000’s, multiple agreements have been signed with different Arab countries
with which Turkey had the opportunity to establish strong connections that were
consolidated by its opposition to Israel and its readiness to be a regional shield against its
aggressive attempts. This Islamic appeal in official declarations is perceived as a political
maneuver in empowering the Turkish interests in the region especially after the
destabilization that occurred in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion and the emergence of
the Iranian role as a regional power (Metinulu, 2009).
On the other hand, many prominent figures of the ruling party endorsed some
international theories in the formulation of the Turkish foreign policy like economic
interdependence by creating a circumstantial analogy between the region’s countries and
the European ones’ experience in the attainment of their union (Murrison, 2006). Hence,
Davutoglu, the Turkish foreign minister appointed to office since May 2009 keeps on
stressing the necessity for establishing an economic interdependence in the form of a
regional integration that would empower the mutual relations and decrease any
probability of resorting to war. In spite of giving the economic factor a leading position in
reconciling the different countries together, the AKP leaders promoted the idea of
common interest as a solid basis for mutual understanding, assistance and solidarity in
facing threatening challenges (Oguzlu, 2007). Thus, this openness can be related to a
democratization process where more freedom was given to some local communities
especially in light of the binding conditions that were set to Turkey to join the European
Union (Ozcan, 2008). Accordingly, Turkey chose to abandon its security-based approach
in its foreign policy and adopt the liberal one in dealing with the critical regional issues
that deeply affect its interests. The paradigm shift in foreign policy in terms of
abandoning conservative and military solutions towards threats can be considered as the
main reason for the expansion of the scope of action towards various regions and
countries as well as the diversification of the domains of interaction with them (The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000).
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Hence, the Turkish foreign policy is no more a reactive one that depends in its
definition, design and implementation on the conservative military approach that
developed a defensive pattern in response to threats. On the contrary, foreign policy
issues turned to be a public matter, a disclosed process where several interest groups are
interacting in carrying out the different phases of the policy making regarding major
external affairs. It is more a dynamic and proactive process that is involved in several
domains of interests all over the neighboring regions in order to openly pursue its vital
interests. This remarkable change led to a visible activism that takes part in the
formulation of foreign relations affecting national interests instead of just relying on
conservative projections and preventive violent and repressive solutions (Aras, 2009).
One of the manifestations of the paradigm shift in the Turkish foreign policy towards
Arab countries would be the mediation efforts that the ruling party deploys visibly and
permanently between many antagonistic countries in the region in order to reconcile them
(De L’Etang, 2009). This capacity relies on Turkey’s credibility that it acquired by
having good and equidistant relations with different parties in the region (Alacam, 1995
and Alantar, 2002). Accordingly, Turkey acted and still acts as a mediator between
regional belligerent countries like Syria-Israel since 2008, the different Palestinians
factions since the parliamentary elections held in January 2006 that led to the arrival of
Hamas to the power and Iraqi factions since the Iraqi war in 2003 and contributed to the
settlement of the Lebanese presidential crisis. In addition to these mediatory efforts,
Turkey tries to develop an active conduct in its foreign policy that would give it a central
role in the region especially on the political and the economic levels including the energy
sector. This conduct is mainly based on the involvement of the AKP’s officials in the
different disruptions that would occur in Turkey’s neighborhood based on the integrative
Turkish identity that is inclusive to several cultural and ethnic dimensions which imposes
on Turkey the responsibility to intervene in settling regional insecurities.
In light of the Turkish reconsideration of its position and its geopolitical and vital
space of action in foreign policy, its dynamic diplomacy doesn’t usually stop at its
surrounding regions but extends to the international scene (Hale, 2000; Jung and Piccolo,
2001; Kirisci and Rubin, 2002). Accordingly, Turkey is developing a mediating dynamic
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between its regional countries that are considered by the West as radical and revisionist
countries like Syria, Iran as well as Hamas from one side and the Western countries like
the US and the European Union from the other side. These reconciliatory efforts are
necessary for the regional stabilization and the confirmation of the Turkish presence in
the critical issues that can directly threaten its vital interests (The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2000). Turkey as a secular country with a long experience of nation
building process that tries to some extent to conciliate between its Western basis and its
important Islamic legacy can play this mediatory role between countries in the Islamic
world and the West. The ruling party’s identity and the regional disorder paved the way
for Turkey to lessen the gap between both sides and enhance understanding by promoting
democratic and liberal values. This position has been recently reaffirmed by some AKP
leaders like Erdogan who emphasized the importance of Turkey’s mediation in
stabilizing the region.
Besides, in “the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations” promoted by both Erdogan
and the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero, the Turkish role was conceived as a symbolic
representation of the Islamic world that would be ready to rectify any negative
presumptions and ideas about Islam (Nis and Bali, 2008; Oguzlu, 2007). Besides, this
initiative highlighted the Turkish new complex role as an active Muslim country that can
invest its multicultural Islamic heritage17 in its liberal premises on the political and the
economic levels. In addition, the Turkish position in Lisbon in the occasion of the NATO
summit in 2010 where Turkish diplomats refused the direct and explicit condemnation of
Iran reemphasized this symbolic role. The inability to explicitly consider Iran among the
regional threats by the NATO members was perceived as a diplomatic success for Turkey
who indicated its refusal to condemn any of its neighboring countries (Zaman, 2010).
Such a position could be considered as an indicator of a shift in Turkey’s policy
especially in light of the discourses that refer to religious appeal that support the different
Islamic countries vis-à-vis some Western condemnations. The same position was
manifested in the Iranian nuclear issue when the US wanted to impose sanctions on Iran
and Turkey intervened as a mediator to convince Iran to adopt a more flexible alternative
that would enable it to develop its peaceful program without incurring sanctions.
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Therefore, Turkey participated in the Iranian-Brazilian agreement on the enrichedUranium in a way that conforms to the IAEA proposal (Zaman, 2010).
On the other hand, in order to determine the theoretical framework of this study, a
comprehensive review was made on the literature that treated the different approaches
adopted in the foreign policy analysis. Generally, foreign policy is considered as the
continuation of the national politics beyond the state borders by other means and hence in
its analysis, the same tools of examining the policy-making dynamics of domestic politics
are deployed (Hill, 2003). Accordingly, it would present a wide array of tactics adopted
by the regime in reaction to the opposition (Hudson, 2008). As a result, the ruling elite
may discard the opposition in foreign policy-making by ignoring its criticism and
refusing to react to it or by adopting different direct and indirect tactics in order to gain a
domestic support on a specific issue of concern. Some of these tactics include rewards
and punishments, the underestimation of the opposition arguments, forming alliances and
disorienting the public attention towards a popular foreign policy concern (Hudson,
2008).
Generally, Foreign policy analysis aims to understand the different decisions made by
actors who are deciding either singly or within a group regarding their state’s strategy and
approach towards foreign governments (Smith and Al., 2008). This field is mainly based
on three paradigms in analyzing the actors’ decisions which are the decision-making
approach (Synder and Al., 1954 and 1963), the different theories of foreign policy
elaborated by specialists in International Relations (Rosenau, 1966) and the interaction
between actors and their context of decision-making on the national and external level
(Sprout, 1956). Therefore, this discipline explains foreign policy in terms of decisions
and behaviors that emanate from actors in light of their references and theoretical
background (Smith and Al., 2008). Accordingly, it relies on various analytical levels in
explaining actors’ behavior by focusing on information about the national actors, their
interaction with the context of decision-making, the development of causal relations by
having recourse to social science theories and the attribution of a similar attention to the
decision-making process and the decisions. Thus, foreign policy analysis is based on the
actor-specific theory in explaining and providing an in-depth analysis about the decision34

makers’ behavior. Besides, nation-state has traditionally occupied a primordial level of
analysis in terms of identifying the determinants of an action that concretizes a dual
nature that stems from the interaction between internal and external factors that influence
decision-making (Synder and Al., 1954).
However, foreign policy analysis lacked the existence of a general theory that
encompasses the different analytical levels in which it is interested. It seems as a
discipline that provides tools for a fragmented analysis of different determinants in
foreign policy making without including them into a comprehensive framework that
could be confronted to the different empirical studies (Rosenau, 1966). As a result,
Roseneau and Snyder pleaded for the mobilization of a middle range theory that would
deploy the different analytical tools borrowed from social sciences in order to adapt the
foreign policy analysis to the complexity of the real world. Various cross analysis levels,
multi-causal and multilevel tools of analysis that incorporate information from different
disciplines would provide an accurate study of the policy-making reality by combining
the different influential parameters in policy-making into one comprehensive study.
Another contribution to this field was developed by Harold and Margaret Sprout who
underscored the importance of the study of the psycho-milieu and the context that
surrounds policy-makers. They emphasized the necessity to combine the examination of
power capabilities in terms of influencing decisions in foreign policy with the study of
the strategies and intentions deployed by the different actors in order to have a clear
understanding of the foreign policy outputs. Therefore, this contribution tries to bypass
the actor-general theory that dominated the foreign policy analysis in terms of developing
a more actor-specific theory that enriches the understanding of the actors’ behavior. By
decomposing the unitary vision of the state as the sole actor that aggregates a wide array
of actors involved in the foreign policy making on the national level, the actor-specific
theory makes an insightful analysis of the changes in the policy-making process (Hudson
and Vore, 1995). Hence, the national dimension of the formulation of the foreign policy
was added to the analysis of the actors’ behavior in terms of identifying the specificities
of the policy-makers, their perception of their context of action and the degree of
compatibility between their perception and reality. Consequently, the micro and macro
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levels of analysis are integrated into a large category of variation in explaining the
foreign policy outputs by the means of a cross-national and a middle ranged theory.
Therefore, the national specificities were considered as the starting point in examining
and understanding the variations in the foreign policy choices and behaviors (Smith,
Hadfield and Dunne, 1995).
By considering the psychological and societal factors, more insightful analyses
would be provided regarding foreign policy making. The importance of the psychological
factors emanates from the complexity of the policy-makers’ cognitive map that is
principally derived from a variety of emotions, national and self conceptions as well as
memories and experiences. Moreover, culture, ideology, history, geography and politics
were considered as societal factors that influence the milieu where the different actors are
operating (Sprouts, 1956). In addition to approaching either the psychological or the
societal factors’ influence in policy-making; some integrative approaches may be adopted
in understanding the effect of both factors in the formulation of a nation’s foreign policy
(Brecher, 1972 and Brecker and Al., 1969). For example, some studies were led on the
national role conception in terms of how a nation, in light of its societal evolution,
perceives itself in terms of identity, role on the international level and national attributes
(Holsti, 1970; Hess, 1963; Merelman, 1969 and Walker, 1987). The reliance on the
personal and individual characteristics in analyzing foreign policy as a discipline that
investigates actors endogenously accords a specificity to foreign policy analysis as a
discipline that is distinguished from the IR domain (Hermann, 1974; Hermann and
Pretson, 1994 and Kegley, 1994).
By considering cognition and information as the comprehensive paradigm that
includes the different explanatory factors of foreign policy analysis, further contributions
aimed to adapt psychology to the study of foreign policy (Lasswell, 1930; Rivera, 1968).
Moreover, additional studies underlined the importance of the leader personality’s effect
which is an angle of study that aims to determine the leader’s political belief, his selfperception, his means and style in pursuing goals (Leites, 1951; Johnson, 1977; Holsti,
1977; Walker, 1977). Besides, some contributions highlighted the perceptual factors like
the stereotypical images as well as the cognitive constraints on policy-makers and the
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effect of cognitive maps, style and leaders’ experiences in policy-making (Jervis, 1976;
Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, 1985; Simon, 1985; Heuer, 1999, Kahneman, Slovic and
Tversky 1982; Shapiro and Bonham, 1973 and Stewart, 1977). Other studies focused on
culture that influences foreign policy making through its direct effect on cognition,
attitudes on the international level especially towards crises and the structure of state
institutions (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pye and Verba, 1965, Holland, 1984 and
Cushman and King, 1985). The role of societal groups and opposition was examined in
terms of determining their effects on policy-makers and the degree of the state’s
autonomy in foreign policy formulation (Dahl, 1973; Putnam, 1988 and Hagan, 1993).
Among these societal groups figures the public and elite opinion as an important factor in
influencing the foreign policy-making especially in terms of ideological orientations
(Holsti and Rosenau, 1979; Cantril, 1967; Verba and Brody, 1970).
According to the cognitive and psychological approach, the actor is not a passive
agent who because of its beliefs and personality traits is unable to adapt to the different
institutional and bureaucratic changes, on the contrary, the actor turns to be a problemsolver (Rosati, Hagan and Sampson, 1995). Due to the rational model deficiencies in
explaining the actors’ attitudes in foreign policy, the psychological model emerged as an
explanatory framework for the inability of the former model to conform to the human
reality by relying on four factors (Dawes, 1998; Hogarth and Goldstein, 1996). First,
actors most probably have recourse to simple creations of a worldview that can be easily
received by the audience which explains the permanent use of analogies with historical
events to explain realities (Dawes, 1998). Second, actors may sometimes deny reality
when there is contradicting information to their beliefs. Accordingly, policy-makers
mobilize some defensive cognitions in order to defend their decisions even if they would
have recourse to incremental and superficial modifications to their system of beliefs
especially in its marginal components (Tetlock, 2006). Therefore, long term beliefs are
difficult to change especially when they are related to animosity towards others since
images don’t change easily. Third, the loss aversion is another explanatory factor
deployed by the psychological approach in explaining the actors’ attitudes in foreign
policy especially in the moment of crisis and losses (Kahneman and al., 1992).
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Moreover, experts in foreign policy take decisions that deviate from the objective
calculations of probability due to their human nature that refuses the fact that errors are
ineluctable as well as their inability to account for the events’ frequency in world politics
(Tetlock, 2006). Therefore, actors have recourse to different types of heuristics, cognitive
biases and fundamental attribution error while taking the different decisions (Fiske and
Taylor, 1984).
Besides, the international context after the cold war paved the way for the emergence
of national identity and culture as basic components of the foreign policy formulation
more than the exigencies of the world balance of power (Hudson, 2008). This notion of
cultural hegemony in policy-making sheds the light on the importance of the socialization
process in shaping the leaders’ system of belief in terms of heroes, enemies and legends.
Therefore, the course of action deployed in foreign policy will depend on how a nation
perceives itself, the other and its role on the international scene. The emergence of a
cognitive psychology seemed by then necessary in order to explain how these variables in
terms of preferences and beliefs are formulated by the different actors in the foreign
policy-making on the national level (Rosati, 2000). Instead of assuming rationality as the
explanatory framework in interpreting the human behavior, actors have to be approached
in terms of their subjective construction of the environment according to their beliefs
(Rosati, 2000). Aside from the national level, the psycho-social milieu approach extends
to analyze the international scene as a context of foreign policy-making by relying on the
different International Relations theories. Therefore, the world structure and the
distribution of power among nations play a determinant role in shaping the foreign policy
attitude adopted by the different states (Kaplan, 1957; Hoffman, 1961; Singer, 1972).
This double structure in the foreign policy making that presents a bounded interrelation
between the national and the international scene in terms of actors and structures
complicated the foreign policy analysis (Neak, 2003). Therefore, foreign policy is a
dynamic process that involves the interaction of a wide array of actors that originate from
different structures (Hill, 2003). This complexity impedes researchers from making a
clear typology of actors in foreign policy-making since not only the responsible decision38

makers intervene in the name of their political mandate but also other actors from the
civil society, the state bureaucracy and experts (Smith and Al., 2008).
The study of the decision-making group was underlined as the nucleus of the foreign
policy analysis where the group structure that ranges from small groups to large
organizations informs how the policy is formulated and produced (Synder and Paige,
1958; Paige, 1959, 1968). According to some studies led on the group structure, the
groupthink sheds the light on the effect of the group consensus, its size, and the
autonomy of its participants as well as the role of its leader on how to understand and
formulate foreign policy (Janis 1972 and 1989; Semmel, 1982, Semmel and Minix, 1979;
Tetlock, 1979; Hermann, 1978). Besides, the organizations and bureaucracies were
considered as another potential actor in influencing the decision-making process since it
puts its survival as the most important priority especially in terms of preserving its raison
d’être (Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1974; Hilsman, 1967; Neustadt, 1970 and Schilling and
al, 1962).
As a result, two approaches emerged in defining the object of foreign policy analysis;
one is process-oriented and the other is policy-oriented. According to the processoriented approach, some scholars approached the foreign policy analysis as a long
process that involves a series of decisions that were taken through the time towards a
specific situation. It underscores the importance of the different stages carried out for
taking these decisions in order to identify the changes in the foreign policy (Hudson,
2005). Thus, actors in foreign policy are not aggregated into a unitary form concretized
by the state as a hegemonic institution but they are individual agents who operate within
the state. Hence, to explain the foreign policy as a process, the effects of both actors and
structures are analyzed separately where actors are examined at the lower levels of
analysis and structures at the higher and more abstract ones (Hudson in Ziv, 2008). The
policy-oriented is another perspective in approaching foreign policy that stresses the
importance of analyzing the policy choice itself as a resulting product of the decision
making process and not only as an integrated part of it (Hermann, 1978). Therefore, this
approach aims to analyze the foreign policy as a purposive policy due to the fact that the
focus of study is the set of actions adopted by a particular government (Allison and
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Zelikow, 1999). This policy-centered approach doesn’t have a specific view towards
actors and structures since the focus is on the policy itself and not the way a particular
actor formulated the policy within a specific structure.
In light of the tensions that existed in terms of analyzing foreign policy by combining
both actors and structures or referring to one of them, various approaches emerged related
to the study of foreign policy by focusing either on actors or structures as explanatory
factors. Therefore, realism, neoliberalism, organizational behavior and the social
constructivism were more centered on the structural dimension while the cognitive, the
bureaucratic politics and the liberal or societal actor approaches focused on actors (Smith
and Al., 2008).
Concerning the different actors that dominate foreign policy formulation, there are
two explanatory frameworks that explain the power structure between the different
policy-makers on the national level. Accordingly, the pluralist model perceives power as
distributed among the different societal actors that are nearly equally influencing the
policy-making process and that they are immune from the governmental constrains that
would be deployed on them (Robinson in Smith and Al., 2008). On the other hand, the
elite model, on the contrary to the pluralist model, presumes that one ruling elite
dominates the policy-making process while influencing media and public opinion to
support their policies. Hence, liberalization and the involvement of public opinion in the
foreign policy formulation explain the shift in the states’ attitude on the external level
(Robinson in Smith and Al., 2008).
Starting from the 1970’s, Rosenau, Holsti, Goldmann and Hermann started to accord
importance to foreign policy restructuring and change (Rosati, Hogan and Sampson,
1995). According to Rosenau, foreign policy changes have to be studied as a form of
political adaptation to contextual changes that occur on the internal and the external
levels. Therefore, the need for change rises from an internal evolution that emphasizes
new needs as well as from external changes that represent potential threats which incite
governments to reconsider their behavior in order to preserve the state survival (Rosenau
and Rosati, 1981). On the other hand, Holsti shed light on changes in the foreign policy
by distinguishing between incremental and gradual changes from one side and complete
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alteration from the other side (Holsti and Al., 1982). He identified a foreign policy
typology that entails a variety of external relations patterns that would be adopted by
different countries on the international scene. Therefore, there exist five patterns which
are isolation, self-reliance, dependence, non-alignment and diversification that illustrate
how a foreign policy alteration occurs by moving from one policy orientation to the other
in a cyclic dynamic. However, most of these studies remained probabilistic in terms of
explaining the reasons of foreign policy restructuring in response to external penetration,
dependency and the perception of vulnerability.
Goldmann studied changes in foreign policy as a permanent antagonism between
tendency to keep previous practices and the necessity to adapt to environmental changes
(Goldmann, 1988).18 Thus, he established different phenomena that he called stabilizers
related to cognitive, administrative, international and political factors whose persistence
impedes changes in the foreign policy’s orientations. Hermann underscored the gradual
change in foreign policy that goes from adjustment in its scope and nature of action to a
radical change in terms of role and activities through a progressive modification in tools
and objectives (Hermann, 1990). Accordingly, he considered that foreign policy change
is embedded in the decision-making process where leadership and bureaucracy reshape
its structure in light of a contextual alteration. All these perspectives were integrated into
a comprehensive framework that studies foreign policy as a system that is influenced by
inputs that shape its process and produce outputs (White and Clarke, 1989). However, in
addition to this behaviouralist approach, foreign policy would be examined as a process
of actions and procedures where decision-making is only a constituent part that partially
explains its changes. Consequently, the psychological aspects and the operational
environment on the internal and the external levels are considered as intertwined factors
in understanding and analyzing foreign policy. The foreign policy as a national process
formulated towards the realization of the state interest is generally, in various scholarly
writings, analyzed in light of five explanatory decision-making frameworks that were
developed by many scholars in different disciplines as follows:
1. The power structure is a model that focuses on the policy-making process from the
perspective of the elitist structure of power from which stems the actors’ orientations,
41

interests and policy agenda. Therefore, the priority is given to the nature of the political
system as the essential factor that determines the actors’ profile as well as their
engagement into the decision-making for particular purpose serving them as elites. The
term structure of power underlines the importance of the power position in influencing
the policy-making process. Different scholars elaborated 6 approaches of power structure
on which actors depend in the policy-making process like the elitism, pluralism,
Marxism, corporatism, professionalism and technocracy. Each category refer to a
particular actor profile, ideology, values, facts and source of power that are all
interrelated in the policy-making process (Dror, 1968; Etzioni, 1968 and Smith, 1993).
This model emphasizes the principle of the concentration of power within the highest
hierarchy since the ability to contribute in the decision-making stems from the position.
Thus, the focus is always on the individual interest or the group interest that seems to be
exclusively defined without including the interests of other actors that don’t occupy high
positions.
2. The rational model involving rationality as the working guideline of policy-makers
wasn’t widely supported by the different scholars due to the human shortages and
inability to have all the available information about a particular problem. Its assumptions
are essentially based on Weber and Simon’s reference to the centrality of human logic in
the achievement of the optimal solutions that are formulated on the basis of the legal and
institutional bonds between the different actors and state organizations. According to
Allison, Morgenstern and Neumann, the rational approach is adapted to foreign policy
analysis through the expected utility theory where actors’ rearrange preferences in terms
of their ability to maximize their goals (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010). This model is
evident in terms of expecting actors to have consistent goals that they aim to apply
through a set of alternatives. However, human shortages in decision-making were
highlighted by different concepts like the bounded rationality and incrementalism which
shed light on the various techniques that decision-makers have to adopt in order to bypass
the human inability of disposing of all the necessary information to reach the optimal
solutions (Simon, 1985 and Steiner, 1983). To overcome the complexity of decisionmaking, the muddling through and the mixed scanning approaches were developed by
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Lindbolm and Etizioni respectively in order to underline the necessity of broadening the
scope of action that decision-makers rely on by adapting it to the problems they are
facing (Lindblom, 1972 and Etizioni, 1968). Both of them tried to overcome decisionmaking complexity by combining the rational and other abstract values advocated by the
poliheuristic model which would give more opportunities for decision-makers to choose
among a wider array of alternatives that are not necessarily optimal but plausible
(Steinbruner, 1974).
3. The institutional model sheds the light on the decision-making context in terms of
interest definition and resource mobilization for formulating the necessary policies. In
order to understand decision-making, the institutional influence, according to Selznick
and Easton, has to be perceived as an organic system that has to adapt to the external
environment instead of being mechanically oriented towards predetermined objectives.
Thus, decision-making in different institutions takes into consideration the values and
interests that are manifested by its agents in order to adapt to the required goals
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). This adaptation was emphasized by the prospect
theory as an institutional arrangement that makes the decisions more effective in
achieving the best outcomes regarding a specific issue in terms of risks avoidance
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This institutional context where actors’ interests are
shaped is important in order to understand how decisions are made inside an institution
that is influenced by its historical experience.
4. The public choice model also emphasized the context and the bureaucrats’ behavior
as variables that underline the decision-making process. By relying on the rational choice
and bureaucratic theories, it assumes that employers seek their own interest instead of the
public’s one. Accordingly, bureaucrats try to increase their department budgets and
bureau size (Downs, 1967 and Niskanen, 1971). Conversely, the bureau shaping and the
unorthodox economics approaches assume that the human motivations are the sole
determinants of the human behavior inside organizations. For example, Maslow and
Mayo indicated that the group context plays a critical role in decision-making. On the
other hand, the unorthodox economic theories like those supported by Boulding and
Galbraith, emphasized the importance of abstract factors in the decision-making like the
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integrative power that comes at the top of other influential factors like threat and
economy (Boulding, 1958 and Parsons, 1995). Accordingly, the conventional wisdom
and image influence the different actors’ motivations towards particular decisions in
order to solve certain problems. This model accords importance to the irrational aspects
related to perception, notoriety and legitimacy before the public.
5. The psychological and the informational models rely in their analyses on the
personality and other subjective factors in the decision-making. For example, Lasswell,
Vickers, Simon and Deutsch were interested in determining the perception of the
different problems as well as the organization and the flow of information within
institutions (Parsons, 1995). The behavioral manifestation is the key word for any policy
analysis relying on this model where cognitive consistency is ensured by the actors’
decisions (Jervis, 1976). Besides, facts and values are present in this model since they are
the main factors that formulate the actors’ perceptions of the different problems.
Consequently, goals are assigned an important role in orienting the actors’ behavior in
terms of interests and problems’ definition in light of immediate concerns that events
evoke (Cashman, 1993 and Jervis, 1976). Furthermore, Lasswell, Greenstein and Kaplan
linked between the environment, the actors’ personality, emotions, images, belief system
and their effects on their contribution in the decision-making process (Kaplan, 1957 and
Laswell, 1930).

B. Methodology:
After reviewing the previous literature written about the Arab policy of Turkey as well
as the shift in the Turkish foreign policy approach in general and towards its Arab
neighbors in particular, we found that less attention was accorded to the analysis of this
transition’s features especially in light of the regional context after the Iraqi war. Most of
the examined literature focused on the reasons of this shift without analyzing the
manifestations of this change and its effect on the regional level. Although the transition
process constitutes the starting point of our analysis to underline how the Arab policy of
Turkey gained such visibility within its global and regional diplomacy, this study relies
on examining two features of this transition to answer the main research question and
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verify the hypothesis. Hence, in addition to the importance of the economic interactions
between Turkey and Arab countries especially its neighbors, the political dynamics
would be relevant in illustrating the originality of our analysis in studying the Arab policy
not only from a regional approach but also in terms of tackling new interactive features.
The combination of the economic and the political interactions between Turkey and Arab
countries would emphasize the reasons for which the Arab policy of Turkey would have
served the Turkish national interests. Besides, these features would help in examining the
possibility of their transformation into sustainable tools that would build confidence and
enhance security between Turkey and Arab countries as well as on the regional level.
Therefore, the economic and the political relations will be examined in terms of Turkey’s
formulation of a favorable policy towards Arab countries while more attention will be
accorded to the Syrian case.
First, economic relations will focus on the flows of goods and services as well as the
human and capital mobility between Turkey and Arab countries. Besides, it will be
verified to what extent the trade volume between Turkey and some Arab countries would
be developed into an economic interdependence. On the other hand, political relations
will be studied by focusing on the analysis of the Turkish presence in some regional
conflicts by according importance to mediation as a diplomatic tool frequently utilized by
Turkey in several crisis like the mediation between Syria and Israel. Accordingly, this
feature will try to examine whether Turkey manages to develop conciliatory mechanisms
by its mediation policy between antagonist parties in order to stabilize the region and
empower mutual confidence and security on the regional level.
This study will adopt the qualitative approach in order to identify the motives and the
expectations of the ruling party from the adopted changes in the Arab policy of Turkey.
Therefore, we chose to formulate a questionnaire addressed to several personalities that
would inform us on the different issues and aspects that would answer the research
question. The survey seemed to be difficult since the research relies on a new issue of
study which means that we had a lot of questions that needed to be clarified through a
series of open-ended questions. Besides, in order to ensure consistency and obtain the
required information we opted for a face-to-face interview conducted through a field
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research in Istanbul, Ankara and Gaziantep which addressed a wide array of politicians
from the AK party, the Republican and the Kurdish Peace and Democracy parties as well
as members in the Turkish parliament. In addition, an interview was conducted with
several journalists from Zaman, Taraf and Yeni Safak as well as businessmen, employees
in the MFA, the Prime Ministry, Chamber of Commerce and some university professors
which added different perspectives to the research and helped to reach a better
formulation for our study’s main question, hypothesis and main concept. The questions
were designed according to the research structure and were divided into three categories
that deals, each respectively with the AKP’s specificity, the policy formulation process in
light of the changing power balance between the different actors on the domestic level
and the implementation of the Turkish Arab policy.

C. Conceptual framework:
Policy Analysis is the main concept of this study since it focuses on the analysis and
the interpretation of the changes that occurred in the Arab policy of Turkey since 2002 in
light of two contextual variables: the arrival of the AKP to power and the regional
destabilization in the aftermath of the Iraqi war. The focus will be on the emergence of
new actors in terms of type and influence in the formulation of the Arab policy as a part
of a dynamic and active foreign policy developed by Turkey. The AKP’s agenda called
for the acceleration of the Turkish membership in the EU and the implementation of a
series of constitutional reforms that would pave the way for a better assessment of the
Turkish liberalizing efforts from the European Union. This agenda was progressively
implemented since the arrival of the AKP following the adoption of a harmonizing legal
package at the end of the 1990’s concerning many domestic matters which created a
suitable environment for reforming the Turkish foreign policy. However, the Iraqi war
presented the optimal opportunity for the party to manifest a drastic shift in its foreign
policy approach. In spite of the vitality of the US relations for Turkey especially for the
military, the parliament refused the entry of the US forces to Iraq via the Turkish
territories. Besides, the AKP leaders decided to take into consideration the resentment of
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the public opinion that plays an important role in the electoral success of the party and
would stigmatize the government if the parliament hadn’t refused the US request.
In addition, since the parliamentary decision in March 2003, many issues related to the
Arab policy started to be visibly manifested like the autonomy of the Turkish foreign
policy and the changes in its approach especially towards issues related to Turkey’s
national interests. Therefore, the Arab policy of Turkey is relevant to our analysis since it
highlights a major makeover in the foreign policy formulation in terms of priorities and
tools of action as well as self perception. As a result, policy Analysis is a dominant
concept in this research and it is going to be analyzed in light of the interaction of two
variables which are the Iraqi war and the AKP in the formulation of the Arab policy of
Turkey. However, the policy analysis involves a broad study since it cares about the
existing problems in a particular context and how the different policies deal with these
problems. Therefore, an attention is accorded to the policy context, inputs and its various
stages as well as its results in terms of outputs and outcomes.
Consequently, policy analysis would rely on a wide array of disciplines like political
science, sociology, welfare economics, political philosophy, comparative politics, the
political process and management. Accordingly, various disciplines would intermingle in
the analysis of the Arab policy of Turkey in light of our research question that involves
formulation, decision-making and implementation. In identifying the various changes that
occurred in the Arab policy of Turkey in terms of its agenda structure, formulation, scope
and modality of implementation, we chose to rely on the political/policy process. This
framework includes by its turns various approaches like the stagist, elitist-pluralist, subsystem, neo-Marxism, institutionalist and policy discourse approaches. In light of our
case study related to the Arab policy in general and the Turkish policy towards Syria in
particular, the elitist-pluralist approach19 seems to be the most accurate cognitive
framework in explaining the changes in the Arab policy of Turkey especially in light of a
destabilized regional context and the arrival of a political party with a strong religious
background that managed to conciliate it with the liberal values.
On the other hand, the AKP occupies an important position in terms of decisionmaking, it is almost the main actor which has the final deliberation on different policies
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initiated on the domestic and external levels. The AKP’s influential role in the policymaking process would be understood in light of the alleviation of the military power in
the decision-making process and the AKP’s sufficient majority to create a government
without any elements from the opposition. As a result, we will try to focus on a decisionmaking framework that includes explanatory tools for the elitist-pluralist approach.
In order to answer the main question and verify our research hypothesis, this study
will rely on the power structure theory as an analytical framework in developing the
changes that occurred in the Turkish foreign policy towards Arab countries. Although the
power structure will constitute the basic explanatory paradigm of our study we might
have recourse to some elements from the informational system that would be
complementary to the power structure model. This model seems to be the one that suits
our study in terms of answering our research question in light of the literature review led
on the evolution of the Turkish foreign policy since 1923.
Accordingly, in examining the changes that occurred in the Arab policy of Turkey,
we will focus on the political and the economic levels. The emergence of a new structure
of political actors as well as the existence of an economic elite that is considered as the
main constituency of the ruling party would be better analyzed in light of the power
structure model. This economic and political elite’s structure emphasizes how the
common religious values and circumstances from which they suffered cemented their
internal cohesion and formulated their political and economic preferences in terms of
choosing foreign partners and modalities of action. By the arrival of the AK party to
power, it started to adopt a pragmatic agenda that copes with the national exigencies
without undermining its Islamic roots. This pragmatism promoted by the party and
strengthened by the pursuit of the EU membership negotiations empowered the party and
enabled it to be released from the army’s domination. These features would be clearly
understood by relying on the power structure since it will examine how the adoption of
the reforms advocated by the EU would pave the way for a new formulation of the
foreign policy that influenced the Turkish approach towards Arab countries. Besides, it
will determine how the party retrieves its power both on the national and the international
scenes and what are the sources from which stems the party’s influence in policy-making.
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On the other hand, this theoretical framework would be beneficial in indicating how
Turkey managed to undertake visible changes in its policy towards Arab countries in
spite of the existence of various intellectual writings that promoted such changes in the
1990’s. By choosing the AK party as a variable of study in answering the research
question, the power structure would examine the organizational framework of the party,
its ideology, modalities of action and constituency by situating them in the domestic and
regional context.
However, due to the ideational factor that is linked to the ruling party’s structure and
power, the psychological and the informational model would be partially used in
identifying the effect of the party in terms of political background, cognitive map,
personal traits as well as the surrounding environment on the adopted approaches and
tools in implementing its policies towards Arab countries. Therefore, the informational
and psychological models would underline some aspects in our analysis in order to
support the power structure model and enable it to determine further elements that are
theoretically out of its scope of analysis like ideology, the personal character and the
environment related to decision-makers. Hence, our study variables which are the AK
party’s arrival to power and the regional context of destabilization played a considerable
role in identifying the adequate frameworks on which we will rely in analyzing the Arab
policy of Turkey.
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II. Changes in the Arab policy of Turkey under the Rule of the AKP
This part tries to give an overview on the main reasons behind the visibility of the
Turkish Arab policy between 2002 and 2010 by relying on an actor-based approach, the
power structure model, in analyzing changes in the Turkish foreign policy notably
towards Arab countries. The different theories elaborated within the power structure
model, elitism, pluralism, corporatism, Marxism and professionalism illustrate various
features of the actors who are involved in the formulation of the Arab policy of Turkey
on the national scene. Accordingly, by focusing on the outcomes of the Turkish policy
towards Arab countries as a starting point, the study’s interest will be accorded to the
main factors that contributed to the formulation of the Turkish policy in such a visibility
both on the official and the public levels. These factors were determined in light of a field
research that was conducted in the ruling party’s headquarter, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and universities where most of the respondents highlighted the contextual effect
on the visibility of the Arab policy of Turkey by emphasizing on two basic elements that
constitute the main changes. The first factor is the arrival of the AKP as a majority-ruling
party with Islamic roots rallying a large array of actors who influence the policy
formulation process. The second factor is the policy-making environment where these
actors operate and formulate their policies in light of global, regional and national
exigencies. From these two factors are derived some sub-elements that influence the
formulation of the Arab policy of Turkey like the actors’ identity and interests that are
tightly intermingled in the policy-making process.
Accordingly, these sub-elements were also decisive in the foreign policy-making since
the establishment of the republic; however, they started to have different significations
since 2002. The cognitive map of the new ruling elite that traces the Turkish foreign
policy potential from a historical and cultural investment breaks with the traditional
elites’ defensive attitude towards neighboring countries. The inclusion of the religious
factor as well as the shared historical background as determinants of the ruling elite’s
self-perception favored a psychological rapprochement with Arab countries and created a
sense of a communitarian solidarity from which stems the essence of the Turkish national
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interest. Therefore, the traditional meaning of national interest as the preservation of the
physical integrity of the state from any external threats turned to have a transnational
formulation that transcends the hard-power exigencies previously declared by the state.
Thus, the idea of common interests and threats started to evolve through a social process
that reformulates their significance and would by then create a sort of security
communities where the representation of identity and security is shared between Turkey
and Arab countries. The changes in the elitist cognitive map in terms of self-perception,
the definition of the other notably the Arabs as well as the reformulation of a new mission
for Turkey on the regional and international levels led to the deployment of new tools of
action in terms of intensity and variety as means of strengthening the Turkish new
ideational representation of itself, its role and the other.

A. The main actors of the Turkish policy towards Arab countries.
1. The main political and economic actors on the Turkish national scene.
By relying on the power structure model in identifying the changes in the Arab policy
of Turkey, the analysis of the actors’ influence in its formulation is illustrative for two
reasons. First, the progressive liberalization of the political scene since the 1980’s led to
the emergence of a wide array of actors that influenced the policy-making process in
terms of their interests and ideological orientations. Second, another aspect related to
liberalization is the interaction between these different actors regarding various foreign
policy issues that started to be publicly debated which changed the Kemalist restricted
vision of democracy where diversity was only expressed within the framework of the
state doctrine.
In addition to the emergence of new actors on the national scene, the other factor that
emphasizes the paradigm change in the Turkish foreign policy-making is the retreat of
the military power (M. Mercan, personal communication and E. Kelesoglu, personal
communication, 2011). The army’s influence has decreased in light of the importance
accorded to the negotiations for accession to the EU and the adoption of further
liberalizing reforms that empowered democracy and limited the military intervention
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through the National Security Council (NSC) which was the major instance for decisionmaking (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, the civil authority
started to regain its autonomy vis-à-vis the army and turned to be stronger in terms of its
ability to manage the domestic problems which was manifested by the democratic
opening initiated by the AKP that underlines a visible ideological change in approaching
Arab countries (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2010). The Turkish foreign
policy was dissociated from the national security approach that dominated its formulation
especially towards Arab countries by the arrival of the AKP that adopted a series of
constitutional reforms in 2002 that restricted the NSC authority (K. Balci, personal
communication, 2011). Hence, when the military influence dominated the policy-making
process on the domestic level, Turkey had a self-image as a threatened state that was
permanently under siege in the region.
Accordingly, the AKP worked on alleviating this self perception that was referred to
by some respondents as “the siege mentality” by focusing on democratization and
decreasing the military power which consolidated the Turkish conduct in the region as a
cooperative dynamic instead of the adoption of a confrontational policy (I. Dagi, personal
communication, 2011). The AKP adopted a favorable policy towards Arab countries that
eliminated the psychological barriers by increasing the mutual interactions that enabled
each side to have a direct idea and perception about the other (S. Turan, personal
communication, 2011). Unlike its predecessors, the AKP doesn’t have the same
nationalist prejudices against Arabs and accords importance to the economic and
humanitarian dimensions in its orientation towards Arab countries (M. Esayan, personal
communication, 2011).20
In November 2002, the AKP gained a sufficient majority for creating a government
without having recourse to coalitions with other parties. The parliamentary majority
obtained in the following elections that took place in 2007 and 2011 enabled the AKP to
become practically an influential actor in policy-making notably foreign policy which
reflects a sort of a power concentration that coincides with the elitist approach in
explaining the policy-making process. Accordingly, the party’s charismatic leader,
Erdogan, has a dominating role in formulating a favorable and visible policy towards
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Arab countries whose importance was underlined by the Prime Minister on different
occasions (A. Emre, personal communication, 2011 and Karan, 2011). Some opponents
expressed a critical position towards the Arab policy of Turkey under the rule of the AKP
that is accused of being an autocratic instance that marginalizes other parties from the
decision-making process (A. Emre, personal communication, 2011 and Oymen, personal
communication, 2011). Therefore, according to the Republican Party (CHP), the heir of
the Kemalist tradition, the Turkish policy towards Arab countries is not credible and
against the Turkish national interest since there are persistent problems that prevent both
sides from going beyond normalization. The main difference that impedes the evolution
of such policy is divergence in identity and political reference crystallized by the secular
system in Turkey in contrast to a lagging nation-building process in Arab countries (M.B.
Aykan, personal communication, 2010).21 Moreover, the AKP changed the basics of the
Turkish policy in the Middle East by breaking with its traditions in terms of neutrality by
taking sides with different radical groups in the Arab world as well as adopting an
antagonist position towards Israel (O. Oymen, personal communication, 2011).
On the other hand, the Saadet, the Turkish Islamist party, adopted the same critical
position towards the Arab policy of the AKP since it perceives it as subordinate to the US
policy towards the region and that Turkey as a Western ally is compelled to adopt it (T.
Karamullaoglu, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, Turkey keeps its Western
alignment and orientations in its foreign policy while diversifying its relations with
different partners including Arab countries in order to harmonize the latter’s attitudes and
policies with the world order and empower their strategic ties with the West especially in
a post cold war context (T. Karamullaoglu, personal communication, 2011). Hence, the
party’s leading figure expressed some doubts about the sincerity of the AKP policy
towards Arab countries especially in terms of its intentions in undertaking an intensive
economic policy in the region.22 Thus, in accordance with Saadet, the Arab policy of
Turkey is a maneuver that ameliorates the AKP’s position towards the West (M. Ozcan,
personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, the adoption of an integrative policy
towards Iraq by developing strong economic ties and undertaking political consultations
with the different Iraqi factions compensates the Turkish absence in Iraq as a result of its
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refusal of the deployment of the US forces through its territories (A. Emre, personal
communication, 2011). On the other hand, the zero problems policy pursued by the AKP
for the stabilization and the pacification of the Turkish neighborhood conforms to the EU
conditionality for accession and increases the bargaining position of the ruling party
towards the EU (M. Mercan, personal communication, 2011 and M. Ozcan, personal
communication, 2011). Therefore, by having better relations with Iraq and other
neighboring countries, Turkey turns to be a strategic asset for both the US and the EU in
terms of managing the regional deficiencies in security and development through
permanent bilateral cooperation and consultation.
Most of the critiques addressed to the AKP were formulated in terms of opposition to
its Arab policy as a specificity that emanates from its ideological and religious
background. However, the party relies on pragmatism in its policies instead of adopting
ideological stances that weren’t successfully received by the conservative constituency in
the 1990’s (Yilmaz, 2005). In spite of the existence of further factors that influence the
policy-making like the cultural and religious aspects, the Turkish foreign policy was
visibly influenced by a mentality shift and started to reflect Turkey’s strategic depth in
the region in terms of ensuring peace and stability (K. Balci, personal communication,
2011). A sort of mentality change is revealed by the neoliberal outlook of the party that
conforms to the world order and the deployment of suitable tools that enable it to be
integrated on the domestic and external levels (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
The pragmatic character of the Arab policy of Turkey resides in its responsiveness to
some changing circumstances that incited for a reconsideration of the state policy
regardless the identity of the ruling party (A. Emre, personal communication, 2011).
Accordingly, the increasing trends of economic liberalization and the collapse of the
Soviet Union led to the development of an active and liberal regional policy that is
essentially based on market expansion in neighboring countries.
Besides, the occurrence of the 9/11 incidents paved the way for the development of a
pivotal role for Turkey in the Middle East through the betterment of its relations with
Arab countries (MFA, personal communication, 2011). Hence, the pragmatic character of
the Turkish policy helps in guaranteeing the power balance in the region in light of the
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existence of a regional vacuum23, an Israeli-Iranian antagonism as well as a wide array of
radical groups (A. Emre, personal communication, 2011).24 The tenets of the Turkish
policy coincided with the US interests in the region in terms of pacifying a turbulent
neighborhood through the zero problem principle and the expansion of economic ties.
Accordingly, the AKP is formulating a favorable policy towards Arab countries by
having recourse to trade and political consultations with neighbors regarding the different
crises that emerge on the regional scene which contributes to some extent to the
rapprochement between Arab countries and the West (A. Emre, personal communication,
2011 and I. Kalin, personal communication, 2011).25 Thus, there is a sort of continuity
between the Turkish conduct towards the Arab world and the West especially the EU (M.
Mercan, personal communication, 2011). Hence, although Turkey feels closer to the Arab
world especially in light of the troubles it had with the US and still has with the EU and
Israel, it adopts a pragmatic policy on the political and the economic levels that have
benefits for Turkey as well as Arab countries (Y. Aktay, personal communication, 2011
and T. Kucukcan, personal communication, 2011). These benefits constitute the common
interest on which the Arab policy of Turkey is based by envisioning a win-win interaction
that aims principally to achieve peace through the exchange of values and goods (Y.
Aktay, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Turkish
policy towards Arab countries is an AKP policy, it would easily turn to be a state policy
especially in light of the wide support for the Arab policy of Turkey on the public level
(Y. Aktay, personal communication, 2011 and A. Asan, personal communication,
2011).26
On the contrary to the elitist theories developed in the study of policy analysis, the
new parliamentary organization created a favorable context for a power concentration for
the AKP but without the exclusion of the public that was implicitly engaged in the policy
making through permanent consultations with MPs affiliated to the ruling party (A. Asan,
personal communication, 2011 and O. Turkone, personal communication, 2011).
According to Lasswell and his definition of elitism in terms of influencing the policy
making process, there is a shift in the domination struggle from a class conflict to a
competition on the tools of influence like authority, propaganda, business and knowledge.
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By observing the AKP structure, Lasswell’s definition applies as both a class conflict and
a competition on the tools of influence. The ruling party encompasses different elites that
possess various influential tools notably businessmen, think tanks and popular figures
who had previous experiences in localities from which spurs their popularity (Onis,
1996).
On the other hand, the party also presents a class struggle by rallying the
marginalized elements in the previous regimes where the secular elite dominated the
national scene and the state establishment. Accordingly, even if previous conservative
governments made some steps of rapprochement towards the Middle East and Arab
countries, the AKP is more visible (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2011). The
AKP is a more religious and conservative party that has roots from Central Anatolia like
the Middle-ranged enterprises associated with the Middle Eastern markets which explains
the open door policy towards this region (A. Karabat, personal communication, 2011).
Therefore, the AKP had to take into consideration the sensibility of the Middle East in
terms of culture and belief since it is related to its conservative constituency that reflects
its unique structure that has trade relations with the East as well as the West (E.
Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2011). Consequently, business community is an
important tool in developing an active policy towards Arab countries since it creates
reciprocal confidence and trust between both parties and contributes to the formulation of
the Arab policy of Turkey (Y. Aktay, personal communication, 2011 and I. Kalin,
personal communication, 2011).
Furthermore, according to Lindblom and Dahl, pluralism is generated by the economic
and social development that destabilizes the power balance within the policy making
process between economy and politics where the former is dominant (Lindblom, 1972
and Dahl, 1973). However, in light of Davutoglu’s emphasis on the role of non state
actors like individuals, enterprises and civil society that complements the Turkish
external conduct, the Arab policy of Turkey illustrates a comprehensive signification of
pluralism that is not only restricted to an economic significance. Some private actors with
Islamic affinities became active in mobilizing their own tools of action that add to the
Turkish foreign policy potentials (Babacan, 2010; K. Balci, personal communication,
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2011 and A. Emre, personal communication, 2011).27 Thus, another specificity of the
AKP is the formulation of a policy that is not only addressed to Arab countries on the
official level but also to the public where Arab societies are considered as actors that
started to emerge in the Arab world28 (S. Genc, personal communication, 2011). The
mobilization of the cultural factor by some organizations and movements underscores the
Turkish soft power in terms of deploying new modalities of actions like the establishment
of wide social networks and developing various cultural activities and educational
institutions in different countries in the Middle East (A. Emre, personal communication,
2011 and S. Genc, personal communication, 2011).29
According to some influential figures in the AKP, the party’s ideological background
and dominating position on the national scene have visible effects on the formulation of a
favorable policy towards Arab countries. Therefore, the president of the committee of
foreign affairs in the parliament indicated that the AKP’s perception towards Arab led to
the redefinition of the Turkish policy towards Arab countries on the basis of mutual
respect and the establishment of peace and stability in order to enhance relations that
were forgotten for a long time (M. Mercan, personal communication, 2011). Thus, the
Arab countries occupy an important role in the Turkish foreign policy vision that refers to
the development of a regional integration based on a sort of economic, cultural and social
relations as well as the establishment of a constructive dialogue between nations (M.
Mercan, personal communication, 2011). The singularity and the potential of the Islamic
reference between Turkey and Arab countries would contribute to the regional
empowerment by giving an example of a humanitarian civilization. The deputy’s
discourse emphasized collectivity by referring to Muslims with “we” and indicating that
Muslims can create a peaceful world especially in the Balkans and the Middle East that
would have democratic values in their societies like Turkey (M. Mercan, personal
communication, 2011). Besides, he considered Turkey as the only state that can achieve
this regional vision with Arab countries that have important potentials in terms of
demography, religion, resources and strategic position (M. Mercan, personal
communication, 2011).
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Hence, the AKP counters Lasswell’s fears of a pure autocracy through the emergence
of a ruling elite that concentrates most of the power since this party acquires its tools of
influence from various sources (Lasswell, 1930). This party manifests a grass root
politics dynamic that strengthens its relations with citizens on the public level and
engages different decision-making instances like academicians and scholars through
think tanks (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, the ruling party has
recourse to professionalists and technocrats in the different state institutions especially
the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to facilitate and enhance
the foreign policy-making process where scientific concepts and principles are applied in
light of a clear understanding of the modern world (Bell, 1995). Furthermore, the
liberalization of the domestic scene in Turkey led to the emergence of different informal
actors like think tanks and research centers in the policy-making process (E. Kelesoglu,
personal communication, 2010). Therefore, many think tanks hold public debates by
organizing sessions, conferences and publishing reports on several foreign policy
questions where different intellectual, academic and political figures participate in
analyzing the Turkish policies towards various issues. Moreover, they produce academic
and scholarly studies about the different contemporary concerns on the domestic and
external levels (USAK, SETAV and TASAM’s websites, 2010). All of these
nongovernmental institutions were founded in the 1990’s and their main goal is to serve
to analyze the different policies adopted by the government as well as guiding the policymaking process. These think tanks encompass a wide array of intellectuals from different
backgrounds and with various ideological orientations that permanently not only criticize
the state policies but also develop multiple perspectives for decision-makers. Various
reports and analyses were published by these think tanks about the new Turkish foreign
policy dynamics on the regional level and towards Arab countries. By conducting nationwide surveys, different research centers and think tanks depicted the public visions and
attitudes towards different issues including Arab countries and Arab image in Turkey.
Consequently, the public began to be engaged in open debates about different issues of
concern in state policies including foreign policies through these different think tanks that
increased the public consciousness about the changes in the foreign policy approach.
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On the other hand, the existence of different technocratic instances that participate in
policy formulation in addition to the economic actors underlines the notion of policy
networks and communities that was largely debated by pluralists and Marxists (Dror,
1968; Etzioni, 1968 and Smith, 1993). Moreover, the power structure as developed by
further analyses that refer to the structuralist and instrumentalist approaches perceives the
policy-making process as dominated by actors sharing similar backgrounds and cognitive
perceptions of their environment and who act in light of the exigencies of the economic
factor. Therefore, the dominance of capitalism in the policy formulation is perceived as a
necessary tool for the regime sustainability and legitimacy within the state. Accordingly,
the AKP, as its predecessors in the 80’s and 90’s, deployed the economic factor notably
capitalism both on the national and external levels. The public ties that the party has with
its constituency are principally based on welfare activities and services directed towards
the marginalized classes which manifested a specific type of economic domination that
derogates from the pure capitalist hegemony in light of the state’s intervention side by
side to the individual initiatives. Most of these classes turned to be one of the biggest
entrepreneurial elite that have an interest in developing positive relations on the external
level notably with Arab and Muslim countries.
The favorable economic situation on the national level following the structural
reforms that were introduced into the banking sector coped with increasing growth rates
in its neighborhood and constituted a main source of support and popularity for the party
both on the national and regional levels (Onis, 1996). Despite of the importance of the
economic factor in policy formulation, it manifests a sort of consistency since the ruling
elite’s interests expressed at the higher level doesn’t contradict with the public ones at the
lower levels. Therefore, another category of actors that influences the foreign policymaking towards Arab and Muslim countries in Turkey are the economic enterprises that
emerged in the 1980’s with the liberalization policy and the economic shift towards
exportations. In light of an interview conducted with some members in the MUSIAD, a
sort of an ideological superposition with the AKP was manifested in their justification of
the ruling party’s policy towards Arab countries. These different enterprises constituted
an important part of the Islamic parties’ constituency as well as their socioeconomic basis
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(Gulalp, 2001). Hence, in its foreign policy formulation, Turkey deploys two levels of
interaction; the first one is the strategic engagement that is concretized by a set of policies
and instruments as well as the practical and tactical steps that are taken in order to
enhance the diplomatic and economic relations (Babacan, 2010).30 Some business groups
engage into the second level of interaction like TUSKON and MUSIAD that are two
business groups involved in economic and commercial relations with African and East
Asian markets as well as with Arab countries (Babacan, 2010).
Another approach of power structure studied policy-making as a division of labor
between different actors who are the sole representatives of their own interests within a
state control on their organization and demands articulations (Schmitter, 1974).
Accordingly, this sort of power relation is considered as a functional dynamic in policymaking since it enables the ruling elite to obtain the required collaboration for their
policies implementation (Grant in Parsons, 1995). In the Turkish case, there is a sort of an
ideological compatibility between the different political and economic actors which turns
corporatism to be an integrative mechanism of interests instead of a conciliatory tool
between different demands through the division of labor (Dunleavy, 1995). Although the
national scene is marked by a wide array of actors, the ideological convergence between
the ruling party, the think tanks and the public opinion revealed the AKP as the main and
the dominant actor that prevails in the policy-making process (O. Oymen, personal
communication, 2011).
In examining the Turkish case, the existence of important business groups doesn’t
imply the supremacy of a particular interest since the business groups’ interests converge
with the ruling party’s ideological orientation. Hence, various groups are supporting the
AKP like the Muslim conservative companies that accept its political rapprochement
towards Arab countries (S. Dincsahin, personal communication, 2011). After the Iraqi
war and the development of an active and visible foreign policy especially in the Middle
East since 2002, new doors and opportunities were opened for businessmen in the region
and Northern Iraq in particular (MUSIAD, 2011).31 Besides, many MUSIAD members
even conduct business in different Arab countries by their own initiatives like in Northern
Iraq and Syria where they are expanding their markets, concluding trade agreements and
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holding exhibitions (MUSIAD, 2011). Hence, a common consent appears between many
MUSIAD enterprises and the different conservative governments notably the AKP whose
political stance endorses the deployment of economic tools in the Turkish conduct
towards the Middle East.32 Accordingly, there is a shared conviction that Business will
help in achieving stabilization which explains the governmental engagement in securing
roads and borders for commercial transactions (MUSIAD, 2011).
Different figures from the MUSIAD had reference to similar arguments used by the
AKP representatives in explaining the factors that contribute in formulating a favorable
policy towards Arab countries. Both businessmen and AKP members referred to common
religion and culture as well as geographic proximity in explaining the importance that
Arab and Middle Eastern countries occupies in foreign policy notably in terms of trade
transactions (MUSIAD, 2011). On the other hand, most of the Anatolian enterprises that
emerged in the 80’s and 90’s in Turkey needed new markets and wanted to avoid
Western competition which oriented them towards Arab countries (S. Ozel, personal
communication, 2010). Although Turkey has economic relations with the US and the EU,
the Western markets don’t seem to be sufficient33 for the Turkish exports which
underlined the need for the development of an active policy on the regional level, as
indicated by many think tanks reports (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011).34
Therefore, even if the AKP is a conservative party that entails some Islamic elements,
it adopts a pro-business and pragmatic policy in its conduct on the regional level which
undermines the different allegations about the possibility of an Islamic agenda (A.
Karabat, personal communication, 2011and I. Dagi, personal communication, 2011). As a
result, Turkey reaped the benefits of its liberal orientation in the 1980’s by having a
vibrant economy that reached the 16th rank among the largest economies in the world in
2010 and hence constituted its main tool of soft power (Babacan, 2010).35 Therefore, the
Turkish policy stems from its need for a better Middle East that constitutes an economic
potential where the AKP is in a better position to go for an economy-centered regional
policy that increases the Turkish shares in Arab markets as well as its assertiveness on the
regional level (I. Dagi, personal communication, 2011).
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2. The AKP singularity in terms of its external conduct towards the Middle
East and Arab countries.
Before 2002, under the rule of the secular elite, the Arab policy of Turkey was mainly
developed for practical reasons related to economic exchanges and the provision of oil.
As a result, any rapprochement with Arab countries had a volatile character in response
to national exigencies and was only feasible at the time of crisis with the West like in the
1960’s and 1970’s.36 However, by the arrival of the AKP to power, the changes that
occurred on the national and external levels created an opportunity for the formulation of
a visible policy on the regional level notably towards Arab countries (A. Emre, personal
communication, 2011). Therefore, in spite of the similarities that the AKP shares with the
centre right parties in foreign policy in terms of relying on the economic tools towards
Arab countries, this party explicitly evokes a shift in the elite’s perception towards
neighbors that is manifested by the emergence of new dynamics in its regional policy
especially towards Arab countries. Accordingly, the AKP is a unique actor in comparison
to the secular and the conservative elites that governed Turkey from the establishment of
the Republic till 2002.
The AKP singularity in foreign policy stems from its specific sociopolitical profile on
the national level that influenced its perception and attitude towards Arab countries. The
popularity of the party originally stems from the experience of some AKP figures in
governing different municipalities in the 1990’s (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication,
2010). Accordingly, the AKP is uniquely considered as the representative of the people’s
will on the contrary to the previous regimes that considered people unable to determine
their own interests and hence have to be commanded in an autocratic way towards
modernization (Bayraktar, 2007). Besides, unlike the Kemalist regimes that minimized
the influence of the Islamic community, the AKP claims more rights and freedom in
religious matters (M. Esayan, personal communication, 2011). By adopting a political
rhetoric that is based on rendering public services and distributing resources to citizens
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instead of ideologies, the AKP gained a large maneuver not only in policy formulation
but also in decision-making on the domestic and the external levels.37 In light of the large
Islamic and conservative constituency of the AKP, the formulation of a visible Arab
policy enables the AKP to bypass the secular state bureaucracy through the adoption of
bold positions that rallies the public opinion on the national level (M. Altunisik, personal
communication, 2011 and C. Oktay, personal communication, 2011). In light of the one
minute crisis in Davos in 2009 where the Turkish Prime Minister attacked his Israeli
counterpart and the Mavi Marmara incidents in 201038, the adoption of a just and equal
position in international instances enabled Turkey to reveal a sort of understanding in its
attitude towards Arab countries before Western countries (M. Esayan, personal
communication and E. Mahcupyan, personal communication, 2011). In other words, the
AKP is distinguished from its predecessors in its Arab policy in terms of the negative
perception towards Israel as a real threat due to its destabilizing and oppressive policies
in the region and the Islamic character that plays an important role in the Turkish
rapprochement towards Arabs as well as the economic cooperation (C. Karan, personal
communication, 2011).
In addition to the public support and the misperception of Israel as the main sources
of policy change towards Arab countries, the neoliberal character of the AKP’s policies
on the domestic and regional levels and the abandon of the nationalistic rhetoric
constituted a favorable context that highlighted the AKP’s success and singularity in its
Arab policy. Some changes were introduced towards problems facing Turkey on the
regional level in terms of approach and modalities of action. The concretization of these
changes was plausible in light of the international context that is marked by the end of the
cold war and 9/11 which paved the way for the crystallization of the AKP uniqueness.
Accordingly, there is a tactical difference that occurred in the Turkish policy-making
process where problems are differently perceived by the new ruling elite (E. Kelesoglu,
personal communication, 2011 and T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Arab
countries were not welcomed under the rule of the previous Kemalist regimes in light of
their perception of Islamists as the main threats to the national integrity of the country
(M. Esayan, personal communication, 2011).
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The AKP started to approach the domestic issues differently like the Kurdish problem
and political Islam by considering them as normal political issues on the contrary to the
previous elites who perceived them from a national security perspective (Aras and
Akpinar, 2010). In light of the democratic atmosphere that started to prevail in Turkey,
this change in perception helped in developing a better Turkish policy towards
neighboring countries like Syria and Iran which was manifested by cooperation and
consultation in terms of resolving common problems like the Kurdish issue (Aras and
Akpinar, 2010). Consequently, Turkey started to adopt a different approach towards the
Middle East that emanates from its self-vision and mission in its new strategic and
geopolitical environment after the end of the cold war where Turkey can play a pivotal
role as a regional power (G. Cetinsaya, personal communication, 2011).
Furthermore, the AKP developed a global agenda where Turkey occupies a central
role as a regional power through its equidistant relations with the different countries on
the contrary to Ozal who developed an active economic policy towards Arab countries in
light of its alliance with the West (B. Koroglu, personal communication, 2011).
Accordingly, the Turkish foreign policy deployed since 2002 envisions Turkey as a
central power that acts with its neighbors based on the zero problems policy which
accorded Turkey a vast maneuver in its surrounding environment that turned to be an area
of influence (Babacan, 2010). On the contrary to the previous governments especially the
ones that came to power after the cold war that were still conservative in terms of
preserving the status quo and following power balance policies, the AKP took successful
and consistent actions in its foreign policy (MFA, personal communication, 2011).39 By
increasing its domains of action on the external level by the means of the zero problems
approach, Turkey is able to develop relations, in particular on the economic level, with
the East including the Middle East and Central Asia in addition to Latin America while
maintaining its ties with the West (Babacan, 2010). Therefore, the AKP’s interest in its
Arab policy is to create opportunities for regional peace and stability through economic
integration, the zero problems policy as well as a proactive diplomacy (B. Koroglu,
personal communication, 2011).
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By examining the old administration that was mainly constituted of the traditional
secular elite, diplomacy was always considered as an important foreign policy tool since
Ataturk till the AKP. However, the way this diplomacy is utilized was a matter of
difference between the AKP and its predecessors. Under the rule of the secular elite, the
Turkish foreign policy was prudent, cautious, and careful as well as based essentially on
reciprocity that encompasses the previous characteristics (M.B. Aykan, personal
communication, 2010). Consequently, the main difference resides principally in
reciprocity where the traditional elite were prudent and cautious enough not to make any
concessions in terms of the Turkish national interest unless they are confident about their
adversaries’ responsiveness especially concerning thorny issues like the Cypriot question,
and the differences with Armenia, Syria and Iran (M.B. Aykan, personal communication,
2010). In contrast, the AKP decided to take some initiatives towards its neighborhood
even if they won’t be reciprocated which is a clear violation of the mainstream policy that
was adopted under the rule of the traditional elite. This new strategy set by the current
ruling elite in light of the Turkish regional responsibility40 as a new mission implies its
intervention with some initiatives that don’t necessarily have to be reciprocated by some
gains.
This mission is additionally emphasized by a permanent effort to keep the region out of
any external influence by strengthening ties with the different neighboring countries
which incited Turkey to stop its neutral attitude towards regional conflicts. Accordingly,
Turkey not only started to take initiatives without gains in return but also manifested the
will to take sides in these conflicts in favor of its neighbors on the expenses of its
Western alliance (M.B. Aykan, personal communication, 2011).41 For example, in the
case of the Palestinian issue, the AKP insisted on the necessity of including Hamas in the
negotiations which underlined a new tactic towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that
illustrates a derogatory perspective from the previous administrations that tended to
conform to the international community’s position. The same attitude was also replicated
towards the Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir to whom Erdogan showed sympathy
against foreign interferences in light of the Darfur genocide in which the international
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community accused Al Bashir of being involved (M.B. Aykan, personal communication,
2010).
Besides, the AKP is also unique from the previous conservative regimes like those of
Mendres, Ozal and Erbakan since it succeeded to sustain in power without having major
constraints in its policy formulation on the external level (C. Karan, personal
communication, 2011). This ability to face the state bureaucracy’s resistance to changes
allowed the party to concretize its vision of investing history and culture in order to come
up with real changes in Turkey’s role on the domestic, regional and international levels.
Accordingly, the AKP approaches Arab countries as an asset that wouldn’t minimize
Turkey’s relations with the West but on the contrary it would increase its bargaining
force and autonomy vis-à-vis the major powers like the US and the EU (M. Ozcan,
personal communication, 2011).42 Although the AKP may resemble to the Milli Gorus
movement created by Erbakan in terms of relying on historical and religious ties in
formulating its policies towards Arab and Muslim countries, it adds a liberal and
democratic dimension that emphasizes the importance of the Turkish ties with both Arab
and Western countries (B. Koroglu, personal communication, 2011). This conciliation of
the liberal and conservative aspects in the party’s identity was manifested by its ability to
have access to power without having recourse to coalitions and to gain a wide popular
support not only from conservative and Muslim constituencies but also liberal tendencies
among which figures some non-Muslim elements (B. Koroglu, personal communication,
2011).
The main factor that underlines the AKP singularity is its foreign conduct in light of
the adoption of the philosophical framework developed by Davutoglu where many
foreign policy initiatives that broke with the traditional attitude were taken by the AKP
which changed the Turkish mainstream track on the external level and introduced new
strategies for approaching external issues (M.B. Aykan, personal communication, 2011).
For the AKP, foreign policy is based on a win-win approach and not on the sum zero
vision that induced a rigid nationalistic policy especially with its neighborhood in the
Middle East (Y. Aktay, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, in light of the new
principles of the Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, the main aim of the party is to
66

break up with the previous rigid practices of the traditional elite and adopt new initiatives
in order to alleviate the circle of animosity that was created around Turkey (M.B. Aykan,
personal communication, 2011). These bold attitudes drove some political opponents, the
US and the EU to consider that the AKP policies underline an ideological shift where the
axis of interest is no longer the West but the regional neighborhood and the Islamic world
(Babacan, 2010).
On the other hand, some journalistic speculations considered these policies as a
continuation of the traditional foreign policy while manifesting an Islamic appeal that can
be considered as a new ottomanism43 or a pan-ottoman policy that underscores a Turkish
leadership. However, these speculations were denied according to some assertions that
Turkey is investing its historical and geopolitical assets in a way where relations with
Muslim countries and the West are established on equal basis (Aras and Akpinar, 2010).
Therefore, this ideological investment is a sort of a soft power that is mainly based on
political, social and economic interactions as well as societies’ interdependence.
Accordingly, this power enabled Turkey to play the role of a mediator that reduces the
gap between the East and the West which is a unique role in the Middle East that it hadn’t
played before throughout its modern history.44 This role of mediation is enhanced by the
Turkish attempts to increase solidarity on the regional level while defending justice. Such
a position was clearly manifested in different regional issues45 where the AKP accorded
more importance to justice than his predecessors who defended order and complied with
the international community positions (M.B. Aykan, personal communication, 2011).
This attitude shows to what extent the Turkish foreign policy under the rule of the AKP is
a sort of syncretism that entails pragmatism, nationalism and Islamism (M.B. Aykan,
personal communication, 2010 and Karan, personal communication, 2011).46

B. The Arab policy of Turkey within its foreign policy and its evolution since
the arrival of the AKP to power.
1. The context of the Arab policy’s formulation under the rule of the AKP.
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The emergence of a new ruling elite on the national scene by the arrival of the AKP
to power and the remarkable economic development are the main factors that constituted
a favorable domestic context for changing the Turkish foreign policy, in particular
towards Arab countries (Aras and Akpinar, 2010 and MFA, personal communication,
2011). The need to expand towards new markets to absorb the national economic
production and the public support for a rapprochement towards Arab and Muslim
countries underscore the visibility of the Turkish foreign policy in terms of manifesting a
radical change. On the other hand, according to the current foreign minister’s vision, by
the end of the bipolar order and the occurrence of 9/11 domestic factors like religion,
culture and identity started to influence the foreign policy formulation in addition to the
military, economic and geostrategic concerns which favored Turkey’s emergence as a
country that deploys soft power tools in its conduct on the regional and global levels
(MFA, personal communication, 2011 and Kardas, 2010).47 Moreover, the EU decision to
open the negotiations for Turkey’s membership in 2005 empowered the democratic
transition in Turkey, limited the authoritarian practices and arbitrary interventions of the
army and enabled Turkey to adopt a regional vision that aims for stabilization and
securitization in its neighborhood (Aras and Akpinar, 2010 and C. Karan, personal
communication, 2011). Hence, the existing global context started to put pressures on the
Turkish foreign policy in terms of balancing its relations with the West as well as with
neighboring countries notably the Arab ones.
The Ottoman legacy had a negative effect on the republic elite that was marked by
the fear of conspiracy against the Turkish modern state which drove decision-makers to
follow a security approach that alienated the different political, economic and societal
milieus from participating in the foreign policy formulation (Aras and Akpinar, 2010).
Accordingly, the authoritarian regime that existed after the establishment of the Republic
where the military had a considerable influence considered the foreign policy as a tool for
the preservation of the Turkish territorial integrity and security. As a result of the
referential and ideological gap, the Turkish policy towards Arab countries was marked by
a psychological repulsion, bilateral struggles and closed borders (Aras and Akpinar,
2010). However, the economic and political stability that reached their peak under the
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rule of the AKP combined with the acceleration of the democratic transition enabled the
ruling elite to overcome these barriers and increased their confidence on the external
level (I. Kalin, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, the arrival of the AKP to
power had an impact on the Turkish foreign policy formulation through its conservative
identity as well as its economic and multi-level liberal policy (Aras and Akpinar, 2010).
Moreover, the adoption of some EU criteria that increased the social and cultural
freedom contributed to the eradication of the culture of fear and its substitution by
political openness, diversity and freedom in national politics especially in terms of the
relation between the military and civil institutions which empowered the AKP’s position
on the domestic level (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2010).48 Besides, by
relying on the wide popular support and in light of the structural and political weaknesses
of the other parties, the AKP became the sole decision-maker in foreign policy and its
initiatives towards Arab countries are formulated by figures from the party and influential
interest groups among its constituency (M.B. Aykan, personal communication, 2010 and
Karan, personal communication, 2011).49 Therefore, the traditional elite represented by
the judiciary power, the army and the secular parties aren’t a major impediment for the
implementation of the AKP policies either on the domestic or the external levels.
Furthermore, the arrival of the AKP to power enabled the formulation of a new
version of foreign policy that reflects a mentality change on the national level where the
emergence of Islamic groups that contested the republic traditions favored the revival of
the Ottoman Empire norms in terms of more freedom and liberty of religion on the social
level (E. Mahcupyan, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, the foreign policy has
incurred some modifications in terms of communication content and interaction on the
external level with different countries including the Arab ones (E. Mahcupyan, personal
communication, 2011). For a long term, Turkey considered history and geography as a
burden which made it unable to deal with different security issues; however, this is no
longer the case. In light of the eruption of various ethnic and religious conflicts in the
region, Davutoglu’s new geographic imagination where history, geography and culture
are considered as assets in the Turkish foreign policy helps in creating a true model of
multicultural coexistence in the Middle East where nation states’ borders become
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artificial (I. Kalin, personal communication, 2011). As a result, Turkey started to develop
bilateral relations with Arab countries by the means of trade, visa elimination with Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan where the borders between them became blurred in addition to
the establishment of a High Level Strategic Council as an important platform where
major issues are discussed (I. Kalin, personal communication, 2011).
The bipolar order has limited the interregional relations and Turkey developed a
foreign policy based on balancing the different regional actors in light of their ideological
references (MFA, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, it institutionalized its
relations with the West on the cultural, strategic and security level and prioritized its
territorial integrity against the Soviet threat in its foreign conducts (MFA, personal
communication, 2011). Due to changes on the international level since the end of the cold
war era, the Turkish foreign policy started to change its security approach by adapting
itself to the new world structure especially in terms of global economy structure
(Babacan, 2010). Accordingly, by the end of the bipolar order, Turkey started to invest its
cultural and historical affinities with its neighborhood which was manifested under the
rule of the AKP that adopted an active, dynamic and bold policy towards its surrounding
regions as a sphere of influence and opportunity (Davutoglu, 2010 and MFA, personal
communication, 2011). This assertiveness was favored under the rule of the AKP as a
confident party that wants to accelerate its integration into the EU by having an active
role in the Middle East (E. Mahcupyan, personal communication, 2011). As a result, a
new perception of the Turkish foreign policy as a priority emerged on the national level
especially after the end of the cold war that changed mentalities and favored the adoption
of equality and justice towards the different countries all over the world (I. Kalin,
personal communication, 2011).
This structural change in the foreign policy framework after the demise of the Soviet
Union coincided with additional contextual factors that influenced the formulation of a
visible Arab policy. In addition to the disappearance of the ideological blocks and the
unity of the world configuration, the liberalization dynamics that occurred in Turkey
since the 1980’s, the party’s conservative and entrepreneurial constituency and the
vacuum of power in the Middle East since 2001 all paved the way for the AKP to
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develop active policies towards Arab countries (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication,
2011). Accordingly, the AKP is instrumental and more comprehensive in its foreign
policy in addition to the existence of a regional context that constituted an opportunity for
the development of better relations with Arab countries like the Iraqi war and the Kurdish
issue. (M. Ozcan, personal communication 2011 and M. Altunisik, personal
communication, 2011). Instead of relying on its strategic alliance with Israel, the military
encouraged the adoption of an open policy towards the Middle East in the aftermath of
the Iraqi war due to its suspicion of the Kurdish status in Iraq as well as the Iranian
influence in the region (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).50 Besides, the
acceptation of the Turkish candidacy for membership in the EU as well as Ocalan’s
imprisonment reduced the Turkish dependency on the security approach and enabled it to
normalize its relations on the regional level especially with Israel (M. Ozcan, personal
communication, 2011).51 Therefore, the Arab resentment against the strategic alliance
that took place in 1996 between Turkey and Israel was alleviated which paved the way
for the receptivity of the Turkish policy towards Arab countries notably on the public
level (M. Ozcan, personal communication, 2011).
On the other hand, in light of the tensions manifested in the Middle East politics
especially in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine and the existence of a wide array of crises
related to instability and underdevelopment, Turkey started to be more involved in the
region (I. Kalin, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, since 2002, Turkey was
able to develop an influential role towards the different states and actors in its
neighborhoods in terms of adopting effective initiatives for peace and stability
(Davutoglu, 2010). Besides, the emergence of the civil societies’ dynamics in public
spheres in Turkey and their involvement in humanitarian and social relations on the
external level enabled the development of better relations with neighboring countries like
Syria, Iraq and Lebanon with which Turkey invested its historical and cultural ties.
Hence, the different business organizations in Turkey participate in supporting the state
policies by developing further steps and actions that endorse the Turkish position as a
global actor (Davutoglu, 2010). Therefore, a rhythmic diplomacy was manifested on the
regional level which allowed Turkey to turn from a central state into a global power
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where there is a compatibility and harmony between the state policy and the civil
society’s strategies (Davutoglu, 2010).52
In its regional policy, Turkey aims to have a more secure and prosperous Arab world
since the latter’s stabilization will have positive repercussions on its national scene and
its relations with its neighborhood especially with Iraq and Syria (M. Altunisik, personal
communication, 2011). In addition, the domestic stability as well as the economic
development favored the concretization of a Turkish potential in the world order through
the development of an active policy towards Arab countries (E. Mahcupyan, personal
communication, 2011). Accordingly, this Turkish potential manifested the need to be
supported by the ability to play a role model in the region as a referee that would
guarantee regional stability while controlling its dynamics to avoid their derogation from
the world order (E. Mahcupyan, personal communication, 2011). In light of the power
shift on the international scene where importance is more accorded to cities and regions,
the regional dimension was emphasized in the Turkish foreign policy whose scope of
action coincides with the borders of the Ottoman Empire in order to add a new dimension
in world order (E. Mahcupyan, personal communication, 2011).53Therefore, Turkey
broke with its traditional role as a bridge country between different parties and started to
develop a central role on the international scene in terms of adding new values and taking
effective initiatives (Davutoglu, 2010). The metamorphosis of a regional reference that is
credible for Arab countries in terms of providing a liberal example that conforms to the
world order’s exigencies on the political and economic levels and copes with the Western
inability to successfully intervene in the region underlines the Turkish centrality in
response to the world’s needs (E. Mahcupyan, personal communication, 2011).

2. The different tools of action deployed by the Turkish regional policy in the
Middle East and their influence on the formulation of the Arab policy of
Turkey.
The reconstruction of the Turkish self perception as a central power that encompasses
several identities based on its geostrategic location between different regions incited for a
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change in the Turkish foreign policy’s framework (Aras and Akpinar, 2010).
Consequently, Turkey has equal and simultaneous interest in maintaining and developing
a multidimensional and balanced policy towards the different countries in its surrounding
regions (MFA, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, within the geographic area
that extends from the Balkans to Central Asia, Turkey doesn’t accord any priority for a
particular region but looks forward being influential by adopting a comprehensive policy
towards its neighborhood. This regional dimension emerged in the Turkish foreign policy
since the 80’s and was more crystallized in the 90’s after the demise of the bipolar system
that accorded a larger political maneuver for Turkey especially on the regional level due
to the disappearance of the Soviet threat. As an exigency of a contextual change in world
politics, the regional dimension emanates as a prerequisite for Turkey’s perception of its
own role as a regional power that is responsible for the development of its neighborhood
through the adoption of a holistic vision of joint regional development based on shared
interests, spaces and destinies (M.B. Aykan, personal communication, 2010 and T.
Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, the Turkish national interest started
to have a transnational formulation that is no longer confined to a nationalistic and
egocentric vision which implies the recourse to soft power tools towards neighbors in
order to achieve it.
This regional dimension illustrates a “new Ottomanism” where Turkey tries to
overcome security threats by having good relations with neighbors and adopting a
transnational look in its surrounding region.54 This transnational look is manifested by the
abandonment of the national security approach that dominated in the Turkish foreign
policy since the establishment of the republic. Accordingly, the AKP developed a
common security approach with its regional partners in order to cooperate in curbing
transnational threats that concerns the whole region and not only Turkey. Hence, the
nationalist and unilateral approach in the Turkish regional policy was substituted by the
creation of common interests between Turkey and neighbors among which not only
common gains in terms of economy and spaces are shared but also common destinies are
better managed through the limitation of regional threats on the political level (E.
Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2010).55 Thus, common interests in the region are
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materialized in the Turkish regional policy through the empowerment of trade on the
bilateral and the multilateral levels as well as the construction of national firms and
energy pipelines in different regional countries (E. Isler, personal communication, 2011).
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On the other hand, the development of consultation mechanisms on the different issues

and the involvement in the resolution process of many crises through mediation help in
emphasizing the image of a regional common destiny projected by the Turkish elite
where all countries are keen to solve their own problems. Therefore, the intensification of
the economic cooperation through trade, the recourse to political consultation and
mediation are the main concrete tools that Turkey deploys as a soft power facilitated by
its historical, socioeconomic and human ties with its surrounding regions (MFA, personal
communication, 2011).
In spite of the equidistant policy adopted by Turkey towards its neighbors, the shift
from focusing on common problems to common interests underlines a sort of
particularity towards the Middle East. The Turkish definition of Middle East is not fixed
but mainly includes North Africa, Arab countries, Israel and Iran (U. Ulutas, personal
communication, 2011). The Turkish policy towards the Middle East is a preventive
policy that stems from a pure Turkish perspective based on its geostrategic, historical and
geographical position between different regions among them figures the Middle East
(Davutoglu, 2010). It designs its policies towards the Middle East according to a
geographical perspective that perceives this region as partitioned into four groups which
are the neighboring countries, Iraq, Syria and Iran, Arabia as well as Egypt, Jordan and
Lebanon, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and North Africa (Davutoglu, 2010).
However, Turkey looks forward for a peaceful and secure Middle East through the
establishment of an intense dialogue, the empowerment of cultural, ethnic and religious
ties between societies by the means of mediation and the activation of trade among its
countries through economic interdependence (Davutoglu, 2010). Accordingly, several
official visits made by the Turkish President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to
Arab countries enabled Turkey to be a trustworthy channel of communication between
different actors like countries, people and NGOs (Davutoglu, 2010). These visits were
developed as an integrative part of the bottom-up policies deployed towards the Middle
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East that focus on the public level as the factor that would increase the interactions
between states on the official level.57 Besides, the economic tool was the first and
primordial tool in the Turkish policy since capital is believed to induce a political
harmonization as an equivalent for the public’s effect on the social level in terms of
enabling a better integration (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Therefore,
interdependence that is basically crystallized on the economic level may extend to the
consolidation of further ties on the social, political and cultural levels (M.B. Aykan,
personal communication, 2010).
Interdependence in the Turkish policy towards the Middle East has a double soft
power manifestation on the economic and political levels. On the economic level, Turkey
has intensified its commercial and economic relations with Arab countries due to the fact
that they are considered as efficient tools in solving the different political problems
between both sides (M.B. Aykan, personal communication, 2010). Besides, the Middle
East is considered as an opportunity for Turkey in terms of having a market diversity that
would assimilate the Turkish products that resulted from a long process of an economic
development and a liberalizing policy in the 1980’s (E. Kelesoglu, personal
communication, 2010).58 Turkey increased its trade volume with different Middle Eastern
countries since 2002 where 11.9 billion out of 86.1 billion dollars were the Turkish
exports to the Middle East in 2007 (Kucukcan, 2010 and Babacan, 2010). Therefore, the
Turkish trade volume had remarkably increased with Syria and Iran between 2002 and
2009 where it went from 773 million and 1.254 billion to 1.752 billion and 5.430 billion
dollars respectively (TIM, 2011).59
Various steps concretized the economic tool in the Turkish foreign policy on the
regional level with Arab countries. On the institutional level, the creation of the TurkishArab forum provided a common multilateral platform for the conclusion of several
economic projects and free trade agreements with different Arab countries like Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan (Davutoglu, 2010 and Babacan, 2010

). Turkey

signed 40 and 48 agreements with Syria and Iraq respectively in a matter of a week in
2009 (Candar, 2009). Most of these agreements deal with the economic and commercial
ties between Turkey and these countries as well as the construction of a railroad that joins
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Europe with the Eastern part of the Middle East and the facilitation of oil and gas transfer
across the different regions by the creation of a series of pipelines as a projected vision
for the future (Candar, 2009). Accordingly, The Middle East represents a commercial
specificity for Turkey not only in terms of economic trade but also in terms of energy
resources (Babacan, 2010). Turkey’s location between several regions enables it to play
the role of an energy hub by which passes energy transportation from the Middle East,
Caspian region and Russia to Europe.60 This dependence in energy resources between
Turkey and Middle Eastern countries is supplemented by an increasing intra-regional
trade that has been facilitated by the visa-free agreements signed with different Arab and
regional countries (Babacan, 2010). Moreover, investment is another side of Turkey’s
economic policy in the Middle East where it has the largest business volume that comes
after China especially in Iraq (Babacan, 2010). Accordingly, Turkey needed to benefit
from the strategic assets in the Middle East in terms of markets and energy resources
which incited for the deployment of the economic tool in order to create more equality
and justice in the region.
On the other hand, political coordination is another tool that the Turkish policy
deploys towards Arab countries in terms of discussing the most important issues in the
region (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, the Turkish soft power on
the political level manifests a sort of an identity reconstruction in terms of creating a new
role and image of Turkey in world politics. After being a strictly Western ally in the
region during the bipolar era where a rapprochement towards Arab countries was a
function of its alignment exigencies, Turkey now plays a significant role of an ineluctable
regional leader that manages its surrounding neighborhood through mediation in terms of
empowering peace and security (Babacan, 2010). Accordingly, Turkey created a
multilateral instance for political coordination with Arab countries which is the High
Council for Strategic Cooperation where regular ministerial meetings are held between
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon (E. Isler, personal communication, 2011 and I.
Kalin, personal communication, 2011). This initiative highlights the Turkish policy’s
potential in the region as a zero problems’ dynamic that establishes a win-win approach
between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries. Thus, the Turkish policy formulation has
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changed towards the Middle East as well as Arab countries in terms of approach and style
of actions where a rhythmic and pro-active diplomacy is deployed with neighbors
especially with Syria and Iraq in terms of managing common areas of contention like the
water issue and the Kurdish threat (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Therefore,
the main principle in this policy is to resort to dialogue as a basis for apprehending a
problem instead of having recourse to conflicts. Consequently, Turkey develops a
mediation role where it acts as a regional broker between the different belligerent parties
as illustrated by the Israeli-Syrian talks and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Babacan,
2010 and Aras and Akpinar, 2010). By relying on its model role as a successful liberal
democracy and its economic and commercial ties with the different countries as well as
its willingness to take part into the management of many regional problems related to
sectarian and ethnic conflicts, natural resources distribution, mass destruction weapons
and lack of democracy associated with human rights violations, Turkey creates a new
order based on peace, cooperation and consultation (Aras and Akpinar, 2010).61
In spite of its comprehensiveness, the Turkish policy towards the Middle East
manifests some structural and practical deficiencies that create a gap between the Turkish
regional vision and policy implementation. Accordingly, the Turkish policy seems to
manifest not only an antagonist and exclusive approach in the region but also a lack of
clarity in terms of its structure and final goals (S. Ozel, personal communication, 2010).62
The Turkish leadership perceives Israel as a predator that disturbs the regional order that
the AKP aims to promote in the Middle East in terms of ensuring peace and security
between the different countries. In light of the open criticism adopted towards Israel,
Turkey looks forward deemphasizing its importance in the regional politics for the US by
playing a strategic role in the region that would protect its interests on the economic and
security levels (S. Ozel, personal communication and Y. Aktay, personal communication,
2011). The Israeli war on Gaza in 2008 followed by the Mavi Marmara incidents led to a
regional instability that is detrimental to the Turkish interests in terms of guaranteeing the
commercial flows and securitizing the energy pipelines.
Besides, Turkey fears a revival of a Kurdish separatism that would emanate from Iraqi
Kurdistan as a result of an Israeli assistance (S. Dincsahin, personal communication,
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2011). On the other hand, Iran, in light of the historical rivalry and regional competition
in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the controversial nuclear
program, would be a potential source of a regional unrest with which Turkey prefers to
cooperate instead of opting to a direct confrontation. Although Turkey refused a direct
condemnation of the Iranian nuclear program at the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010, it
accepted to install the anti-missile bases as a defensive measure for any attacks that
would threaten its security (MFA, personal communication, 2011). In addition, according
to a confidential source in the MFA, Turkey tries to balance the Iranian sectarian policy
in the region in order to preserve the regional integrity (MFA, personal communication,
2011).63
Moreover, it is worth noting that the Turkish vision for the Middle East is based on the
promotion of peace, security and joint regional development through interdependence on
the economic and political levels. However, the word interdependence that was
repeatedly advocated by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Davutoglu, is not clear in terms of
structure and final goal (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011 and M. Ozcan, personal
communication, 2011). According to some respondents, interdependence is mainly of
economic nature and is inspired by the European experience and therefore they give a
reductionist vision for interdependence by referring to the visa release and free trade
agreements. Besides, some manifested some hesitations about the main goal of
interdependence by underlining its flexible nature that may extend to a political union (K.
Balci, personal communication, 2011). On the other hand, interdependence can be
considered as a synonym for a regional integration and it consists of establishing a good
neighborhood and peaceful relations based on an economic and social rapprochement (B.
Koroglu, personal communication, 2011).
Accordingly, Turkey is on its way for the creation of a regional integration since it
intensifies its economic and strategic relations with its neighborhood, eliminates visa,
increases the cooperation between civil societies 64 and develops common projects in
education, industry, culture and tourism (B. Koroglu, personal communication, 2011).
Besides, another respondent added another dimension for interdependence by considering
it as an equivalent for regional integration by indicating that the notion of political
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borders starts to lose significance in terms of allowing states to overcome their problems
and increase their interactions (M. Ozcan, personal communication, 2011). In addition, it
may also refer to the development of stable relations through different mechanisms like
free commercial exchange and economic integration like ASEAN, NAFTA and EU (M.
Ozcan, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, in light of the various answers
obtained from the different respondents, it can be inferred that integration is essentially of
economic nature that strengthens the bilateral and multilateral relations highlighted by the
official visits that include businessmen from both sides to conclude treaties (M. Ozcan,
personal communication, 2011).
According to some figures in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regional integration is a
sort of a regional synergy where the different countries solve their own problems through
a regional ownership dynamic that is developed by the AKP through its attempts to solve
problems and increase the regional peace and stability (MFA, personal communication,
2011). This dynamic would increase the dialogue between societies and ameliorate the
bilateral relations in terms of developing high levels of cooperation on different levels of
interaction especially Tourism and Business (MFA, personal communication, 2011).
Therefore, it is a high level of cooperation on the political, economic and cultural levels
that Turkey tries to adopt in order to reach synergy that signifies a spillover effect
between the different levels of interaction in terms of cooperation and benefits (MFA,
personal communication, 2011). In addition, the interviewed personnel established a sort
of a vision where interdependence and integration are the two main complementary steps
that illustrate the Turkish policy in the Middle East through their occurrence in a
sequential order. Hence, in light of the respondent’s answers, economic interdependence
means that each country complements the other on the economic level through trade and
investment. This complementarity on the economic level paves the way for a more
cooperation on the political level where Turkey tries to develop consensual relations in
the region by conciliating between the different regional countries through the mediation
process.65 Turkey, by according importance to the political dialogue between countries,
ensures the crystallization of an economic interdependence that leads to an economic
integration that would be supplemented by the intensification of cultural relations in
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terms of ensuring a cultural coexistence and security in the region (MFA, personal
communication, 2011).
On the other hand, some respondents emphasized that illusive character of the
Turkish vision in the Middle East by indicating that in spite of the existence of an
ambition of uniting the region economically, the idea of economic interdependence was
not well founded according to a pre-determined institutional framework (M. Akgun,
personal communication, 2011). Therefore, the AKP looks for what is applicable like the
visa release and the establishment of free trade zones in terms of creating a regional
rapprochement instead of a regional integration or interdependence. Accordingly, he
added that Davutoglu aspires to enhancing bilateral and multilateral relations while
integration is an institutional scheme that is not a necessity due to the absence of a
common external threat for Arabs and Turks (B. Dedeoglu, personal communication,
2011). Besides, the AKP’s policy in the Middle East would be considered as a regional
partnership that consists of holding a series of multilateral consultations in order to solve
some common problems.
Furthermore, the idea of regional integration advanced by Davutoglu at least on the
economic level was considered as a naïve idea since the Middle East can’t be integrated
in the international economy because of its chronic and unstable political situation that
makes it only central for the West in terms of energy resources (C. Oktay, personal
communication, 2011).66 Besides, the Turkish vision is not reciprocated by many Middle
Eastern and notably Arab countries since their interests are divergent and can’t be
harmonized by the Turkish efforts in terms of mediation especially in light of the failure
of the Turkish intervention in the Lebanese presidential and governmental crises where
Turkey wasn’t able to convince all the political actors. Moreover, the interdependence
vision seems to be advanced on ideological premises without being supported by
institutional and concrete infrastructure for its realization. Accordingly, many countries
signed visa release and free trade agreements with Turkey; however, the Turkish trade
volume is still low especially with Syria in comparison to the Turkish priority accorded to
its economic and commercial relations with the EU (C. Oktay, personal communication,
2011). He concluded that any step towards an integration scheme with Arab countries
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will be as an alternative to the custom union that Turkey signed with the EU that would
be applicable in case of a rejection of the Turkish candidacy (C. Oktay, personal
communication, 2011). Furthermore, he emphasized that an economic interdependence
would be plausible especially in light of the joint regional development vision advanced
by Davutoglu but it can’t evolve into a political framework of integration (C. Oktay,
personal communication, 2011 and E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2011).
Generally, in light of the respondents’ reaction to the Turkish policy in the Middle
East as a tool of action and a visible maneuver of the AKP, a sort of progress in the
Turkish policy formulation towards the Middle East and Arab countries was underlined
although the party’s vision in the region is neither complete nor realistic. Accordingly,
Turkey started to communicate directly with Arab countries and abandoned the zero sum
game approach that dominated the bilateral relations that were marked by a psychological
barrier between both sides. Besides, according to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the
AKP, the premises of a regional integration started to be concretized by the conclusion of
strategic agreements with Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey in many domains like
security, economy and energy (E. Onen, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly,
Davutoglu’s vision is perceived as a bourgeoning communication process with neighbors
in order to establish common spaces and interests in light of a win-win approach that
would lead a regional stabilization as a common regional destiny (M. Ozcan, personal
communication, 2011). Such stabilization is hence based on a comprehensive and
realistic cooperation scheme in various levels of interaction like economy, politics and
security (M. Altunisik, personal communication, 2011 and E. Onen, personal
communication, 2011).67
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III. Changes in the Turkish Policy towards Syria
By having an overview on the changes that the new ruling elite introduced into the
Arab policy of Turkey, the Syrian case would be illustrative in examining how these
changes in the foreign policy formulation were reflected on the practical level with one of
the most important regional partners for Turkey. By highlighting the dynamics of the
Turkish policy towards Syria, the study will shed light on the centrality of the contextual
factor in shaping and favoring a rapprochement between both sides on the regional and
international levels. Accordingly, the collapse of the bipolar system, the absence of
efficient mechanisms that would deal with the erupting regional conflicts in light of a
power vacuum and the emergence of a wide array of Turkish elite that shares a
conservative ideological orientation paved the way for an openness towards Arab
countries notably Syria. Thus, the Turkish policy towards Syria has to be understood
within the same parameters of changes in the Turkish foreign policy in general. Through
these parameters, the different particularities related to the Syrian case that constituted
the main motivation for the ruling elite to start a change in its policy formulation would
be examined and analyzed.
A. The particularity of the Syrian case for Turkey
1. Reasons for changes in the Turkish policy towards Syria
Despite of the permanent attempts to strengthen common interests with Syria
especially in terms of developing economic cooperation and investment in the petroleum
sector at Ozal’s time, both sides couldn’t manage to overcome their respective concerns.
Accordingly, Syria under the rule of Hafez Al Assad considered Turkey as an antagonist
neighbor and neither an agreement on a common system for an equitable water
repartition nor a consensus on the Alexandretta/Hatay province was reached (T. Ozhan,
personal communication, 2011). The bilateral antagonism culminated in October 1998
when Turkey was on the verge of a war with Syria as a result of the latter’s continuous
support for Kurdish factions affiliated to the PKK that were trained in its territory and
under its supervision in Lebanon. However, after Ocalan’s detainment by the Israeli
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secret service agents and its delivery to Turkey and the signature of Adana Protocol 68
between Turkey and Syria, the Turkish policy started to manifest a sort of normalization
towards Syria (MFA, personal communication, 2011). In 2000, on the occasion of Al
Assad death and in an attempt to consolidate the Syrian national scene, the Turkish
president, Necdet Sezer visited Syria which favored the acceleration of the conciliation
between both sides in spite of the expression of some American objections on the visit (T.
Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Besides, due to the Syrian isolation on the
international scene, its new administration under the presidency of Al Assad’s son was
more receptive to the Turkish rapprochement and its normalization initiatives (K. Balci,
personal communication, 2011).
Changes in the Turkish policy towards Syria can be explained by referring to the
national circumstances both in Turkey and Syria as well as to the regional context. Under
the rule of the AKP, the relations between Syria and Turkey started to be more visible for
two reasons. First, the liberal outlook and the pragmatic discourse of the AKP favored the
alleviation of the Syrian fears of the Islamic ideology previously held by Erbakan who
revived the Arab fear of the Turkish domination through its Islamist project under a
Turkish leadership that tried to develop further relations with some religious opposition
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood ( Zarcone, 2004).69 Therefore, the moderate and
pragmatic character of the AKP dissolved these suspicions before the Syrian
establishment and enabled it to be accepted by its neighbors that were receptive to his
initiative to solve their common problems. Accordingly, the conciliation of the state
secular character with the party’s religious background favored a Turkish rapprochement
towards Syria as a common political reference for their respective regimes. Moreover,
some prominent figures in the AKP are interested in developing better relations with
Syria and consider it as an important gate for Turkey to the Arab world.70 This
willingness for betterment resulted from the Turkish democratization and liberalization
process on the national level that emphasized the uselessness of the recourse to the threat
imaginary towards Syria as a source of disorienting the public attention from domestic
deficiencies since the ruling elite’s credibility is sustained through democratic
mechanisms (Aras, 2004). This domestic change enabled Turkey to gain the public
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opinion in Syria which in addition to the Sunnite factor constitutes a source of credibility
for Turkey towards Syria (M. Altunisik, personal communication, 2011 and Altunisik and
Labbad, 2009).71
Second, the openness of the AKP in its foreign relations and its ability to maintain
strong relations with its Western partners notably in light of Turkey’s admission as a
candidate for membership in the EU constituted a suitable context for the receptivity of
the Turkish policy by the Syrian establishment that wanted to break with its isolation on
the international scene by having a rapprochement with Turkey (B. Koroglu, personal
communication, 2011). As a result, Syria stopped to raise the Hatay/Alexandretta
province question in its bilateral relations with Turkey and started to accept the Turkish
initiatives in terms of solving the water issue through the High Level Strategic Council
meeting in 2009 where lots of Memorandum of Understanding were signed 72 since it
wants to develop close relations with Turkey as a gate to its reconciliation with the
international community (M. Ozcan, personal communication, 2011 and Kuri, 2008).73
The formulation of a favorable policy towards Syria stemmed mainly from the
disappearance of the Arab-Turkish antagonism that resulted from the positivist approach
adopted by the early secular elites in the development of the Westernization process that
stigmatized Arabs as a source of backwardness (Aras, 2004). Therefore, the Turkish-Arab
formula turned from the perception of the latter’s subordination to the former in an
exchanged vision of disdain towards a normal relation based on equality. Consequently,
the abandonment of the cognitive map shaped by the Ottoman past in Turkey favored an
alleviation of the anti-Turk nationalism version despite the existence of some reticence in
the Syrian Foreign Ministry regarding the development of stronger relations with Turkey
that would bypass those with Iran (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). However,
these concerns were decreased to some extent by the development of a unified strategy
for political consultations with several regional partners that joined Turkey and Syria in
the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (I. Kalin,
personal communication, 2011). In addition, the adoption of the common interests’
strategy by the AKP in terms of intensifying relations in beneficial domains that would
have a spillover effects on other fields of cooperation and contention as well presented an
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opportunity for the recovery of the Syrian economy that has severely suffered in the last
twenty five years (Kuri, 2008).
The changes in the Turkish foreign policy in terms of its strategies and approaches
were reflected on its Arab policy in general notably towards Syria that was the first Arab
country approached by the Turkish neighborhood policy (E. Onen, personal
communication, 2011). The changes that occurred in the actual Turkish establishment
incarnated by the AKP in terms of the cognitive map that forms the elite’s identity and
hence their political maneuver on the external level influenced the policy-making process
towards Syria (Aras, 2004). The AKP identity represented a shift from the ethnic
nationalism that dominated the mentalities of the Republican elites who were mainly
influenced by the last years of the Ottoman past where Arabs and Kurds’ separatism
shaped the Kemalists’ perception of Arab countries. Hence, there was a tight link
between Turkey’s self perception and insecurity that were intermingled in the
formulation of the state identity and its foreign policy (Weldes in Aras, 2004).
Consequently, Turkey’s attitudes on the external level were dominated by the notion of
foreign threats that were constructed on the basis of the prevailing security culture.
By breaking with this cautious mentality and the adoption of a comprehensive and
confident framework in the policy-making process especially on the regional level,
Turkey was ready to restart a new policy towards Syria based on goodwill and equality.
The adoption of different initiatives with neighboring and antagonist countries like Syria
crystallized the peak of these changes and highlighted the importance of Syria for
Turkey. In order to eliminate their problems related to the PKK, the water issue and the
controversy over the Hatay province, Turkey started to create a ground of common
interests with Syria to facilitate their rapprochement and distract their attention from their
mutual problems of the past (MFA, personal communication, 2011). Accordingly, Turkey
focused on increasing its economic and cultural relations with Syria while giving a
particular attention to the humanitarian issues that would help both Turkey and Syria to
overcome their mutual problems. By introducing different initiatives to Syria related to
the facilitation of human and trade movements through borders as well as increasing the
economic treaties and political consultations, Turkey and Syria were able to overcome
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the psychological barrier that impeded their cooperation throughout the previous decades.
The Turkish formulation of a policy based on reciprocal economic interests was
considered as the tool for constructing a new ideational positive element that would
replace the negative historical imagination that dominated both countries’ bilateral
relations. As a result, in 2002, the bilateral relations started to evolve and biannual
meetings were held with Syria as well as other regional countries like Iraq and Iran in
order to discuss common concerns especially the ones related to the Kurdish issue (S.
Ozel, personal communication, 2010). On the commercial level, the visa was eliminated
and therefore businessmen movement was facilitated especially between neighboring
cities like Gaziantep and Aleppo (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Hence, the
binary formulation of a Turk-Syrian/Arab antagonism was substituted by a notion of
continuity in terms of generating common interests and shared regions of prosperity
through the consideration of the Syrian and the Turkish territories as a common space of
influence. The process of visa elimination from the Turkish side helped in formulating an
informational consciousness both on the elitist and public levels in Syria about an
important change in the Turkish reality that is no longer an imperialist danger in the
region which reduced the degree of enmity between both countries.
On the other hand, the regional context helped in breaking with the elitist
manipulation from both sides about the external reality and hence paved the way for
enhancing the Turkish policy of rapprochement towards Syria. Therefore, different
regional factors contributed to the elimination of the filtering mechanisms that persisted
between Syria and Turkey by breeding their mutual misperception and sustaining the
psychological barriers. On the occasion of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Al
Hariri’s assassination in 2005 that resulted in a wide international condemnation of the
Syrian influence in Lebanon, Turkey started to develop a better policy towards Syria
without being impeded by the threat imaginary previously developed by the Kemalists
and frequently reciprocated by the Syrian leadership (S. Ozel, personal communication,
2010). Accordingly, Turkey manifested its ability to understand the Syrian concerns
through the creation of areas of common interests and willingness to save Syria by the
means of liberalization and democratization in order to integrate it into the world order
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(B. Dedeoglu, personal communication, 2011). Besides, it developed a sort of a political
rapprochement as an attempt to balance Iran’s influence on Syria which contributed to
the change of the US approach towards Syria especially by alleviating the Syrian-Iranian
alliance and inciting Syria to adopt a flexible policy regarding its rejectionist stance in the
region (M. Altunisik, personal communication, 2011).
The abandonment of the defensive approach and the adoption of a different paradigm
regarding the Kurdish issue deemphasized the importance of the Turkish-Israeli alliance
for the military establishment which paved the way for better relations with the Syrian
policy-makers that had some resentments against this alliance (Aras, 2004).74 Till 1999,
the Kurdish presence in the Syrian territories was a major concern for Turkey which
explains the tensions that dominated its relations with Syria especially in light of the
dominance of the security approach deployed by the army (E. Kelesoglu, personal
communication, 2011). However, the Kurdish issue was tightly related to the EU
accession negotiations which incited Turkey to adopt a societal and political opening as
well as a series of reforms towards Kurds in order to be admitted as an EU member. In
addition, the Iraqi war context helped to alleviate common tensions that existed between
Turkey and Syria since both of them shared common views about some security concerns
and criticized the US policy towards the Middle East (Ulutas, 2009). As a neighboring
state that shares the common longest borders with Turkey, both sides manifested
common interests in terms of containing the Kurdish threat as a security concern that
incites for the development of further cooperation patterns that goes beyond economy
(M. Ozcan, personal communication, 2011). This opening appeased the tensions between
Turkey and Syria and allowed Turkey to change its approach towards the latter.
In addition, the Turkish policy towards Syria enabled the AKP to put an end to the
burden of the strategic alliance that was imposed by the military establishment and to the
security paradigm that coincided with the Israeli regional concerns especially regarding
their common enmity manifested towards Syria (Ulutas, 2009 and Aktay, 2011). Thus,
the change in the Turkish foreign policy in the 2000’s in terms of the development of a
new regional role that implies an openness with several neighboring countries like Syria
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and Iran led to the realization of the party’s conservative constituency’s will in terms of
normalizing the Turkish-Israeli relations (Y. Aktay, personal communication, 2011).

2. The different dimensions of the Turkish policy towards Syria and their
importance within the Arab policy of Turkey
No sooner had the Adana Protocol been signed in 1998, Turkey proceeded to engage
into an active policy that has remarkably evolved towards Syria in terms of overcoming
bilateral problems by establishing a constructive atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation
(MFA, personal communication, 2011). This policy approach consists of developing and
multiplying the areas of common interest in their mutual relations which would enable
both sides to forego their issues of contention that would be dissolved as soon as benefits
are disseminated (MFA, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, the Turkish policy
towards Syria starts with intensifying economic and political relations as the first step for
creating common interests and spaces that would lead to the convergence of their national
destinies and therefore the eradication of their bilateral problems. Hence, in addition to
the various projects that were initiated in many domains between both sides, the signature
of the Free Trade Agreement followed by an increasing rate of trade volume and the
political openness manifested by the exchange of frequent visits on the official level
underscore the main dimensions of changes in the Turkish policy towards Syria (MFA,
personal communication, 2011). Most of these visits started in 2000 after the death of the
Syrian president and began to gain importance especially between their respective
Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFA, personal
communication, 2011). Accordingly, a Syrian consulate was opened in Gaziantep in 2004
which enabled the strengthening of the economic, parliamentary and public relation with
Syria as well as coordinating their positions in international instances (Kuri, 2008).
Besides, in October 2007, the former Turkish foreign minister, Ali Babacan signed a
“Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation” with his Syrian counterpart about the
development of different potential projects in many domains notably politics and
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security, economy as well as energy and water (MFA website, 2011). In light of this
memorandum, Turkey managed to transform the areas of contention into possibilities of
cooperation. Therefore, instead of maintaining a persistent suspicion towards Syria
regarding border management in light of the persistence of the Kurdish issue, Turkey
engaged Syria in fighting against terrorism in addition to renovating the existing border
gates and transportation networks as well as eliminating entry visas and landmines from
borders which would lead to an increase in trade and tourism (MFA website, 2011).
The mentality change in the Turkish leadership paved the way for a better
understanding from Syria that not only abandoned its demands on the Hatay province but
also started collaborating with Turkey in fighting the PKK militants among which figured
four thousand Kurdish militant from Syria (M. Esayan, personal communication, 2011).
This perspective sheds the light on the shift in the nationalistic and unilateral approach
that was previously adopted towards bilateral issues of contention like the Water problem
and the Kurdish crisis. Accordingly, Turkey emphasized the necessity of the Syrian
engagement in fighting the Kurdish rebellion by holding joint operations and exchanging
necessary information in light of various agreements signed in 1998, 2003 and 2010. In
addition, both sides agreed to be responsible for controlling their respective borders,
restricting the acquisition of explosives by Kurdish militants and ensuring a continuous
and direct contact through special envoys and direct telephone lines.75
Besides, further initiatives were launched and manifested a Turkish openness like the
Arab Natural Gas Pipeline as a joint project between the Turkish Petroleum Corporation
and the Syrian Oil Company that unifies the natural gas pipelines as well as the insurance
of exchanging mutual expertise in water management (MFA website, 2011). In light of
the detrimental effects of the GAP project that Turkey started to develop in 1983 on
Euphrates, Turkey changed its water policy by emphasizing the necessity of sharing
benefits through the development of further regulatory mechanisms.76 Therefore, joint
meetings, researches and training programs especially after the Iraqi invasion and
changes in regional balances were held in order to emphasize the Turkish willingness to
cooperate with Syria (Daoudy, 2010). Consequently, the Euphrates and Tigris Initiative
for Cooperation was initiated in 2005 as a track II channel by scholars from Iraq, Syria,
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Turkey and the US as well as a joint technical committee in order to discuss the different
possibilities to solve the water issue between the riparian countries through dialogue.
However, the water repartition between Syria and Turkey remains in a stalemate since
Turkey insists on the national character of the Euphrates and accordingly refuses the
application of the equitable repartition principle with Syria (Kuri, 2008). Therefore, Syria
ignores this problem and avoids to raise it before Turkish officials (MFA, personal
communication, 2011). Hence, the water issue is reformulated in terms of technical
problems in water repartition that needs the adoption as well as the development of
further mechanisms for water collection and transfer in order to rationalize water usage.
Therefore, the issue started to be identified by new terminologies used by the state
bureaucrats in the AKP headquarter and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where “water
conflict” is substituted by “water management” through common projects like the project
of the friendship dam on the Orontes River (MFA website, 2011).
Moreover, further tools were established in terms of endorsing the Turkish openness
towards Syria like the signature of a series of treaties and protocols that resulted in the
creation of the Nusaybin-Qamishli customs gate, a Syrian-Turkish joint bank, a train line
linking between Aleppo and Gaziantep as well as developing a natural gas network
between the two countries (MFA website, 2011). On the other hand, Turkey had recourse
to the High Level Strategic Council in order to lay the foundations of its new
constructivist approach towards Syria. This council concretized an evolution in the
Turkish policy towards Syria since it paved the way for the concretization of many
mutual agreements. Accordingly, in its first and second meetings that took place in
Damascus and Ankara respectively in 2010, 51 and 11 treaties were signed in different
domains especially in trade and fighting terrorism (MFA website, 2011). Besides, the
Turkish policy towards Syria is more embedded into a comprehensive vision that
encompasses the regional well-being in terms of establishing and ensuring peace and
stability. Thus, the formulation of better relations towards Syria is deemed to have a
positive spillover effect on the region which explains the series of consultation held with
Syria in order to discuss and solve the different regional issues. Consequently, a dialogue
was established between the Syrian and the Turkish leaders (Gul-Asad; Erdogan-Asad) in
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addition to the mediation role that Turkey plays between Syria and Israel built on
Turkey’s credibility as an honest broker between the different parties in its neighborhood
which is an additional aspect of Turkey’s constructivist approach (MFA website, 2011).
According to Gul, Syria is the starting point in the reformulation of the Turkish policy
towards Arab countries since it is considered as a gate for Turkey towards the Middle
East in addition to the common historical ties (Mansura, 2009). The emphasis on the
investment of the economic, social and cultural ties that highlight similarities instead of
differences would enhance the peace process in the region and increase mutual
understanding (Yaman, 2009). Most of the Turkish economic initiatives towards Syria
are launched on the basis of complementarity in terms of products exchange which
enables a further potential increase in the bilateral trade volume that is expected to reach
5 billion dollars in 2012 (MFA website, 2011). Turkey mainly exports industrial and
electrical products to Syria in return for importing raw materials and food products.
According to the Minister of Industry and Trade, Turkey is trying to expand markets in
its neighbourhood for its flourishing industry in various sectors like electric energy, steel,
textiles, electrical home appliances, glass industry, fertilizers, petro chemicals, cleaning
materials, paint industry, building and construction industry and railroad (Ministry of
Industry and Trade website, 2011).
Therefore, the pacification of the Turkish attitude towards Syria in terms of creating
areas of common interests is intertwined with the state responsibility to ensure a better
atmosphere for the different businessmen and national companies to develop trade
relations with their counterparts in Syria (Ministry of Industry and Trade website, 2011).
The trade volume between Turkey and Syria has remarkably increased between 2002 and
2009 by reaching 1.174 billion dollars in 2007 and where the Turkish exports occupied
an important share by going from 266.771 million to 1.4 billion dollars and the Turkish
investments reached 800 million dollars in 2006 (TIM and TUIK, 2011). Besides, in 2006
Turkey was listed as the first country that receives Syrian exports that constitute 64.94%
of its total exportations (Kuri, 2008). This increase in trade relations is tightly linked to
the conclusion of several treaties like the Free Trade Agreement and the visa elimination
(2007), the prevention of double taxation (2004) and the mutual promotion and protection
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of investment (2006) that led to the formulation of further mechanisms77that are held by
the ministries of industry and trade from both sides in order to ensure sustainable
economic and commercial relations as well as technical cooperation on the bilateral level
(MFA website, 2011 and Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce website, 2011).
Furthermore, Syria was listed as the most important neighboring country for Turkey
with which it started the formulation of a prototype Arab policy by emphasizing common
interests like the facilitation of the families’ movement across borders by lifting visas and
eliminating customs between both countries.78 Besides, in 2006, a program of regional
cooperation was launched towards Syria and financed with 10 million dollars by the
counsellor of the State Planning Organism in Turkey in order to develop projects related
to infrastructure, technical cooperation and skills’ development as well as culture and
tourism promotion across borders. As a tool for expanding economic development in the
region, Turkey underscores the connection between regions along the borders in order to
secure neighboring spaces and enhance their joint economic development. Therefore,
these projects were jointly adopted in borders’ governorates as a means of mutual
rapprochement like in Gaziantep, Kilis and Aleppo (Madenoglu, 2009). This program
illustrates the evolution of the economic, cultural and social interactions between Turkey
and Syria as the main dimensions of the betterment of cooperation within a framework of
solidarity and consent (Madenoglu, 2009). It is the first funding program that is run by
national expertise from both sides and it financed 55 projects within different domains
(Yaman and Mansura, 2009). The program has positively influenced different sectors like
trade, culture, tourism and energy which vitalized the economic, social and cultural
domains in the region especially in light of the Turkish willingness to replicate it with all
regional countries (Madenoglu, 2009).
Besides, Syria is an important trade partner and is the second state to which Gaziantep
exports. The volume of the Turkish exports to Syria from this city reached 77 million
dollars in the first half of 2009 (Kocer, 2009). The Chamber of Industry in Gaziantep
works within the program of regional cooperation for the implementation of a series of
projects between Gaziantep and Aleppo that focus mainly on production quality and
abundance (Kocer, 2009).79 This regional cooperation that started in 2007 aimed to
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ensure a better development in border regions and making them attractive points for
further investments as well as an example for regional cooperation. Accordingly, with a
budget of 25 million dollars that is basically accorded by the Turkish side, four more
border regions from both sides were added which are Al-Raqqa, Al Hasaqa, Urfa and
Mardin.

B. Turkey’s policy towards Syria within its overall foreign policy and its
implication on the Middle East.

1. The importance of the Turkish policy towards Syria for Turkey on the
regional and international levels in light of the mediation tool.
The Turkish policy towards Syria as an example for its rapprochement with Arab
countries have many positive returns for Turkey on the regional and international levels
since it shows to what extent Turkey can implement its regional policy in accommodation
with its Western partners’ interests in the region (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication,
2010). The Turkish policy towards Syria incarnates the Turkish potentials that the
Western powers lack in the Middle East especially in light of the deadlock reached in the
Palestinian issue and Iraq reconstruction in the wake of the US invasion in 2003. The
Turkish regional policy towards Arab countries started first with Syria and was then
emulated to the other countries which enabled Turkey to relocate itself in the regional and
international balance of power (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2010 and M.B.
Aykan, personal communication, 2010). The possession of a visible and diffuse soft
power that is supported by a strong military force strengthens the Turkish position on the
external level in terms of stabilizing the Middle East and coordinating between Arab
countries and the Western powers notably the US and the EU (E. Kelesoglu, personal
communication, 2010).
The changes in the Turkish policy towards Syria contributed to the limitation of the
Israeli power and its isolation especially after the attacks on Gaza that highlighted the
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Israeli antagonist approach in the region. As a result, Israel that used to consider Turkey
as an ineluctable shield that balances the Arab antagonism in the region through its liberal
orientations highlighted by its strategic alliance and political alignment with the West has
lost an important regional partner which contributed to its isolation (A. Emre, personal
communication, 2011). However, Israel by its recourse to a hard power policy in Gaza
obstructs the implementation of the Turkish vision in the Middle East. Besides, in spite of
the Turkish efforts to mediate between Syria and Israel, the latter’s government
misperceives the AKP and considers it as a bridge for Islamist factions and hence a
source of threat for its national security in the Middle East (O. Oymen, personal
communication, 2011). As a result, the freeze of the Turkish mediation efforts between
Syria and Israel coincided with the development of further cooperation with Arab
countries which emphasized a visible shift on the external conduct that is not always
supported by the military.
In December 2008, while the Syrian-Israeli negotiations took place under the auspices
of a Turkish mediation, the Gaza incidents occurred without any previous notification to
Turkey which angered the AKP that harshly condemned the Israeli acts in Gaza and led
to the end of the negotiations (S. Ozel, personal communication, 2010 and T. Ozhan,
personal communication, 2011). The Turkish policy towards Syria is an illustration of its
comprehensive paradigm that it deploys on the external level in particular with
neighboring countries. Mediation as a soft power tool developed on the regional level in
order to manage conflicts and ensure stability reflects the Turkish willingness to ensure
its autonomy as a regional power on the international scene (Candar, 2009). Being among
its visible political dynamics in the region, mediation exhibits the Turkish success in
accommodating democracy and achieving a considerable level of economic power under
the leadership of a party with Islamic roots (Candar, 2009 and B. Koroglu, personal
communication, 2011). Therefore, this uniqueness led to the creation of a role model in
the region that is solely manifested by Turkey that grasped a visible admiration and
support in the Arab and Muslim world especially on the public level (Candar, 2009).
Hence, mediation allowed the concretization of the Turkish potential into functional
dynamics in terms of settling conflicts between belligerent parties like Syria and Israel
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and bridging gaps between them. Even this singularity presented by Turkey in the
Middle East as the sole modern, secular and developed country on the political and
economic levels marks, from the Turkish president’s point of view, the beginning of a
Turkish century in the region (Gul in Candar, 2009). The adoption of an active policy
with Syria as a neighboring country especially in terms of settling its differences with
Israel is an important step for the securitization and the stabilization of its surrounding
markets that it needs in light of its incredibly growing GDP that approaches one trillion
dollar (Candar, 2009 and E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2010). Consequently,
the political aspect of the Turkish policy towards Arab countries illustrated by its
important role as a mediator between Israel and Syria increases Turkey’s importance in
the region and enhances its position towards the EU (G. Cetinsaya, personal
communication, 2011).
Although this mediation dynamic would benefit Turkey in its negotiations for
accession to the EU it has some limits since it would raise a negative reaction from Arab
countries (S. Ozel, personal communication, 2010 and Kardas, 2010). Accordingly,
Turkey can create a zone of interest in the region through the deployment of economic
means as well as acting as a mediator between belligerent parties but if this zone of
interest turns into a zone of influence it will lead to the increase of the Arab countries’
suspicions about Turkey’s regional intentions (S. Ozel, personal communication, 2010
and Kardas, 2010).80 Besides, the Turkish rapprochement with Syria was criticized by the
Bush administration that opposed the Turkish openness towards some elements that are
perceived as radical in the region like Syria (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011).
For this administration, Turkey is a strategic partner that is utilized as a political, cultural
and military leverage for the US interests in the region. However, Obama positively
perceives the Turkish policy towards Arab countries and encourages Turkey to develop
its economic and political tools with its neighborhood within a multilateral approach
based on the division of power between Turkey and the US in the region (B. Dedeoglu,
personal communication, 2011).
The Turkish participation in the mediation efforts presents a new image for Turkey on
the external level where it acts as a moderate country that intervenes between belligerent
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parties to alleviate their tensions in addition to resolving its problems with its neighbors
which conforms to the EU accession terms (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
Accordingly, the development of a mediation role in the region between Syria and Israel
contributes to the Middle East securitization which is not without positive effects in terms
of favoring the Turkish access to the EU. Therefore, the Turkish policy towards Syria
manifested new values that Turkey can bring for the EU by its foreign policy potentials
that stem from its historical, cultural and religious affinities from which the EU state
members can benefit in order to consolidate their political union (K. Balci, personal
communication, 2011).81
With the changes that occurred on the international scene after 9/11 and the increase
of islamophobia, Turkey has always an influence and credibility before the West. By
being institutionally affiliated to the North in addition to the common mentality and
values that it shares with the Arab and Muslim countries, Turkey was able to extend its
mediation efforts between regional countries from one side and between the region and
the West from the other side (O. Turkone, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, the
Turkish policy towards Arab countries in general and Syria in particular is a credit for
Turkey in its relations with the US and the EU since as a Muslim country it is aware of
the sensitivity of these societies (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2011). The US
and the EU can’t establish connections or interact with the Middle Eastern countries as
Turkey that is able to initiate a discussion with Middle Eastern countries and hence can
establish a mediation role between Arab countries and the West. According to Erdogan’s
declaration “we are the same people”, Turkey departs from a common identity factor that
can contribute in bringing the Middle Eastern countries and the West together.
Consequently, the Turkish involvement in some regional issues in light of its powerful
position in the Middle East constitutes a pressure on the EU for accelerating the access
negotiations especially in terms of having a bargaining power in facing some thorny
issues like the Cypriot problem (A. Karabat, personal communication, 2011 and M.
Ozcan, personal communication, 2011).82 Thus, the Turkish policy in the region through
its mediation between Syria and Israel would give credit to Turkey since it complements
its relations with the EU in terms of fulfilling the integration objectives (I. Dagi, personal
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communication, 2011). Therefore, the Arab policy of Turkey doesn’t contradict with the
Turkish interests with the West notably the EU especially in light of the absence of a
clear and coherent Arab policy adopted by European countries in the region (I. Dagi,
personal communication, 2011). Moreover, the more Turkey is engaged in the Middle
East, the more the global profile of Turkey is empowered and the more cooperation the
US will have with it since it doesn’t have a clear idea about how to solve many regional
issues like the situation in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Palestine (I. Dagi, personal
communication, 2011 and K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
Although the Turkish policy in the region may manifest a sort of autonomy in its
foreign conduct, it can’t lead to a competition with the US since Turkey is balancing its
foreign policy on the regional and global levels in order to deemphasize the East-West
duality in its identity (M. Altunisik, personal communication, 2011 and I. Dagi, personal
communication, 2011). Therefore, Turkey is an actor on its own right; it develops an
equidistant policy in the region instead of adopting a strict alignment with the Western
powers which was manifested in the frequent visits on the official level between Turkey
and Syria and the coordination of their mutual positions towards different regional issues
like the war on Iraq and the Iranian nuclear program (M. Altunisik, personal
communication, 2011). Thus, Turkey appears as an emerging country that possesses
military power, acts as a mediator in Iraq in accordance with the US and develops
relations with Syria and Iran despite of the American objection (M. Altunisik, personal
communication, 2011). Besides, by deploying an active policy towards Syria whose
leadership has strong ties with Iran, Turkey acts as a regional balance towards Iran in
terms of maintaining stability and power balance in the region (K. Balci, personal
communication and E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2011).83 Furthermore, by
strengthening its relations with a marginalized country like Syria, Turkey acquires
different alternatives within its multidirectional foreign policy and increases its power as
well as its choices on the external level (Y. Aktay, personal communication, 2011).
Moreover, on the domestic level, this policy would boost the AKP’s popularity since its
constituency supports the Turkish policy towards its neighbors in terms of increasing
mutual trade like the case with Syria.
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Although this policy enables Turkey to include the different belligerent parties into a
comprehensive integration scheme, this vision may face some limitations. Some
respondents emphasized the inability to conciliate between an economic integration in the
region with the EU custom union in which Turkey is an active member (O. Oymen,
personal communication, 2011). Moreover, in the Middle East, it is not possible to
develop an integration scheme that would go beyond a free trade zone due to the absence
of a common denominator between Turkey and its neighbors in terms of political
development that is rarely manifested in Arab countries due to deficiencies in the rule of
law, democracy and human rights (O. Oymen, personal communication, 2011).
In addition, the Turkish policy can’t be a step towards the creation of an alternative
integration with Arab countries in case of the rejection of its membership since the
European countries are important trade partners for Turkey and its policy aims only to
diversify its relations and not to change its orientations (A. Karabat, personal
communication, 2011).

Thus, the Turkish policy towards Syria as a prototype of its

dynamics in the Middle East will be reduced to the formulation of favorable and neutral
policies that conciliate between its Western ties and regional affiliations and the
presentation of a role model for Arab countries in terms of democratization and economic
development (O. Oymen, personal communication, 2011). As a result, Turkey emerged
as a wise state that develops a preventive policy in the region through its engagement as a
mediator in order to limit the spillover effect of the different crises on the domestic and
regional levels (M. Altunisik, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, the Turkish
mediation consists of facilitating discussions, providing a safe space for Israeli-Syrian
and the Israeli-Palestinian talks as well as developing a prevention structure action based
on economic aids (M. Altunisik, personal communication, 2011).
On the other hand, the effects of the Turkish openness towards Syria for Turkey on
the regional and international levels may seem controversial due to the existence of some
impediments that may inhibit their concretization. Accordingly, in spite of the fact that
some state members in the EU are satisfied with the new Turkish role in terms of
securitizing the energy corridors and stabilizing the region, there is some reticence to the
Turkish candidacy especially from France and Germany (C. Karan, personal
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communication, 2011 and T. Karamullaoglu, personal communication, 2011). In
addition, although the EU positively perceives the Turkish policy in the Middle East, the
negotiation stalemate still persists and there isn’t any progress in terms of discussing
further chapters related to the Turkish candidacy while the Cypriot case turned to be a
frozen issue (M. Akgun, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, even if the US and
the EU are not ready for the different steps taken by Turkey towards Arab countries, they
are aware of the Turkish foreign policy and want to control it (E. Mahcupyan, personal
communication, 2011).
Davutoglu is convinced that there is a mutual understanding between Turkey and the
regional countries which makes the former reliable in mediation. However, there exist a
lot of issues of difference between Turkey and the US regarding the Turkish role as a
mediator that it developed in the region. For example, the Turkish-Israeli contention and
the recognition of Hamas as an element of the Palestinian government and a democratic
partner by the AKP constitute a point of difference between Turkey and the US. Besides,
Turkey developed further relations with Syria despite of its isolation by the US because
of its relations with Iran and Hezbollah and managed to reduce the gap between the
Syrian leadership and the international community (S. Ozel, personal communication,
2011). On the other hand, Erdogan’s stance towards Israel seems to be radical for some
secular academicians who perceived it as detrimental to Turkey in terms of negatively
influencing its credibility and ability to be a mediator in the region. Thus, according to
them, Turkey has to preserve its relations with Israel in order to keep the balance between
Arab countries and Israel and work as an effective mediator that would contribute to the
success of a peace process in the region since this balance is a basic requirement that
ensures the Turkish conformity to the world order and the international community’s
stances (S. Dincsahin, personal communication, 2011).
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2. The contribution of the Turkish policy towards Syria to peace-making in
the Middle East
Turkey’s rapprochement towards Syria since the arrival of the AKP to power is a
clear crystallization of the Turkish initiative for a better regional management in the
Middle East. The Syrian case underlines to what extent the Arab policy of Turkey has
been reformulated into a neighboring policy that aims to develop intense cooperation that
leads to the relegation of the common issues of belligerency and the deployment of
pacific and diplomatic tools such as mediation in solving the regional stalemate like in
the Syrian-Israeli peace process in 2008. According to different experts in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and journalists, Syria has given up its claims on Hatay and water rights
and started to adopt a different attitude towards these problems. The visa release between
both sides helped to alleviate the territorial dispute especially in light of the creation of a
common space that stretches over the Turkish and the Syrian territories that became
accessible to citizens from both sides (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011 and S.
Touran, personal communication, 2011). Concerning the water issue, Turkey manifested
some flexibility regarding water management while expressing its readiness to adapt its
water provision to the Syrian needs by increasing the quantity of the released water
especially in case of droughts (T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). In addition to
the importance of the free trade agreements, the High Level Strategic Cooperation
Council is a complementary multilateral platform that includes Turkey, Syria and Iraq
where regular biannual meetings are held between these countries’ cabinets (MFA,
personal communication, 2011). The coordination of their common policies in different
domains of cooperation through these meetings contributed to the alleviation of their
mutual problems concerning the water and the Kurdish issues. In these meetings
journalists can participate and a journal forum is issued about the different problems that
concern the three parties (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
The problematic nature of the Middle East politics and the existence of various
economic potentials including cooperation in the energy sector present two sources of
attraction that incite Turkey to be involved in the region and act as a mediator not only
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between Syria and Israel but also in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq and between
Iran and the West (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011). The Turkish credibility as a
mediator is built on its rank as one of the 20 richest countries, the 15th country with the
highest GNP as well as its identification to the North while voicing at the same time the
different regional causes before international instances (K. Balci, personal
communication, 2011).
Turkey’s objectives in terms of alleviating the regional unrest, ensuring its stability
and power balance coincide with the basic tenets of its foreign policy notably the
rhythmic diplomacy in terms of harmonizing its external conduct with the international
community exigencies. Accordingly, these objectives are conceivable through economic
integration and mediation that are the main principles entailed in Turkey’s policy towards
the Middle Eastern countries including Syria at first place (K. Balci, personal
communication, 2011 and U. Ulutas, personal communication, 2011). These two
principles render Turkey more neutral and capable to concretize its rhythmic diplomacy
by intervening whenever they are threatened by a third party towards which the Turkish
leadership is ready to display a harsh and critical position as it was illustrated in Davos
and Mavi Marmara incidents. However, these principles may have some limits especially
towards Syria’s problems in the region and the Palestinian issue in light of the US
opposition of the Turkish rapprochement towards Syria and Hamas as well as the Turkish
resistance vis-à-vis the US policy in the Middle East that was manifested in the UN
resolution against Iran and the parliamentary decision in 2003 (U. Ulutas, personal
communication, 2011and K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
However, in spite of the Iranian perception of the Middle East on sectarian basis and
the Syrian rejectionist policy in the region, there is more convergence than difference
between Iran, Syria and Turkey especially in trade, energy, and openness towards the EU
as well as in increasing contacts on the public level (C. Karan, personal communication,
2011).84 Moreover, Turkey is convinced that it can defend both countries by convincing
them through the deployment of the aforementioned principles to comply with the
international community demands in order to avoid sanctions.
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Besides, the Turkish assertiveness towards its neighborhood is due to the fact that its
relations with Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq constitute the center of its national interest
(O. Turkone, personal communication, 2011). Consequently, the Turkish policy towards
Syria in terms of deploying the zero problems policy was adopted with other countries in
the region in addition to the economic integration factor based on the interactions
between businessmen in terms of trade that was facilitated by the common religion and
culture shared between Arab countries and Turkey. In spite of the inability of the Turkish
efforts to solve the Iraqi issue and limit its repercussions on the region through the
Neighboring Countries Initiative, it was a step that underlines dialogue and direct contact
as a common culture between Arabs and Turks in the regional conduct in order to
manage the various emerging problems (S. Turan, personal communication, 2011). As a
result, the US don’t resist to the Turkish regional policy but on the contrary it perceives
Turkey as a key factor in the region in terms of developing relations with Arab countries
especially the radical ones like Syria in a way that would enable the integration of their
systems in terms of promoting democracy in Syria and the harmonization of their
positions with the world order on the economic and political levels through the different
dynamics of the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East (E. Onen, personal
communication, 2011).
Furthermore, the Israeli-Syrian talks are considered as an integral part of the peace
process in the Middle East and Turkey played an important role in hosting the last
bilateral talks in May 2008 (Ulutas, 2009). The main Syrian claim in these negotiations is
the return to the June 1967’s borders and the withdrawal from the Golan Heights (Ulutas,
2009). The peace talks took place due to the Israeli fear of the Iranian threats and the
Syrian willingness to end its isolation on the international level (B. Koroglu, personal
communication, 2011 and M.B. Aykan, personal communication, 2010). This process is
important in terms of putting an end to borders conflicts and the regional security
concerns. Therefore, the existence of a third party like Turkey in addition to the US was
important in inciting both sides to abide by the resulting agreement and its
implementation so that its positive effects would spill over the entire region. Turkey has
an important role in alleviating the tensions between both parties in terms of helping them
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to come up with a consensual agreement (Ulutas, 2009 and E. Isler, personal
communication, 2011).
Obama’s arrival to power favored a Turkish rapprochement with Syria as well as the
development of Syrian-Israeli talks since he adopted a constructive policy in the Middle
East that is distinguished from the one pursued by the previous administration (Ulutas,
2009). Accordingly, the US was ready to intervene in the peace talks between Israel and
Syria in light of the betterment of the US-Syrian relations. However, the rise of the Ultra
right parties in Israel accompanied by the weakness of the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud
Olmert as well as the attacks against Gaza launched in 2008 stopped the negotiations
(Ulutas, 2009). The Turkish mediation between Israel and Syria was initiated in June
2004 after the consent of both the Syrian president and the Turkish prime minister to start
talks through the Turkish ambassador in Israel (Zaman, 2008). Therefore, in May 2008
the Israeli-Syrian talks were officially declared and Turkey was announced as a mediator
between both parties. Turkey was present in five rounds of indirect talks between Syria
and Israel and it helped them to carry out negotiations which had positive effects on
Turkey as an influential and close country to both parties (U. Ulutas, personal
communication, 2011 and T. Ozhan, personal communication, 2011). Syria and Israel
were about to come up with a formal agreement by the end of 2008 when the Gaza
operations were launched and led to the emergence of tensions between Israel from one
side and Turkey and Syria from the other side (B. Koroglu, personal communication,
2011 and K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
The Turkish engagement in facilitating the conclusion of a peace treaty between Syria
and Israel would enable the creation of a better pacification atmosphere in the Middle
East for different reasons. First, the conclusion of this treaty would encourage a further
liberalization in Syria since the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition facing the
Syrian leadership, by opposing this treaty will have a large mobilizing power against the
regime on the national level which will destabilize the Baathist party and alleviate its
rejectionist policy in the region since it won’t be the sole decision-making instance in
Syria (Ulutas, 2009). Second, it would favor a rapprochement between Syria and the US
which would lead to the elimination of the economic and political sanctions imposed on
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Syria since the amelioration of the Syrian relations with both Israel and the US is
intertwined and evolve in parallel. Moreover, as a result of the Turkish attempts to
encourage the conclusion of such treaty, the Syrian-Iranian alliance would be ended since
it will lose its raison d’être once the Syrian regime is accepted and legitimized by the
international community. Besides, by ending its relations with Hezbollah, Iran and
Hamas, Israel may trust Syria and comply with its demands by withdrawing from the
Golan Heights especially in light of a Syrian-American reconciliation (T. Ozhan,
personal communication, 2011 and Ulutas, 2009). Therefore, these factors altogether
would contribute to the normalization of the Syrian policies and the alleviation of the
regional deadlock through the resolution of the Golan Height issue. However, the
inability to cope with the regional complexity in the Middle East impeded the realization
of the aforementioned results. By refusing the Israeli antagonist policy in the region
through the adoption of an open criticism and the broadcast of a pro-Palestinian TV series
stigmatizing the Israeli behavior in Gaza, Turkey suspended its talks with Israel in
addition to the cancellation of an international air drill that was supposed to be held in
Konya (B. Koroglu, personal communication, 2011). Israel replied by conveying its
objections to the Turkish ambassador and its refusal to resume the negotiations under a
Turkish sponsorship (B. Koroglu, personal communication, 2011). Consequently, the
Turkish foreign minister declared that the Turkish mediation in the Israeli-Syrian talks
will be conditioned by the amelioration of the relations between Turkey and Israel that
has to apologize for its offense addressed to the Turkish ambassador and the assassination
of 9 Turkish citizens in the Mavi Marmara convoy (Aljazeera, 2010).
The better atmosphere that will result from the success and the advancement of these
talks would positively influence the Middle East by the enhancement of the SyrianAmerican relations through Turkey.85 Thus, the Israeli-Syrian indirect talks are
considered among the factors that might change the US perception towards Syria and
favor its acceptance as well as its integration as a regional actor (U. Ulutas, personal
communication, 2011).86 Some respondents even went further by asserting that by
enabling Syria to launch a negotiation process with Israel, Turkey contributes to regional
pacification through the alleviation of the Arab-Israeli conflict intensity and the limitation
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of the Iranian impact on the Syrian regime (M. Ozcan, personal communication, 2011).
This assertion was based on the fact that by taking the responsibility for the attenuation
the Israeli-Syrian conflict through mediation, the Turkish government would contribute
to a positive evolution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in light of the relations between
the Syrian regime and some Palestinian factions like Hamas. As a result of a probable
appeasement of the main regional deadlock, it would be expected that many regional
actors especially Hamas would gain an international legitimacy as a partner in the Middle
East peace process which would pave the way for the creation of a Palestinian state
(Ulutas, 2009). The Turkish facilitation of an intra-regional dialogue through a policy
based on values and principles between antagonist partners presents a prospect for
normalization of the region politics in light of the possible resolution of the Palestinian
issue that would be followed by an Arab recognition of Israel through a successful peace
process that would be fair towards the different countries in the Middle East (K.Balci,
personal communication, 2011). The feasibility of the Syrian-Israeli peace process in
comparison to the Palestinian-Israeli one would lead to a fast solution that would be the
starting point of a paradigm shift in interstate relations on the regional level which would
contribute to the regional stability that Turkey looks forward achieving it through its
active policy with its neighborhood.
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VI. Conclusion:
The Arab policy of Turkey is a dimension of a bourgeoning dynamic on the regional
level that aims to develop an integrative vision of stabilization that would include the
different states into regulatory mechanisms transcending the persistent regional stalemate
regarding the different crises. The economic interdependence and the collective
intraregional consultations are the main mechanisms that were generalized with different
regional countries as well as Arab ones (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011). A
comprehensive analysis of the Turkish foreign policy would negate the existence of any
specificity towards Arab countries that are perceived as neighboring and regional partners
among others in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The inclusive character
of the Turkish foreign policy is even underlined by the elite’s rhetoric where different
operational and theoretical concepts are formulated and conceived to be projected from
Turkey and diffused towards different countries starting by the neighboring ones
(Davutoglu, 2010). Accordingly, Turkey started to implement an active and visible policy
in the region in terms of eliminating barriers to trade and human movement as well as
increasing interactions on the political level with different countries in various regions
surrounding its territories. Thus, the Arab policy of Turkey is a part of a gradual policy
based on the promotion of common interests with neighbors on the political and the
economic levels that favors a further rapprochement that underlines the sense of
collective imaginary where space and regional problems are commonly shared (B.
Koroglu, personal communication, 2011).
However, the Arab policy of Turkey manifests not only an activism on different levels
of cooperation but also a radical shift in the Turkish establishment’s imaginary towards
Arabs. In spite of the persistence of bilateral conflicts between Turkey and neighboring
countries like Greece about the borders demarcation, the same nature of conflict with
Arab countries like Syria has taken a wider amplitude (Aras, 2005). This amplitude
mainly refers to the Turkish establishment that adopted a nationalist ideology based on an
ethnic identification that claimed superiority over Arabs in the Kemalist traditional elite’s
mental map. In addition to the defensive character of the state in terms of preserving its
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territorial integrity, a sort of aversion culminated at the beginning of the 20th century
towards Arab countries which increased the Turkish repulsion from the Arab world in
comparison to its neighboring countries. Therefore, the traditional elite abandoned Islam
as a source of identification by considering it as a means of backwardness that Turkey
has inherited from Arabs. On the other hand, Arab countries had a negative memory
about the Ottoman Empire that was considered as an oppressive colonial power that led
to the increase of an Arab consciousness that was politically and culturally opposed to the
Ottoman hegemony. The same occurred in Syria where a strong nationalist identification
began to crystallize against the Turkish administration that adopted discriminatory rules
on the Syrian territories against Arabs. Accordingly, the Arab nationalism was generally
shaped by anti-Turkism but was more exacerbated in Syria due to the territorial dispute
over the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay). The domination of a negative representation of
the other on the Arab and the Turkish sides impeded the formulation of a favorable policy
towards Arab countries as well as its receptivity by the latter.
The historical imagination and the Kemalist elite’s world view and identity that were
the main source of the persistence of a psychological barrier between Arabs and Turks
were reversed by the arrival of the AKP (Aras, 2005). In light of the end of the cold war
and the redefinition of the Turkish policy in terms of scope and levels of action, the
Turkish activism was manifested in the region in alignment with the exigencies of its
Western alliance like in the Balkans. However, this activism was accentuated in the
Middle East especially towards Arab countries in terms of public attention and
importance for both Turkey and Arab countries due to the lack of such positive contacts
on the official level that started to visibly increase since 2000’s (B. Koroglu, personal
communication, 2011).87The arrival of the AKP to power constituted a major favorable
context for positive changes in the Arab policy formulation in light of the new synthesis
presented by the party’s identity, self-perception in terms of mission and the image it has
towards the other especially the Arabs. As the heir of the ex-Islamist party, the Virtue
Party, the AKP presented a reforming wing that incorporated liberalism side by side to its
conservative moral and ethical system (Onis, 1996).
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Accordingly, the party identified itself as a conservative liberal actor on the national
scene that manages to conciliate its religious background and affiliations with those of
the liberal and the non-Muslim groups living in Turkey. Thus, the party manifested an
identity revival by reintroducing the historical and cultural elements into its policies
especially on the regional level where Islam is an inspiring reference in formulating the
Turkish policy with its neighbors without being a political instrument that defies the
state’s secular character. The reformulation of the Turkish foreign policy by reinvesting
the historical, cultural and religious factors manifested a syncretism of various identities
that stems from its geographic position as a meeting point between three major regions
and continents (Davutoglu, 2010). Its historical ties and cultural background shared with
its neighborhood started to emerge as an exigency for the development of a Turkish
mission on the regional level. Hence, Turkey developed the zero problems policy in order
to overcome its regional problems and started to implement a policy of values where
Turkey maintains equidistant and equal relations with all countries while expressing its
neighborhood problems before global actors and international instances (T. Kucukcan,
personal communication, 2011).
Moreover, under the rule of the AKP that conserved strong ties with citizens on the
public level in light of its experience in localities, Turkey has abandoned its prejudices
against Arabs and started to develop normal policies that sometimes converge with Arab
stances especially in some regional conflicts like the Palestinian issue (A. Asan, personal
communication, 2011). The acceptance of Islam as a reference in the party’s identity
reduced the gap between Turkey and the Arab world since religion is no longer conceived
as a source of backwardness that is tightly linked with Arabs. This new mentality
emphasized by the AKP’s elite represents an inevitable factor that favored a
rapprochement towards Arab countries based on pragmatic tenets in terms of providing
the suitable atmosphere for a sustainable active policy that would be continuing even
after the departure of the AKP (A. Asan, personal communication, 2011 and F. Houaidi,
Personal communication, 2011). The investment of cultural, historical and identical
factors in the development of an equidistant, multidimensional, rhythmic and a balanced
policy between security and freedom exigencies that aims to reduce its problems with
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neighbors has been manifested in the Arab policy of Turkey through the creation of areas
of common interests. Therefore, the success of the Arab policy of Turkey through the
application of these principles towards Arab countries emphasized the visibility of an
active Turkish foreign policy and contributed to its credibility which makes it difficult for
any political elite to change radically the Arab policy of Turkey adopted by the AKP.
By observing the environment within which the AKP formulated the Arab policy, it
would be important to underline the contextual role in favoring such a rapprochement for
many reasons related to developments on the national, regional and international levels
(A. Emre, personal communication, 2011). The strategic depth, the current foreign
minister’s book about the Turkish foreign policy, describes the structure of a new foreign
policy that in spite of its preservation of its balancing attitudes on the external level,
presents new potentials within a new world order. In light of the demise of the bipolar
system where culture and more precisely religion became an influential dynamic in
interstate relations, the investment of the Turkish geostrategic and historical heritage
comes in riposte to the power balance changes that modified the states’ self perception
and roles on the international level.
Besides, the liberalization process has evolved on the Turkish national scene and
shaped the relations between the different institutions in terms of the rules of the political
game and power balance (B. Koroglu, personal communication, 2011). Therefore, the
army’s role was normalized and reformulated in light of the democratic mechanisms
adopted by the political system. As a result, more freedom were accorded to a wide array
of social movements that were previously marginalized but now emerged as
socioeconomic powers on the national scene and started to develop networks that
increase their influence on domestic and external policies (Onis, 1996). Moreover, the
power vacuum and the absence of leadership in the Middle East notably in the Arab
world favored the acceptation of the Turkish activism on the regional level especially in
light of its Sunni character and its equidistant and rhythmic policy that preserves the
power balance between the different states. On the other hand, the Turkish tools adopted
in the implementation of the Arab policy are consistent with the world order and aim to
develop common interests on the bilateral and multilateral levels with Arab countries
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which coincides with the Western interests in terms of regional stabilization and
pacification (Davutoglu, 2010).
All the aforementioned factors indicate that the Arab policy of Turkey is an
important initiative that should be reciprocated by Arab countries especially in light of
the political and economic stalemate from which they suffer on the domestic and regional
levels. The engagement into economic relations marked by an intensification of
commercial exchanges constitutes a potential for a regional prosperity among the
different Arab countries that would hence have a better access to the international
markets in addition to gaining expertise from the Turkish side in different domains.
Besides, Turkey didn’t penetrate the Arab world through a threatening political project
but through the development of reciprocal interests which would alleviate the Arab
countries suspicion related to regional hegemony and domination (F. Houaidi, Personal
communication, 2011). Turkey by operating into a multilateral scheme through its
simultaneous policy developed with different countries on the regional and international
levels as well as its role as a facilitator and mediator in regulating conflicts underlines its
aversion to a regional hegemony but a collective empowerment of the different countries
(K. Balci, personal communication, 2011 and O. Oymen, personal communication,
2011).
On the other hand, the rise of the Israeli operations in the occupied territories without a
balancing power highlighted the Arab countries’ inability to play an active role in terms
of changing a persistent status quo that is detrimental to the regional stability. Therefore,
the Turkish firm position towards the Israeli operations against Palestinians paved the
way for the expression of a wide public opinion in Arab countries that started to contest
the status quo in terms of authoritarian regimes and their inability to achieve their
citizens’ needs and representing their will (S. Genc, personal communication, 2011). The
AKP as a symbol of a Turkish democratization by incarnating a new party in terms of
ideological reference that acceded to power in a secular state with an overwhelming
majority and adopted an active regional policy underlines the effect of the political
liberalization on the Turkish confidence in its conduct on the external level. Therefore,
what is interesting in the Turkish policy towards Arab countries is the way by which it is
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perceived and inciting reactions in the Arab world. A public awareness started to
consolidate its presence on the public sphere and started to be stimulated by a role model
that can denounce the regional injustice incurred by an international passivity towards
Arab causes (S. Genc, personal communication, 2011).
However, there is an exaggeration in the estimation of the Turkish role. Turkey has
proved to be a central country that plays an active role in dealing with different issues on
the regional level but it didn’t achieve its role in terms of solving all its problems with
neighbors (F. Houaidi, Personal communication, 2011). Besides, the regional political
and economic instability impedes the Turkish role in expanding its active policy towards
Arab countries especially in light of its contrasting position towards the different
revolutions that erupted in the Arab world. Turkey has developed better relations on the
public level in the region more than on the official level which is an increasing and
promising potential for the Turkish policy towards Arab countries especially in the ones
where the authoritarian regimes that were suspicious towards the Turkey’s role collapsed
(S. Genc, personal communication, 2011). Although Turkey’s policy was well received
by different neighboring countries like Syria and Iraq, some important Arab countries
like Egypt and Saudi Arabia were suspicious and uncomfortable with the Turkish
regional policy that they perceived as a threat to their domestic and regional legitimacy
(K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
Turkey has to readapt and restructure its Arab policy in light of the actual regional
context especially in terms of conciliating its interests with the different Arab countries
that experienced a public revolt. In light of the differences between the Tunisian,
Egyptian, Libyan, Syrian and Yemenite revolutions, the harmonization of the Turkish
policy towards Arab countries seems to be a necessity for Turkey on the global level
before its Western allies and the international institutions. Therefore, in light of the
turbulent events in the different Arab world and the Turkish interests invested in the
region, Turkey has to develop a neutral policy on the official level especially towards the
five countries where revolutions stroke. Accordingly, it has to put the emphasis on
another type of policy where social actors have to be more active in terms of developing
relations with their counterparts in these countries. The recourse to social actors in
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maintaining relations with the aforementioned countries would avoid any political
confrontation since they would deploy different activities on the humanitarian, educative
and economic levels that would enable Turkey to resume its relations after stabilization.
This alternative would be beneficial for the Turkish policy-makers especially towards
countries with which Turkey had good relations on the official level like Syria and Libya.
The other potential that Turkey has in these circumstances is emphasized by the
concretization of its critics towards authoritarian regimes since the elimination of
authoritarian regimes illustrated the Turkish role in terms of contesting the excess of
repression and security concerns in Arab countries as well as developing a liberal policy
where social actors like civil societies participate in the formulation of the Turkish
foreign policy (S. Genc, personal communication, 2011). Now, some Arab countries have
eliminated their authoritarian regimes and have opposition groups that start to perceive
Turkey as a model for the future regimes. Therefore, authoritarianism as a major
impediment for the Arab policy of Turkey is eclipsing and new opposition groups started
to be active and visible on the political level with which Turkey can engage into a
dialogue. Turkey can develop an instructive policy towards Arab countries by helping
these opposition groups and guiding them in light of the Turkish experience. Besides, the
social interaction is an important factor that has to be emphasized towards the different
countries like Tunisia and Egypt where Turkey can build alliances with future leaders
which would enable a better implementation of its tools on the regional level. Economic
interdependence and strategic consultation can even evolve into a more institutionalized
framework in the region with the different Arab countries which would preserve the
regional power balance. Moreover, the Arab policy of Turkey would focus on mediation
as an effective tool especially in countries where the old guards are no more in power. By
being involved between the different political and social actors on the national level in
these countries, Turkey would accelerate the process of building a national consensus and
bridge the gap between the military and the opposition especially the youth.
The reformulation of the power balance structure in the Middle East in light of the
occurring revolutions is a contextual opportunity for the different Arab countries to
reconsider their regional policies. Therefore, the adoption of flexible attitudes in terms of
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enhancing their communication with Turkey especially on the educational and the
cultural level develops a solid base for the crystallization of the Turkish vision in the
Middle East. By empowering social relations and cultural ties on the public level as a
bottom-up policy for a “grass root integration”, a rapprochement on the public level
would incite for changes in the policy-making mechanisms in the Arab world. Such level
of integration would favor the convergence of the political institutions’ visions which
would lead to the development of common policies on the domestic and the regional
levels. Accordingly, the intensification of social relations would cope with the political
openness on the national scenes in the Arab world where public opinion would gain
influence as an actor in the foreign policy-making.
In light of the public participation, Arab countries would be able to reciprocate the
Turkish initiatives by developing an open policy towards Turkey in terms of facilitating
the economic exchanges through different dynamics that can go beyond eliminating
customs and lifting visas to the creation of a common market. Moreover, by engaging
into regular consultations with Turkey, Arab countries can bypass the regional stalemate
and develop common regulatory mechanisms as the premises for an intraregional
diplomacy where foreign policies are harmonized regarding common issues. Hence, the
Arab-Turkish Cooperation Forum would be the embryo of a multilateral mechanism not
only for discussing issues related to cooperation on various levels of interest but also as a
more developed instance for decision-making in terms of harmonizing the Turkish and
Arab countries stances and actions regarding the different political issues on the regional
level especially towards the most aching issues in the Middle East.

113

1

Determinism is a term that describes the mentality of the Turkish establishment at the time of the Birth of
the Turkish Republic where the elite were previously among the Young Turks that were opposed to the
authoritarian Sultanate regime at the beginning but started to adopt a nationalist rhetoric at the beginning of
the 20th century especially after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, this intellectual and
the political elite since 1920’s emphasized a “Turkishness” that is ethnically exclusive and aims for
strengthening the basis of a Turkish state based on a Western tradition. The duty of the state consolidation
in the aftermath of the ethnic revolts in Anatolia and the international treaties that divided the Empire was
to protect the Turkish territories by deemphasizing its identity as an ottoman and Islamic empire through
the adoption of a rigid secular regime inspired from the Jacobinist French tradition and the alignment with
the West.
2

The term “West” here refers both to an ideological and cultural orientation in the Turkish establishment
that started to develop a nation-state based on a modernization process that introduced a different life style
than the traditional one on the domestic level that coped with a rapprochement with Western countries and
a repulsion from Arab and Islamic countries. On the other hand, during the period from 1923 and 1990, the
Soviet Union, by having claims on the Northern East territories in Turkey, presented a geostrategic eastern
threat that was counterbalanced by an official adherence to the liberal Western bloc under the US
hegemony.
3

In spite of the Syrian official demand addressed to Turkey in terms of opposing the creation of the Israeli
state, Turkey was keen not to lose its candidacy to NATO as well as the American support against the
Soviet threat which made it recognize Israel in 1949.
4

The Saadabad Pact was signed in 1937 between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan as an initiative to
consolidate relations between oriental countries in the Middle East under the auspices of the Afghani king.
For the Baghdad Pact that was signed in 1955 in the context of the cold war, it had more geostrategic goals
in terms of creating a defensive coalition on the Southern borders of the Soviet Union. It was signed
between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, the UK and the US joined its military committee in 1958. Turkey
joined the first treaty in order to create a sort of rapprochement with its neighbors especially at that period
of time when it was recovering from the World War I’s effects. On the other hand, the Turkish engagement
in the second coalition was due its security concerns in the region notably vis-à-vis the Soviet Union
whereas many Arab countries at the time adopted a socialist system and engaged into the Soviet eastern
bloc. Therefore, most of them didn’t welcome such a move made by the Turkish government since it was
aligned with the US and supportive to Israel in the region. Both treaties didn’t include Arab countries that
were under occupation except for Iraq that was independent in 1932.
5

There was an aid suspension and arms embargo imposed by the US on Turkey due to its military
intervention in Northern Cyprus in 1974. .
6

This forum was created in 2007 after the signature of a framework agreement between Turkey and the
Arab League. It consists of a regular and permanent ministerial forum that is held each year in order to
discuss cooperation and common concerns on the different levels and to come up with the necessary
recommendations for enhancing relations between both sides.
7

Western paradigm refers to the Turkish elite’s orientation towards the enforcement of a secular state on
Western basis that coped with an institutional and ideological alignment with the West. The word paradigm
is used here in order to underline an official and decisive conduct that is related to the State security and
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survival both on the national and the international scenes whose abandon is out of question among Turkish
state establishment.
8

Normalization and rapprochement express sequential steps in the Turkish policy towards Arab countries.
Accordingly, normalization is the manifestation of a willingness to keep good and friendly relations with
Arab countries in terms of breaking the stalemate in their bilateral relations that persisted till late 1960’s.
Therefore, normalization that was undertaken under the rule of the traditional Kemalist elite is different
from rapprochement that emphasizes a turning point in both the Turkish policy and the Arab receptiveness
of the Turkish state image and role in the region which has many repercussions on their bilateral relations.
Accordingly, Turkey by initiating a rapprochement approaches Arab countries both on the official and
public level as partners with whom it shares common interests and destiny.
9

The paradigm shift is an intellectual concept elaborated by different academicians in their analysis of the
Turkish foreign policy changes in terms of deemphasizing the security approach in their external relations
notably with regional countries and according a priority to the common interests that would be the basis of
bilateral relations instead of focusing on areas of conflicts. Therefore, common interests is the key word of
the paradigm shift in terms of shaping the Turkish foreign policy that deploys economic tools and social
relations on the public level through NGOs instead of using threats. Therefore, neighboring Arab countries
are not perceived as a threat for the Turkish security but as potential partners in the region’s development
and prosperity. Besides, the introduction of the cultural factor in the Turkish foreign policy conduct is a sort
of manifestation of a paradigm shift that contributed to the elimination of the psychological gap between
Arab and Turks.
10

The Turkish refusal to resolve the water problem with Syria and Iraq while considering the Euphrates
water as a national river and not an international one in contradiction to the international law emphasized a
kind of superiority in the Turkish conduct towards Arab countries especially in light of the ignorance of the
Syrian and Iraqi losses as a result of the Turkish projects on the Euphrates.
11

Regionalism is a notion that emerged on the elite’s political agenda in Turkey after the demise of the
Soviet Union in order to emphasize a change in the Turkish vital space that is no longer confined to its
borders but it extends towards its neighboring countries with whom Turkey started to adopt an active policy
in terms of engaging in bilateral agreements in various domains of cooperation.
12

The collective action mechanisms refer to initiatives that are taken by Turkey in terms of developing
regional institutions that enable the different countries to meet, exchange their points of view and adopt
collectively the necessary decisions that would enhance the regional condition and relations between
Turkey and the concerned Arab countries. The High Strategic Cooperation Council and the Arab-Turkish
Cooperation Forum are the main instances that highlight the notion of collective action through institutional
bodies that try to empower the regional ownership principle that consists of developing an active policy of
engagement with the different neighboring countries in order to solve the regional problems while
preventing any external intervention. These are instances where the different problems and concerns are
discussed and they aim to conclude different agreements and come up with general recommendations that
constitute a road map for improving the multilateral relations.
13

This approach dominated the Arab scholars’ position towards the mentality map of the Turkish ruling
elite since 1923 till the 1990’s where Turkey, according to some Arab scholars on the contrary to some
Turkish official and academic declarations about the Turkish neutrality in the Middle East, adopted an
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interventionist policy in alignment with its western alliances. This approach was defensive because it was
in reaction to changes that occurred in the elite’s structure and ideology that was, by its turn, reflected in
the Turkish attitude towards Arab countries. The Arab intellect underlined the Turkish alienation from its
Islamic roots and started to develop scholarly writings that accuse Turkey of being antagonist to Arab
countries both on the international and regional levels. Turkey voted against the UN resolution for the
declaration of the Algerian independence in 1962 and was the first Islamic country to recognize Israel in
1949. Besides, Turkey’s policy on the regional level was confined to geostrategic consideration that were
mainly related to the preservation of its territorial integrity and stability through intervention in case of the
emergence of a threat to its security by deploying threats and military forces either for deterrence or in
reaction to any attempt to violate its security like in the case of the Syrian support to the PKK. As a result,
by reading different scholarly books in the Arab world about Turkey, it would be easy to realize how they
emphasize the righteous of the Arabs’ position and causes and how Turkey deceived them by denying its
roots, aligning its policies and orientations to the West and deemphasizing its relations with Arab countries
while illustrating Arabs in a negative way in its national literatures since the beginning of the 20 th century.
14

This factor contributed to the psychological gap between Arab and Turks more on the public level than
one the political and intellectual one since different scholars in the Arab world called for the adoption of a
secular system in the Arab world especially in the aftermath of the nationalist wave in Arab countries
where the Sultanate was perceived as the main source of the Arab backwardness.
15

Some of these policies are related to his support for traditional lifestyles that were constrained by the
Turkish constitution in 1924 like the show of tolerance towards the Islamic practices, the opening of
thousands of mosques that were closed by the State and the legalization of the call for prayer in Arabic.
16

These links were implicitly manifested by the close relations between some political leaders in the ruling
party and some of figures that are members in these business associations
17

One of the new concepts that were associated with the active foreign policy under the rule of the AKP is
“the new (neo) ottomanism.” This concept emerged due to the Turkish investment of its historical, cultural
and religious bonds in the region in consolidating its relations with its neighbors that lie in the geographical
area of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, this multicultural heritage emphasized in the Turkish foreign policy
enabled Turkey to have more receptiveness from its neighboring countries in terms of extending its policy
on the political and economic levels with several countries in the Balkans, the Middle East and Eastern
Europe in addition to Central Asia.
18

This perception of change in foreign policy is interesting for analyzing the Arab policy of Turkey in light
of the rupture with the animosity that pertained between both sides and its substitution by a policy of amity.
The contrast between animosity and amity is illustrative since this perceptional shift implies a
destabilization in the foreign policy pattern followed by a stabilization that ensures better bilateral terms.
19

This approach fits with the power structure model in terms of determining how the policy making in a
political system would involve a variety of elite that take part into the formulation, the decision-making and
implementation of the different state policies. Hence, the elitist-pluralist approach is an explanatory subcategory among other approaches in analyzing how the power structure in a political system influences the
policy-making process.
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20

The redefinition of the Turkish foreign policy and the adoption of a multidimensional approach where
Turkey is perceived as a central geostrategic country influenced its trade. Therefore, the Turkish
exportations manifest a continuous increase from 2002 where they were 36 billion dollars by reaching 85.5
billion dollars in 2006 (The Turkish Exportation council (TIM), 2011). The visibility of the Turkish trade
and exports with new partners other than the Western ones like Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and
China is explained by the conformity of the Turkish foreign trade structure with the global economy
changes marked by the emergence of the Eastern markets since 1990’s rather than by a change of axis
(Babacan, 2010).
21

The supporters of this party mainly constitute a secular constituency that is not pleased with the Islamic
rhetoric deployed by the AKP in its foreign policy since they perceive it as a threat to their way of life.
Both the army and the opposition notably the Kemalists are concerned with the Turkish policy towards the
Arab countries since it’s an indicator of an increasing Islamic solidarity that threatens Turkey’s secular
character (I. Dagi, personal communication, 2011).
22

According to the vice president of the Saadet Party, Turkey should develop a common market policy by
encouraging investment with Arab countries in influential sectors like the steel industry that is according to
him the most important tool that would ensure the development of the Muslim world. However, the AKP’s
trade and investment flows are basically hot money that doesn’t improve infrastructure either in Turkey or
other in Islamic countries.
23

The regional vacuum refers to the absence of the leading role that was played by the traditional regional
powers especially Egypt which led to the lack of the regional balance between Arab and non Arab states
and the manifestation of power politics by Iran and Israel that threaten the regional stability especially in
light of the Arab countries’ inability to play an active role concerning the regional crises.
24

The respondents even went further by indicating that the US would prefer to have alliance with Turkey
rather than Israel in order to control the radical groups as well as Israel’s independent policy in the region.
According to them, the US doesn’t plan its foreign policy in compliance with the Israeli interests since its
power has limits in the region which implies that it has to rely on new regional powers like Turkey and
Egypt.
25

On the contrary to the nationalist discourse adopted by the previous regimes since the World War one,
Turkey started to reduce the nationalist fervor on the domestic scene which helped in alleviating the
psychological gap not only between the Arab states and Turkey on the official level but also between their
respective societies (E. Kelesoglu, personal communication, 2010).
26

According to Meliha Altunisik, professor of International Relations at the Middle East Technical
University, the Turkish policy towards the Middle East is institutionalized in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs due to the fact that it can’t be ignored in light of the economic benefits retrieved from it.
27

For example, the Islamist groups that participated in Mavi Marmara flotilla were openly against the
Israeli policy in Palestine and underlined the AKP sympathy towards Palestinians (Karaman, 2011).
28

Accordingly, the AKP policy manifests a sort of a role model for Arab societies through its position both
on the national and the international level. First, the party succeeded to combine between the liberal values
and its religious and conservative background in terms of realizing a visible economic development and a
political openness on the domestic scene especially regarding the religious rights. On the other hand, the
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party’s position in the region towards the Palestinian issue in Davos and in the aftermath of the Mavi
Marmara incidents has increased the party’s ability to address the public opinion.
29

One of these movements is the Fethullaci that has a strong existence in Turkey especially in Media where
a wide array of newspapers and TV stations are affiliated to the movement and endorse a religious
orientation in the Turkish society. The cultural dimension diffused by this movement supports the Turkish
foreign policy in spreading the cultural influence of Turkey on the regional and international levels
30

In light of the WTO statistics, Turkey occupied the 22 nd position in exports from 2004-2006 after being
the 25th in 2002. Besides, exports increased by 25.3% in 2007 and 23.1% in 2008 while the trade volume
was 107.2 billion dollars in 2007 and 132 billion dollars in 2008 (Babacan, 2010).
31

This information was confirmed by a businessman in MUSIAD who underlined the interplay between the
arrival of the AKP to power and the Iraqi war in increasing trade with neighboring countries like Northern
Iraq. Accordingly, in spite of the existing regional instability, trade reached 5 billion dollars and the
intermediate companies and NGOs that Turkey had in Iraq after 2003 have increased remarkably.
32

The Middle East is the second most important partner for the MUSIAD after the EU in terms of
importation and exportation especially Syria and Iran. The interviewed businessman underlined that the
AKP policy related to visa release and free trade agreements between Turkey and neighboring countries
increased tourism and stimulated trade especially in light of the stable economy in Turkey.
33

In spite of the importance of the European and the American markets for Turkey, there is a preference to
look for different markets in neighboring countries in light of the high competitiveness that the Turkish
products face and the obstacles that impede the businessmen to have an easy access to the European
markets like the visa procedures (Kirisci, 2011). Besides, the need of the Arab markets are much more than
those of the European and the American ones especially in products where Turkey has a comparative
advantage more than Arab countries like electronics, machinery and construction.
34

The EU is the first trade partner for Turkey in light of the increase of the industrial sector’s weight in its
exports by being 115.2 billion dollars in 2008 (The Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), 2011). The exports
to the EU in 2008 were 63.4 billion dollars and occupied 48 % of the total Turkish exports with an increase
of 4.9% (TUIK, 2011). However, since the 2000’s, Turkey’s exports to the Middle East in general and to
the Gulf Cooperation council in particular as well as to African countries manifested a visible increase
(Babacan, 2010).
35

The increasing rates of FDI, the revenues generated from privatization, mergers and acquisitions
constitute an important source of economic growth in Turkey.
36

Accordingly, the 1980’s and 1990’s were marked by a rapprochement with Arab countries under the rule
of the center right parties (the ANAP and the Right Path Party) that needed to rally Islamic groups among
their constituency and the state bureaucracy (Onis, 1997 and M. Ozcan, personal communication, 2011).
On the other hand, at the time of the Cypriot crisis in 1964-1965, Turkey tried to gain the support of Arab
countries at the UN General Assembly for a resolution that condemns Greece and calls for the partition of
the Island.
37

The active foreign policy adopted by Turkey since 2002 is justified according to some figures in the AKP
by the confidence that the party gained on the national level in terms of empowering its position and
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gaining the necessary public support. The AKP domestic empowerment vis-à-vis the different secular
establishment was manifested by some changes that were undertaken in the different core institutions of the
State like the constitutional court and the Higher Education Council where many of their members are proAKP in addition to the presidential post that was occupies by Gul since 2007.
38

These incidents consisted of a humanitarian assistance sent by an Islamic organization (IHH) for
Palestinians who were under siege in Gaza.
39

These policies consisted of creating alliances in order to counterbalance any potential external threat in
terms of ensuring neighboring countries’ neutrality or amity towards Turkey.
40

Regional responsibility means that Turkey as a regional country has to develop an active role that stems
from its new foreign policy principles “proactivism” and “Zero problems with neighbors” in order to
prevent crises escalation and enable a pacific resolution of the different problems between its neighbors to
ensure peace and stability in its surroundings.
41

For example, this respondent indicated that Turkey refused to vote for a UN resolution that condemns
Iran which put its interests with the West at stake. At the conference of Lisbon that took place in June 2010,
Turkey refused to accept the anti-missile convention if it would explicitly mention some terms against
Iran’s nuclear program. Such an attitude wasn’t that visible at the time of the traditional elite since the
foreign policy tended to be neutral especially if Western allies are involved in the question of concern.
42

On the contrary to the CHP that thinks that the Turkish policy towards Arab countries would distant
Turkey from its Western ties, the AKP perceives its Arab policy as complementary aspect in its external
conduct notably towards the EU that brings more liberalization and democratization to Turkey while the
Arab countries increase Turkey’s political power on the regional and the international levels (M. Ozcan,
personal communication, 2011).
43

New Ottomanism is a concept that emphasizes Turkey’s assertive diplomacy within the limits of the
Ottoman Empire with which it shares common identity, culture and values that imply it to intervene for
regional stability and the increase of mutual interest.
44

In addition, although the AKP was associated with Islam, its policies are different from Islam. Its leaders
are conservatives and practicing Muslims but on the contrary to former Islamist parties, the AKP doesn’t
refer to Islam in the foreign policy formulation. Islam is reinvested as a cultural dimension of the Turkish
identity and conciliated with its Western character which constitutes a considerable potential in Turkey’s
policy in the Middle East.
45

Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Turkey condemned the double-standard policy adopted by the
international community towards the Weapons of Massive Destruction question in the Middle East and
called for a just policy that refuses the possession of nuclear weapons by any regional country. The same
position was adopted in the Palestinian issue after the Gaza war and in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara
incidents where the Israeli policies where openly criticized by the AKP in international instances.
46

The development of a new mission for Turkey as a central country responsible for the regional stability
through the deployment of a proactive policy towards crises illustrates a pragmatic character that was
intermingled with a nationalist and Islamic fervor in Mavi Marmara incidents where Turkish citizens
affiliated to an Islamic civil organization were killed on their way for saving Palestinians.
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47

Most of these soft power tools consist of diplomacy on both the political and public levels, economic
interdependence and cooperation on the regional level.
48

The military power is decreasing and therefore it tries to develop better relations with the AKP especially
in light of the formulation of a new constitution for the Turkish Republic in which the army is looking
forward having more rights (E. Mahcupyan, personal communication, 2011).
49

By referring to the AKP as the sole decision-maker, it is meant to underline that it is the party’s ideology
and stance that dominates the decision-making process. The same applies to the policy-making although
other actors like public opinion, businessmen and some think tanks influence this process, since the weight
of conservative civil societies including humanitarian and charity organizations as well as businessmen
associations support the AKP policy in light of the economic prosperity, the political openness and the
increase of public freedom on the domestic level.
50

This stance was adopted by the army as a result of the alleviation of the security threats on the national
level especially after the capture of Ocalan. Besides, in light of the weakening of the military position after
the adoption of the EU reforms and the successive cases that condemned some military officers for their
involvement in a planed coup d’état against the AKP, the military tries to avoid confrontation with the
ruling party while aiming to be accorded more competencies in the new constitution. By being more
concerned with the national security on the domestic level, the military may adopt a harder stance once the
emergence of a potential threat on the external level would shake the state’s national integrity and security.
51

Different members in the AKP underlines the necessity to keep the Turkish-Israeli relations at a normal
level without having a specific privilege or priority in the Turkish regional policy as in 1996 where a
strategic alliance took place.
52

Turkey has an active and visible role as mentioned before in regional and international organizations by
being responsible towards its neighbors as well as the different countries by raising their cases of suffering
and injustice in these multilateral instances. This policy is not only followed by state officials but also is
complemented by many civil societies actors in Turkey which are involved in providing material help and
support for needy countries and communities around the world. Therefore, this active policy is a direct and
concrete expression of the rhythmic policy in terms of developing a visible and outreaching diplomacy on
the international level which empowers Turkey as a global actor.
53

The Turkish activism on the external is manifested by a proactive and multidimensional policy adopted
towards the different countries around the World where Turkey acts as a global power that intervenes in the
different international issues through a wide array of actors that extends from the government to NGOs.
However, according to Mr.Davutoglu’s vision, the Turkish regional policy is mainly addressing the
countries that lie in the geographical area that coincides with the borders of the Ottoman Empire except for
Iran, Morrocco and Mauritania (K. Balci, personal communication, 2011).
54

This transnational look refers to the adoption of an inclusive approach that is not only confined to the
national concerns but also entails those expressed by the neighboring countries in a way where Turkey
adopts a stance that underlines a sense of collectivity in formulating its regional policy. Hence, it
emphasizes the abandon of the nationalist discourse especially towards Arab countries which led to an
ideological transformation that alleviated mutual prejudices between both sides. The Islamic character of
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the AKP helped in the development of this transnational dimension in the Turkish policy on the regional
level in general and among Arab countries in particular.
55

The region destiny is a term that is used by M. Davutoglu in his book and his public speeches in
reference to the Turkish foreign policy potential in developing a preventive dynamic that aims to limit the
regional insecurities and instabilities by intervening at the earliest stages of crises instead of being a
reactive policy that seeks remedies to regional unrests. Here the word regional destiny refers to the extent
to which the Turkish foreign policy manifests an outward activism that assigns considerable importance to
the whole developments that occur in Turkey’s neighborhood which implies the necessity to intervene to
prevent the escalation of the regional problems into serious crises. Therefore, the regional management in
terms of preventing crises and solving problems at their earliest stages in the neighboring regions is
referred to as “the regional common destiny” since any problem that would start in any country in the
region would have a spillover effect on the others which underlines the notion of commonality that not only
includes sharing problems’ effects but also their prevention through the regional cooperation mechanisms.
56

An economic forum was hosted in Turkey and gathered Central Asian and Arab countries that held a
multilateral discussion about the construction of oil pipelines that would pass from these countries to
Turkey in order to be sold to Europe. Here the idea of mediation is crystallized in a different dimension
where Turkey doesn’t only promote reconciliation between belligerent countries but also acts as a central
hub for energy transfer across regions.
57

According to this respondent who is an MP and member in the AK party committee of foreign affairs, if
people can cross borders easily, trade, tourism and common policies would be better and easily developed
and formulated between Turkey and Arab countries (O. Turkone, personal communication, 2011).
58

The Turkish exports tripled between 2000-2009 in the Middle East especially towards Lebanon and
Northern Iraq where in the latter the Turkish products constituted 80% of the goods in the local market.
59

The Turkish exports to the Middle East went from 9% to 18% from 2002 to 2009 and hence represent
20% of the Turkish trade relations.
60

Turkey perceives itself as a center that creates circles around it; hence, Turkey focuses on the Middle
East as the source of its power in other regions like Europe, Africa, Caucasus and Balkans where Turkey
tries to create a securitized energy corridor (A. Karabat, personal communication, 2011).
61

A clear example of managing regional problem is Iraq for which Turkey utilized its presence in
international institutions in order to plead for the preservation of the Iraqi unity and stability. Besides, it
initiated the Iraq Neighboring Countries Process in 2003 that was enlarged afterwards to entail the P5, the
G8, the Arab League, the OIC, the UN and the European Commission in order to bring together the
ministers of Iraq and its neighboring countries for consultations, helped the Sunni to integrate the Iraqi
elections in 2005 and enabled the different belligerent parties to meet and talk together (Aras and Akpinar,
2010).
62

The Zero problems with neighbors principle conceived by the Turkish foreign policy as an ultimate
vision seems for some respondents to be violated by the Turkish leadership attitude in the region towards
Israel where an open confrontation after the war on Gaza and the Mavi Marmara incidents had many
negative drawbacks on the Turkish policy by rendering too idealistic to cope with the regional reality.
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63

According to an influential respondent in the MFA, Turkey is against the adoption of an ethnic or
sectarian policy in the region. However, in Iraq and in response to the Iranian support to Shiite politicians
in the parliamentary elections, Turkey supported the Sunni political leaders while inciting them to stop their
abstentionist policy and take part into the political life in Iraq.
64

The social relations are materialized by the creation of a series of a cultural center “Yunus Emre” in
different countries and regions surrounding Turkey. Besides, Turkey highlights the humanitarian dimension
in its regional policy towards Arab and African countries through the mobilization of some economic
institutions and conservative civil society organizations.
65

Here a respondent from the MFA compared the Turkish role in conciliating between different parties
through mediation to the role of a commonwealth power that is keen to preserve its ties and influences with
the old colonies. Some illustrative cases for this mediation in addition to the Turkish role in facilitating the
Israeli-Syrian talks is the facilitation between Arab countries and Iran where Turkey gathered the Iraqi
neighbors for discussing possible solutions for containing the Iraqi instability as well as between Islamic
countries like the ECO Summit that took place at the end of 2010 in Istanbul between Iran, Turkey,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian countries where Turkey brought together Iran and Pakistan after
the occurrence of a mosque blast in Iran where Afghanistan was accused of being reluctant in fighting al
Qaeda members (Aljazeera, 2011).
66

Here the notion of regional integration as advocated by M. Davutoglu didn’t have a precise definition and
seemed instead as a term that underlines the potential of creating better relations on different levels without
having a particular final vision to be attained or achieved. Accordingly, some academic respondents
highlighted that the main goal of the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East is to integrate this region’s
countries into the world economy through the development of an economic interdependence between these
different countries and Turkey that has already achieved a high ranking position in terms of economic
development by being among the 20 largest economies in the world.
67

With the Levant states like Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey developed an economic integration
framework for cooperation by the conclusion of a quadrilateral free trade agreement. Besides, the Iraq’s
neighborhood initiative on the foreign and the interior ministries’ level was promoted as an additional
leverage for regional management (M. Altunisik, personal communication, 2011).
68

The Adana protocol is a bilateral agreement signed between Turkey and Syria where Syria renounced to
provide any help or assistance to the Kurdish militants from the PKK and declared its engagement with
Turkey in fighting its elements by establishing a security system on the borders and a direct contact
between the high level security authorities from both sides.
69

Erbakan’s policy was badly received by Arab countries which was manifested by his visit to Egypt and
Libya where the leaders of both regimes in 1996 criticized Turkey especially in the former for Erbakan’s
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and its advocacy for according them more rights in Egypt.
70

According to a Turkish ambassador who served in Syria in the 1990’s, the Syrian-Turkish conflict over
the Euphrates’ water basin constituted a persistent barrier between Turkey and different Arab countries that
took side with Syria in its water conflict with Turkey.
71

The Sunnite factor is considered by many academic writings in Turkey as an element that favored the
rapprochement between Turkey and several Arab countries especially on the Public level. Different
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academicians didn’t hesitate to highlight the Iranian danger in terms of dominating the region through the
so called the Shiite Crescent by supporting Shiite elements in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Gulf Countries, Iraq
and Lebanon and also because of its nuclear program. Besides, in spite of the fact that the official level in
Turkey tries to avoid any reference to a sectarian or an ethnic tendency in its policies, some journalists
emphasize the Sunni character of the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East especially towards Syria
and Iraq where the Sunni are alienated from power and where Shiite and Alevi dominate the political
system (Hurriyet, 2011). Besides, according to a prominent Turkish journalist, many Arab countries fear
the Iranian threat and need Turkey to counterbalance it especially in light of its development of a nuclear
program.
72

Turkey continues its water provision to Syria according to the terms of the protocol that was signed with
Syria in 1987 according to which Turkey provides an amount of 500 m/s to Syria. In 2009, Turkey signed 4
memorandums of Understanding with Syria for the construction of a joint dam “the Friendship Dam” on
the Orontes River, the establishment of a pumping station in Syria and for the efficient utilization of water
resources as well as the remediation of water quality. Besides, there is “Al Asi Dam project” that consists
of a common initiative undertaken by both sides for a better management of water resources.
73

The Syrian poor economic performance and the leadership change after the death of Al Assad father
pushed for the necessity to start reforms in Syria in order to strengthen the regime credibility that was
weakened in light of the emerging domestic demands that call for a more democratization. In addition to
the regime’s fragility after Al Assad death, Al Hariri’s assassination was another conjuncture that increased
the international community pressure on Syria to change not only its national policy but also its regional
one in order to end its isolation. Therefore, Turkey by taking the initiative for a rapprochement with Syria
in 2000, the existing circumstances at that time allowed for the betterment of their bilateral relations and
the decrease of the Syrian isolation especially on the regional level. Accordingly, Syria started to have
intense economic relations with Turkey and negotiated some projects for gas exportation to Europe through
Turkey in addition to launching indirect talks with Israel.
74

The different paradigm refers to the change that occurred in the elite’s mental map towards the Kurdish
issue. Throughout long decades, the ruling elite in Turkey considered the Kurdish factor as a main threat to
the national security of the state and deployed repression and covert missions in countering the Kurdish
activists. However, this perception has changed especially after the capture of the PKK leader and the
adoption of the liberalizing reforms imposed by the EU. The AKP has proceeded to a democratic openness
towards Kurds where more cultural rights and freedom of expression were accorded to them. By the
improvement of the democratic conditions in Turkey where the civil-military relations where reconfigured
in accordance with the liberal democracy where the supremacy is for the people’s choice incarnated by the
rule of the government, the end of the Kurdish threat as well as the Syrian support to their operations
against Turkey, the need for a strategic alignment didn’t have a reason to exist anymore. This IsraeliTurkish alliance was a reason for the superficial and confrontational relations between Syria and Turkey
due to the fact that parts of the former’s lands were and are still occupied by Israel. On the other hand, the
Turkish Israeli relations underlined the western orientation of the Turkish establishment which contradicts
with the Syrian rejectionist policy in the region.
75

In 2010, Syria arrested 20 people who were convicted of being involved in suicide-bombing operations
that attacked synagogues and HSBC bank in Istanbul and delivered them to Turkey.
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76

The GAP project is an initiative that dates back from the 1980’s and aims for the elimination of
development inequalities between the different regions in Turkey. GAP is an acronym that stands for
“Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi” in Turkish which means the South Eastern Anatolian project that was
launched for 9 cities located on the Tigris and Euphrates basins in South Eastern Turkey in order to
increase their production and employment capabilities as well as enhancing their economic and social
conditions through the creation of 22 dams and 19 power plants. This project is mainly based on the
utilization of the Tigris and Euphrates water for generating electricity and improving irrigation, agriculture
as well as the infrastructure of the rural areas in the South Eastern region. The Turkish needs for
development were confronted by a Syrian and an Iraqi demand for more water for irrigating agricultural
lands that constitute the main source of revenue for both countries which created tensions between Turkey
from one side and Syria and Iraq from the other side.
77

Most of these mechanisms consist of the Joint Economic Commission, the Industry Follow-up
Committee, the Business Council and the Joint Commission for Land Transportation.
78

Both countries signed a treaty of visa release in November 2009.
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The president of the Chamber of commerce in Gaziantep underlined the importance of the Turkish
openness towards Syria since it would allow Turkey to bridge the gap between the Arab free trade zone and
the EU custom union.
80

Most of the respondents referred to the Turkish mediation as a kind of facilitation that Turkey provides
for belligerent countries in terms of conciliating between them and inciting them to talk together in order to
solve their problems through peaceful means. By limiting its policies into defined areas of interests like
economy, political rapprochement and dialogue as well as mediation in the neighborhood, Turkey would be
able to act as an acceptable and welcomed regional power. However, if these zones of interest turn into
some extended ambitions of influence and control over the region, Turkey might be trapped into a security
dilemma in the Middle East since any attempt of leadership or ideological, anti western or Islamic role
would be opposed by many Arab countries that are keen to preserve their ties with global powers.
Accordingly, for the mediation role if it would turn from a facilitation platform to an anti-western arena,
Turkey won’t be able to pursue its policy due to the objection that would raise not only from some regional
countries especially the Gulf ones but also the US (Kardas, 2010).
81

The respondent mentioned this factor as an incentive that would motivate the European Union to admit
Turkey as a member. Besides, he added that this factor could also be considered as an asset that would
enable Turkey to be a self-sufficient power on the international and regional levels and that is no more in
need for being a member in the EU.
82

The bargaining power according to different scholars in Turkey refers to the Turkish ability to overcome
the different obstacles that impede its accession to the EU through the development of strong ties with Arab
countries. By multiplying its economic relations with the Middle East, Turkey would be managing different
issues related to the European security like the migration issue, underdevelopment and authoritarianism in
Arab countries as well as securitizing the energy corridor since Turkey is a central hub in transporting the
natural resources from the East notably Arab countries to Europe and the west. The Turkish rapprochement
with Arab countries deals with each of these issues since Turkey for many Arab countries is considered as
role model state especially in light of the ties it develops on the public level through official and social
actors who have direct contact with people in the different surrounding countries. On the other hand,
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Turkey has multiplied its cultural and economic agreements with different countries in the neighborhood in
various fields which contributes to the increase of the development level in the Middle East which would
decrease the illegal migration and terrorist threats that emanate from the region (Demir, 2010; Aydin and
Acikmese, 2007 and Evin, 2003).
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According to the notion of regional responsibility coined by M. Davutoglu, Turkey aims to achieve
stability and peace in the region through the deployment of the aforementioned principles of the Turkish
foreign policy. Among these principles figures the establishment of strong neighboring ties in the regions
that surround Turkey in order to diffuse the different threats that may harm its security. By developing
better relations with Syria, Turkey would be able to reduce the regional tension that is due to the Syrian
isolation from the international community and ties with Iran. Hence, not only would Turkey reduce the
probability of a Syrian support to the PKK but also by having good relations with Syria, Turkey would be
able to enhance the former’s relations with the international community and reduce the Iranian influence on
its leadership. As a result, by having good neighboring relations with the different countries and
maintaining dialogue with them regardless their religious affinities or ethnicities, Turkey would take part
into the preservation of the power balance in the region. According to Hurriyet, many Arab countries are
afraid of the Iranian nuclear program and the probability of its development into a nuclear weapon that
would threat the whole region in particular Gulf countries, Egypt and Jordan which make them support a
Turkish balancing role versus Iran. On the other hand, the US has a declining role in Iraq and needs to
control the nuclear program which was ensured through the installation of the anti-missiles shield on the
Turkish territories after the NATO summit in Lisbon that was held in late 2010. Therefore, by having a
rapprochement with Syria from one side and developing a cautious policy towards Iran by accepting the
NATO summit decision, Turkey would balance the perceived Iranian threat in order to prevent a SunniShiite clash which the Turkish leadership tried to avoid the most (Hurriyet, 2011).
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As mentioned before, Turkey by refusing the sectarian policies tries to prevent the occurrence of a SunniShiite clash in the region by pursuing an active and dynamic diplomacy through talks and mediation. Iran
by being perceived as a threat by the US, Israel and some Arab countries, may not be perceived the same
by Turkey but this doesn’t deny the fact that Iran, for many analysts and academicians in Turkey, is a
potential threat for the whole region including Turkey, through its persistent support to Shiite elements in
the Middle East and its nuclear program. Therefore, in order to maintain the regional balance, Turkey is
keen to preserve its ties with Iran, Syria as well as all the neighboring countries. Accordingly, here the
respondent emphasizes the priority of common interests between Turkey, Iran and Syria in spite of some
differences between them especially on the sectarian policy deployed by the Iranian regime in Iraq in terms
of supporting Shiite factions which contradicts with the Turkish stance that refuses to develop cooperation
and ties based on ethnic or sectarian relations.
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The Syrian isolation on the international scene and the worsening of its relations with the US since 1981
was due to its relations with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, its interference in Lebanon, its opposition to the
Iraqi war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US-Syrian tensions culminated by the rise of Al intifada in
2000, the assassination of Al Hariri and the US invasion of Iraq and hence increased the Syrian political
isolation and the economic restrictions imposed on it (Aljazeera, 2011).
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The other factors are related to the decrease of the sectarian violence in Iraq as well as the limitation of
the Syrian influence in Lebanon especially in light of the US, EU and Saudi weakness in countering the
Syrian influence in Lebanon that were underlined in the Doha agreement concluded in 2008.
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